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INTRODUCTION
Without proof of force, actual or constructive, evidenced by words or
conduct of the defendant... , sexual intercourse is not rape. This is so
even though the intercourse may have occurred without the actual con-
sent and against the actual will of the alleged victim.'
The outrage upon the woman, and the injury to society, is just as great in
these cases as if actual force had been employed; and we have been
unable to satisfy ourselves that the act can be said to be any less against
the will of the woman when her consent is obtained by fraud, than when
it is extorted by threats or force.2
For more than a century, courts,3 legislatures,4 and legal com-
mentators5  have struggled with the controversial and highly
charged question of whether accomplishing sexual intercourse by
means of fraud or coercion is blameworthy and appropriately con-
demnable as rape." In 1986 Professor Susan Estrich's suggested that
' Goldberg v. State, 395 A.2d 1213, 1219-20 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979). But see
Janet E. Findlater, Reexamining the Law of Rape, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1356, 1360 (1988)(commenting on Goldberg: "What sense can one make of this paradox: The victim was
not forced to have sexual intercourse, but she had sexual intercourse against her will
and without her consent?").
2 People v. Crosswell, 13 Mich. 427, 437 (1865) (involving sexual intercourse with
insane woman); see also Pomeroy v. State, 94 Ind. 96, 102 (1883) (quoting this passage
from Crosswell).
' See. e.g., Lewis v. State, 30 Ala. 54 (1857) (husband impersonation); People v.
Cavanaugh, 158 P. 1053 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2d 1916) (police impersonation); Don
Moran v. People, 25 Mich. 356 (1872) (fraudulent medical treatment); Bloodworth v.
State, 65 Tenn. 614 (1872) (sham marriage); Limbaugh v. Commonwealth, 140 S.E. 133(Va. 1927) (criminal seduction); Regina v. Clarence, (1888) 22 Q.B.D. 23 (concealment
of venereal disease).
4 See, e.g., MICH. CoMP. LAws § 750.90 (1996) (fraudulent medical treatment statute
passed in 1883); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-503 (1997) (update of 1870 husband imper-
sonation provision); see also Jane E. Larson, "Even a Worm Will Turn at Last'. Rape
Reform in Late Nineteenth-Century America, 9 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 20-21 (1997)[hereinafter Even a Worm] (discussing age-of-consent campaign as first rape reform and
noting "[w]ith strengthened statutory rape laws, convictions could be achieved in the
kinds of factual pattems that otherwise did not meet unreformed definitions of forcible
rape, so long as the victim was young.").
s See, e.g., J.H. Beale, Jr., Consent in the Criminal Law, 8 HARv. L. REv. 317(1895) (discussing rape by fraud); H.W. Humble, Seduction as a Crime, 21 COLUM. L.
REv. 144 (1921) (same); Emst Wilfred Puttkammer, Consent in Rape, 19 U. ILL. L. REV.
410 (1925) (same).
6 The question is not unique to this time period or the Anglo-American legal tradi-
tion. Socrates is quoted as saying: "Then again, the very fact that he uses not force but
persuasion makes him more detestable, because a lover who uses force proves himself a
villain, but one who uses persuasion ruins the character of the one who consents.'
[Vol. 64: 1
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rape law should "prohibit fraud to secure sex to the same extent we
prohibit fraud to secure money, and prohibit extortion to secure sex
to the same extent we prohibit extortion to secure money."7 Such
suggestion spawned the latest cycle of discussion about this age-old
conundrum in the American legal academic community.8 As the
cases proliferate and the intellectual debate in response to Estrich's
suggestion rages on, state legislatures, riding the successive waves
of rape reform of the 1950s and 1970s, 9 have been quietly enact-
ing a comprehensive array of criminal statutes outlawing multiple
forms of sexual offenses committed by fraudulent or coercive
means.
The potential criminalization of rape by fraud and rape by
coercion is, however, a difficult and troublesome legal development
for a myriad of reasons." ° First, cases involving such acts pose sig-
nificant definitional challenges for the crime of rape, inevitably
implicating the debate over whether it is a crime of violence or a
sexual offense" and the concomitant issue of the proper function
of rape law as either protecting citizens' physical security or, more
broadly, sexual autonomy. 2 Second, because these cases generally
XENOPHON, CONVERSATIONS OF SOCRATES 260 (1990) (footnote indicates penalties for rape
were less severe than those for adultery under Athenian law).
' Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1120 (1986); see also SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL
RAPE: How THE LEGAL SYSTEM VICTIMIZES WOMEN WHO SAY No (1987).
" See, e.g., Vivian Berger, Not So Simple Rape, 6 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 69 (Winter-
Spring 1988) (reviewing SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE (1987)); Donald A. Dripps, Beyond
Rape: An Essay on the Difference Between the Presence of Force and the Absence of
Consent, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1780 (1992) [hereinafter Beyond Rape]; Findlater, supra
note 1; Lynne N. Henderson, What Makes Rape a Crime?, 3 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 193
(1987-88) (reviewing SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE); Dorothy E. Roberts, Rape, Violence, and
Women's Autonomy, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 359 (1993); Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Femi-
nist Challenge in Criminal Law, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 2151 (1995) [hereinafter Feminist
Challenge].
" See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Taking Sexual Autonomy Seriously: Rape Law and
Beyond, 11 LAw & PHIL 35, 36-40 (1992) [hereinafter Sexual Autonomy].
10 See, e.g., Dripps, Beyond Rape, supra note 8, at 1802 (One vexatious prob-
lem . . . involves misrepresentations that cause sexual cooperation."); Stephen J.
Schulhofer, The Gender Question in Criminal Law, 7 Soc. PHIL & POL'Y 105, 135
(1990) [hereinafter Gender Question] ("Perhaps the hardest set of problems in this area
concerns the question of when fraud or misrepresentation should invalidate consent.').
" See infra Part III.A.
12 See also infra Part III.A.; Lucy Reed Harris, Comment, Towards a Consent Stan-
dard in the Law of Rape, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 613, 644 (1976) ('Although the force
element has traditionally furthered the policy of physical protection, as well as serving
an evidentiary function, the role of fraud in rape law demonstrates that freedom of
sexual choice rather than physical protection is the primary value served by
criminalization of rape.').
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involve factual scenarios in which physical force is absent and
consent, in some form, is present, they strike at the doctrinal heart
of rape law,'3 raising issues like: the appropriate relationship be-
tween the elements of force and nonconsent,4 the necessity of
physical force," and the parameters of legally effective consent. 16
Third, discussion of these offenses often "trigger[s] common preju-
dices about the behavior of men and women in sexual encoun-
ters" 7 and reinvigorates colloquy about rape victims' culpability 8
and trustworthiness, 9 deflecting attention from what should be the
real question-the criminality of defendants' conduct. In short,
consideration of these offenses pushes the envelope of rape law's
function in regulating the outermost limits of sexual encounters in
our society.
Part I of this Article collects and analyzes the surprisingly large
body of criminal cases in which courts have struggled with the
difficult question of whether to criminally punish defendants' use of
'" Rape had four basic elements: (1) sexual intercourse, (2) with a woman not the
defendant's wife, (3) by force or threat of force, and (4) without her consent or against
her will. Harris, supra note 12, at 613.
See infra Part III.A.
i See infra Part III.A.
16 See infra Part III.B.
17 Martha Chamallas, Consent, Equality, and the Legal Control of Sexual Conduct, 61
S. CAL. L. REv. 777, 832 (1988).
"o Author Joel Feinberg comments:
Of course, if an occasional nonneurotic but uneducated, trusting woman faith-
fully obeys the instructions of her deceitful gynecologist, . . . she would find
few persons in these enlightened days to give her sympathy. Again the old
attitudes of caveat emptor would surface. 'If she is that stupid, she deserves
what she gets' are words that come easily to many lips. . . .But negligent or
not, stupid or not, she could have been severely harmed by her experience
and subject to the pains of depression, shame, loss of self-esteem, and tortured
conscience, if not pregnancy and more obvious harms. . . . After all, people
do not forfeit their rights simply by being ignorant or naively trusting, and
even stupid people-especially stupid people-can be taken advantage of and
harmed.
Joel Feinberg, Victims' Excuses: The Case of Fraudulently Procured Consent, 96 ETHICS
330, 337 (1986); see also James A. Durham, Forcible and Statutory Rape: An Explora-
tion of the Operation and Objectives of the Consent Standard, 62 YALE LJ. 55, 63(1952) ("The rarity of these cases today may be partly explained by the difficulty of pre-
senting a convincing picture of such grossly impeded comprehension to skeptical jurors;
the scene depicted may resemble more an artful seduction than forcible intercourse.");
Chamallas, supra note 17, at 832 (noting victims of sexual fraud may be less
sympathetic).
'9 Harris, supra note 12, at 628 ("Scholarly discussion on consent in rape gelled in
an era when legal thinkers were emotionally distrustful of rape complaints in general,
but were fascinated by cases where consent was allegedly induced by subterfuge.').
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fraud or coercion in accomplishing sexual penetration or contact.
Commonly, rape by fraud cases encompass instances of fraud in
medical and other treatment contexts, false impersonation, sexual
scams, and sexual theft; rape by coercion cases involve the abuse of
authority and sexual extortion. Many of the courts in these cases
have held that the defendants' behavior, although reprehensible,
failed to satisfy either the force or nonconsent elements of rape.
Frustrated by the lack of coverage of existing rape statutes, however,
several of these courts have asked their respective legislatures to
enact new criminal provisions to subsume this conduct.
Part II of this Article surveys current legislation and reveals a
comprehensive battery of state criminal statutes prohibiting various
forms of rape by fraud or rape by coercion. These statutes fall into
five categories, those that: (1) punish criminal actors who abuse
positions of trust or (2) positions of authority to secure sexual com-
pliance, (3) specifically outlaw the use of fraud or deception, (4)
substitute coercion and other types of nonphysical pressures for the
force requirement, and (5) prohibit nonconsensual intercourse with-
out reference to force, fraud, or coercion. The unitary concept of
forcible rape has given birth to a host of offspring differing in sub-
stantive content and corresponding more closely to the varied be-
havior of sex offenders.
Part III of this Article explores the two doctrinal elements of
traditional rape law-force and nonconsent-in the context of sexu-
al offenses accomplished by fraud or coercion. First, this part ad-
dresses three major sets of objections to the expansion of the force
requirement in rape law or its substitution by fraud or coercion and
concludes that criminal law should punish both violent and nonvio-
lent forms of rape. Second, because the nonconsent issue in rape
law is a vast topic upon which countless courts and commentators
have written, this Part considers the narrower question of how to
distinguish effective and ineffective consent in rape cases involving
fraud or coercion. This Article concludes that the critical question is
no longer if rape law should prohibit sexual conduct secured by
fraud or coercion, but rather when (or under what circumstances)
such behavior merits criminal sanction.
A few definitional points are in order before proceeding. First, I
retain the term "rape" largely for rhetorical reasons. Although its use
may be inconsistent with dictionary definitions," potentially
' See Schulhofer, Sexual Autonomy, supra note 9, at 59-60.
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trivialize forcible rape," and inaccurately reflect current statutory
enactments that employ designations such as criminal sexual pene-
tration and sexual assault, 2 I believe it conveys the appropriate
level of blameworthiness and criminality for this conduct.23 "Sexu-
al predation" might be preferable except for its conflicting usage in
contemporary sexual predator laws.24 Second, I use the term "rape
by fraud" as a shorthand expression for all criminal cases in which
the defendant has accomplished sexual intercourse by any type of
fraud, deception, misrepresentation, impersonation, or other strata-
gem. Finally, I employ "rape by coercion" as a catch-all term for
any cases in which the criminal actor deployed nonphysical pres-
sures, such as a position of authority, extortion, or other threats, to
secure sexual compliance.
1. CASES OF RAPE BY FRAUD OR RAPE BY COERCION: "DR. FEELGOOD,"
"THE FANTASY MAN," AND "THE ABOMINABLE SNOWMAN"
The use or threat of physical violence is just one way men force women
they know to have sex with them. Men also use other kinds of threats,
such as to leave women stranded, to publicly humiliate them, and to fire
them from their jobs. And men obtain sex by fraud; they lie to women,
intentionally creating situations that frighten women into submitting to sex
without a fight.2"
21 See infra Part III.A.
22 See infra Part II.
23 See also Estrich, Rape, supra note 7, at 1183 (arguing that sex obtained by fraud
or extortion should still be called rape because of "the injury to personal integrity in-
volved in forced sex.").
2 See Lea VanderVelde, The Legal Ways of Seduction, 48 STAN. L. REV. 817, 818
n.2 (1996) ("By 'sexual predation,' I mean acts of sex which exploited women, including
rape, coerced sex, sex based on deceptive representations, or sex that opportunistically
took advantage of a woman's reproductive vulnerability. . . ."); see also People v. Evans,
85 Misc.2d 1088, 1098, 379 N.Y.S.2d 912, 921 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1975) (describing
defendant as predator); Jane E. Larson, "Women Understand so Little, They Call My
Good Nature 'Deceit'": A Feminist Rethinking of Seduction, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 374,
453 (1993) [hereinafter Women Understand] ("[T]here is neither a principled nor a prag-
matic basis for regulating the sexual sphere so as to permit more predatory conduct than
is tolerated in the marketplace."). In the final analysis, disagreements about terminology
should not take precedence over consideration of whether to punish the underlying
conduct.
25 Findlater, supra note 1, at 1363-64 (footnotes omitted).
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There exists a remarkably large and diverse body of criminal"'
cases involving defendants' use of fraud or coercion in accomplish-
ing sexual intercourse, with many sharply disagreeing about the
propriety of punishing such conduct as rape or sexual assault."
The case law is a logical and appropriate starting point because
courts are the first battleground upon which disputes are waged
about whether to criminalize rape by fraud or coercion. The legal
analysis and reasoning in the following legal opinions provide the
fodder for subsequent legislative innovation28 and doctrinal com-
mentary.29
Although arising in multiple jurisdictions (some even in foreign
countries) with different rape or sexual assault statutes, three com-
mon themes emerge from the following case law review. First,
courts in rape by fraud or coercion cases have generally adopted an
approach characterized by judicial conservatism and strict statutory
construction. Hanging their doctrinal hats on either the force or
nonconsent prongs of traditional rape law, courts have often been
reluctant to move beyond the literal wording of a jurisdiction's rape
statute and explore alternative doctrinal avenues. For example, with
respect to the force element, courts could have considered the
applicability of the doctrine of constructive force, developed in
burglary law, to subsume instances of fraudulent, nonforcible break-
ing to rape law.3" Similarly, in the consent context, courts perpetu-
ated the problematic distinction between fraud in the factum (mis-
take as to the act itself) and fraud in the inducement (mistake about
the reason for doing the act)3' in lieu of more critically examining
the types of fraudulent inducements that impugn the voluntariness
2 For the most part, I omit civil cases. For discussions of some of these cases, see
Larson, Women Understand, supra note 24; VanderVelde, supra note 24; Michael R.
Flaherty, Annotation, Improper or Immoral Sexually .Related Conduct Towards Patient as
Ground for Disciplinary Action Against Physician, Dentist, or Other Licensed Healer, 59
A.L.R. 4TH 1104 (1988 & Supp. 1997); Brendan de R. O'Byme, Annotation, Civil Liabili-
ty of Doctor or Psychologist for Having Sexual Relationship with Patient, 33 A.L.R. 3D
1393 (1970 & Supp. 1997).
27 W. R. Habeeb, Annotation, Intercourse Accomplished Under Pretext of Medical
Treatment as Rape, 70 A.L.R. 2D 824, 826-27 (1960) (superseded) comments: 'The cases
are not in harmony on the question whether this constitutes rape, the conviction being
in some cases sustained on the theory that a consent obtained by fraud was not a real
consent.'
28 See infra Part II.
See infra Part Il1.
10 See infra notes 475-479 and accompanying text.
11 See infra notes 566-589 and accompanying text.
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of consent.32 Counterbalancing their judicial conservatism, many
courts exhorted their respective legislatures to alter the statutory
complexion of rape law to cope with these troublesome cases.
A second theme emerging from the case law is that criminal
defendants' use of fraud or coercion to secure sexual compliance is
not a recent or rare phenomenon33 as several cases date to the
1800s.34 Moreover, repetitive patterns or similar stratagems emerge
from these defendants' conduct; the times and places may change
but many of the stratagems remain the same. For example, in both
Don Moran v. People (1872)3' and Boro v. Superior Court
(1985),36 the defendants told their respective victims that sexual
intercourse was essential for effective medical treatment instead of a
painful surgical alternative. In fact, cases involving sexual inter-
course accomplished by two different stratagems-fraudulent medi-
cal treatment or husband impersonation-have become so common
as to be recognized as archetypes of rape by fraud 3 7 and the cur-
rent trend is toward expansion. The fraudulent medical treatment
paradigm now encompasses cases of psychological counseling and
religious guidance.38 Likewise, courts have had to consider wheth-
er the husband impersonation model applies to cases of feigned
fianc~s, boyfriends, or lovers.39 Moreover, new genres of sexual of-
fenses continue to emerge, i.e., commercial-like fraud (i.e., sexual
scams),40 property-like offenses (i.e., sexual theft and extortion),41
and coercive pressures (i.e., abuse of authority)4 2 which have sup-
plemented the traditional categories.
The third theme emerging from the case law is the portrait of
defendants as a distinct specie of sexual predator; they were often
repeat offenders with multiple victims. 43 Offenders were not simply
32 Feinberg, supra note 18, at 335; Schulhofer, Gender Question, supra note 10, at
135-36.
" See Feinberg, supra note 18, at 337; Durham, supra note 18, at 63.
3 See supra note 3.
25 Mich. 356 (1872).
36 210 Cal. Rptr. 122 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
37 See, e.g., Don Moran, 25 Mich. at 364-65 (1872 opinion discussing these two
fact patterns).
See infra Part I.A.
See infra Part I.B.
See infra Part I.C.
S. ee infra Parts L.D and I.F.
42 See infra Part I.E.
" See, e.g., Boro v. Superior Court, 210 Cal. Rptr. 123 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985)(referring to "another potential victim of the same scheme') and cases discussed infra
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persons who lied to others in the context of personal relationships,
seducing prospective lovers with protestations of undying affec-
tion.44 Rather, they abused positions of trust and authority over
their victims, such trust having been established through profes-
sional, business, or employment settings. Others preyed on victims
outside of these contexts, often taking considerable pains to locate
the most gullible and unsophisticated citizens.4" Many calculated
their strategies, exploiting fully the power inherent in fraud or coer-
cion but stopping short of physical violence.46 Some devised elab-
orate schemes to defraud their unwary targets, scams that would
have resulted (and sometimes ingeniously did)47 in liability for oth-
er criminal acts, i.e., property crimes.48 These criminal defendants
often earned the moral condemnation of the courts hearing their
cases, even as these courts regretfully relieved them of criminal
responsibility.49 In short, case law illustrates that these offenders
are sexual predators, distinct from forcible rapists, but morally
blameworthy in their own right.50
notes 135-140, 149-153 and accompanying text.
" This Part does not include cases involving purely social or romantic relationships
between defendants and victims, which raise even more difficult issues. While I favor
the expansion of rape law to include instances of deception in the context of purely
personal relationships, see, e.g., Neal v. Neal, 179 B.R. 234 (D. Idaho 1995), a battery
action based on husband's failure to disclose to wife that he was having an affair, the
resolution of rape law's treatment of fraud in professional or arms-length transactions
should be the first step in doing so.
4' The defendants in Boro, 210 Cal. Rptr. 122 and the Mitchell case, infra notes
135-140 and accompanying text, are reputed to have called multiple potential victims in
order to find those gullible enough to believe their misrepresentations.
I See, e.g., People v. Evans, 85 Misc.2d 1088, 379 N.Y.S.2d 912 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1975).
'" See, e.g., United States v. Condolon, 600 F.2d 7 (4th Cir. 1979) (defendant con-
victed of federal wire fraud); LINDA A. FAIRSTEIN, SEXUAL VIOLENCE: OUR WAR AGAINST
RAPE 195-97 (1993) (discussing case of Steve Davidson who was convicted of theft).
Estrich points out that the defendants in People v. Evans, 85 Misc.2d at 1088,
379 N.Y.S.2d at 912, and Goldberg v. State, 395 A.2d 1213 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979),
would have been guilty of property offenses if they had been attempting to obtain mon-
ey rather than sex. Estrich, Rape, supra note 7, at 1119; see also Larson, Women Un-
derstand, supra note 24, at 412 (arguing law allows men to use tactics to secure sex
that would not be tolerated to secure money, what she calls the "sex exception to
fraud).
'9 See, e.g., Don Moran v. People, 25 Mich. 356, 364-65 (1872); State v. Thomp-
son, 792 P.2d 1103, 1107 (Mont. 1990); Evans, 85 Misc.2d at 1098-99, 379 N.Y.S.2d at
921-22.
'a See also SISSELA BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE 43 (1978)
(Bok quotes from Dante: "Of every malice that gains hatred in Heaven the end is injus-
tice; and every such end, either by force or by fraud, afflicts another. But because fraud
1998]
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The cases fall roughly into six major categories, although these
are somewhat artificial because of inevitable overlap between fraud-
ulent and coercive pressures. Cases of rape by fraud include: (1)
fraudulent treatment, (2) fraud as to the defendant's identity (i.e.,
impersonation), (3) sexual scams, and (4) sexual theft; the rape by
coercion cases encompass (5) abuse of authority and (6) sexual
extortion. Due to the large number of extant cases, the following
examples were selected because they were representative, involved
intriguing factual issues, or provided an impetus for legal change
(e.g., California and Kansas passed legislation in response to cases
falling outside the boundaries of their existing rape statutes)."s
A. Fraudulent Treatment
This section begins with the oldest set of cases, involving fraud-
ulent medical treatment per se, and then considers three newer
variations: defendants' use of fraudulent inducements under the
guise of providing psychological therapy, religious guidance, and, in
one unusual case, musical education.
1. Fraudulent Medical Treatment
A considerable number of cases exist in which defendants had
sexual intercourse with patients under the guise of medical treat-
ment, some dating back to the 1800s.2 These cases may be useful-
ly divided into three subsidiary groups.5 3 One group involves de-
is an evil peculiar to man, it more displeases God, and therefore the fraudulent are the
lower, and more pain assails them.'"); FAIRSTEIN, supra note 47, at 197 ('While these
men do not exhibit the life-threatening physical violence of forcible rapists, they practice
a form of abuse and violation that should subject them to criminal liability in a court of
law.").
si See infra notes 339-342 and accompanying text.
52 See generally Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Conviction of Rape or Related Sexual
Offenses on Basis of Intercourse Accomplished Under the Pretext of, or in the Course
of, Medical Treatment, 65 A.L.R. 4TH 1064 (1994); see also Habeeb, supra note 27 and
accompanying text.
" Two other common fact patterns emerge. First, many defendants pretended to be
doctors to gain access to victims. See, e.g., United States v. Reed, 9 C.M.R. 396 (1953)
(captain represented himself as doctor in order to make physical examinations of three
women); Man Injects Women with Vitamin B-12, UPI, Mar. 7, 1990, available in LEXIS,
News Library, UPI File; Phony Doctor Pushes B-12, UPI, Mar. 8, 1990, available in
LEXIS, News Library, UPI File; Chuck Shepard, Juice Bar Show Aimed at Men Between
the Ages of 18 and 21, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis, MN), Oct. 9, 1992, at 7E, available in
LEXIS News Library, Busdlt File; Mike Thomas, Stinky Bandits, Check-Kiting Congress-
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ception as to the nature of the act, e.g., a woman believes that she
is having a routine vaginal examination and the defendant is actual-
ly having sexual intercourse with her. A second group concerns
defendants who induce women to have sexual intercourse by fraud-
ulently maintaining that it is necessary for their medical treatment;
the patients were aware of the nature of the act. A third group en-
compasses types of "ambiguously sexual" touching(s) that the pa-
tient believes are necessary for medical purposes, but which are
only for a defendant's sexual gratification.
a. Deception as to the Act
The first group of cases involves deception on the part of the
defendant concerning the nature of his conduct. In these cases, the
defendant professes to give the patient a routine vaginal examina-
tion but instead has sexual intercourse with her. Most courts have
held that a rape conviction can be founded upon this fact pattern
because the woman does not consent to sexual intercourse, not
knowing that it is taking place. 4 As the authors of one criminal
men, Burglars at Bat, The Happy-Hooker Schoolteacher and, Of Course, That Silly
Suncoast Dome, ORLANDO SENTINEL TRIB., Jan. 3, 1993, at 7, available in LEXIS, News
library, Orsent file ("Dr. Giggles' defendant arrested for practicing medicine without
license, for posing as doctor and giving injections).
Second, doctors and dentists administered substances to patients rendering them
unable to prevent sexual intercourse. These cases are usually brought under rape statutes
prohibiting sexual intercourse with an unconscious or physically helpless person. See,
e.g., State v. Oshiro, 696 P.2d 846 (Haw. Ct. App. 1985) (dentist administered nitrous
oxide); Commonwealth v. Helfant, 496 N.E.2d 433 (Mass. 1986) (doctor administered
drug); State v. Sladek, 835 S.W.2d 308 (Mo. 1992) (dentist administered nitrous oxide);
State v. Lung, 28 P. 235 (Nev. 1891) (no attempted rape because administered drug
could not destroy power to resist); People v. Teicher, 52 N.Y.2d 638, 422 N.E.2d 506,
439 N.Y.S.2d 846 (1981) (dentist sexually abused patients under sedation); Flaherty,
supra note 26, at 1104; see also People v. Royal, 53 Cal. 62 (1878) (defendant doctor
practiced some sort of manipulation on victim and then had camal connection with her).
Finally, a few cases involved dentists who inappropriately touched patients without
drugs. See Hublin v. Shira, 563 P.2d 1079 (Kan. Ct. App. 1977); State v. Styskal, 493
N.W.2d 313 (Neb. 1992).
See, e.g., People v. Ogunmola, 238 Cal. Rptr. 300 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (rape
upheld); People v. Minkowski, 23 Cal. Rptr. 92 (Cal. Ct. App. 1962) (rape upheld);
People v. Borak, 301 N.E.2d 1 (III. App. Ct. 1973) (deviate sexual assault upheld and
rape overturned); Pomeroy v. State, 94 Ind. 96 (1883) (rape upheld); State v. Atkins, 292
S.W. 422 (Mo. 1926) (rape upheld); McNair v. State, 825 P.2d 571 (Nev. 1992) (sexual
assault upheld); Commonwealth v. Morgan, 56 A.2d 275 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1948) (rape
upheld), rev'd, 58 A.2d 330 (Pa. 1948); State v. Ely, 194 P. 988 (Wash. 1921) (rape
upheld); Story v. State, 721 P.2d 1020 (Wyo. 1986) (majority of rape convictions up-
held); Regina v. Flattery, (1877) 2 Q.B.D. 410 (guilty of rape). But see Walter v. People,
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law treatise assert: "It is well settled that if unlawful sexual inter-
course was had with such a girl who thought she was being treated
with medical or surgical instruments and had consented to nothing
else, the man is guilty of rape.""5 Moreover, courts generally have
held that the force requirement is satisfied by the mere use of the
force required for the physical act of intercourse. 6
A recent case illustrating this type of fraudulent medical treat-
ment is McNair v. State in which the defendant was convicted of
six counts of sexual assault on his patients.5 7 McNair appealed
claiming insufficient evidence of nonconsent; the Nevada appellate
court disagreed, noting: "When a physician succeeds in the penile
penetration of a patient under the guise of performing a medical
examination, a sexual assault is committed by fraud and deceit and
without the victim's consent." 8 The court further declined McNai-
r's invitation to consider his behavior as simply a matter of medical
ethics, emphasizing the importance of treating such behavior as a
crime. 9 The court, in fact, adopted a term coined by one author
to describe similar types of cases-"confidence style assaults."6"
Lack of force was not an obstacle to the defendant's conviction be-
cause Nevada's sexual assault statute did not require force but only
that the sexual penetration occur against the person's will.
50 Barb. 144 (N.Y. App. Div. 1867) (no rape). See also Ebhart v. State, 34 N.E. 637
(Ind. 1893) (defendant quack persuaded gullible parents to allow him to sleep in same
room as daughter, where he took advantage of her). For recent cases see Kirk Loggins,
Nurse Testifies of Rape, TENNESSEAN, Nov. 1, 1995, at 1B, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Tennes File; John Commins, Alleged Rape During Exam Brings Charges Against
Physician, NASHVILLE BANNER, Sept. 12, 1995, at B1; John Commins, Doctor's Attorney
Denies Rape Charges, NASHVILLE BANNER, Sept. 13, 1995, at A2.
55 ROLUIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 215 (3d ed. 1982) (foot-
note omitted).
s' In Borak, the court employed the concept of statutory force and stated: "Force is
thus implied when the rape or deviate sexual acts proscribed by statute are accom-
plished under the pretext of medical treatment when the victim is surprised, and un-
aware of the intention involved." 301 N.E.2d at 5; see also Pomeroy v. State, 94 Ind.
96, 100 (1883) (force element satisfied when no consent exists).
57 825 P.2d 571 (Nev. 1992).
'a Id. at 574.
s9 McNair, 825 P.2d at 576.
60 Id. at 576; see also Lynn Hecht Schafran, Writing and Reading About Rape: A
Primer, 66 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 979, 1018-20 (1993) (discussing blitz and confidence
rapes).
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b. Sexual Intercourse as Necessary Medical Treatment 1
In contrast to opinions involving deception as to the sexual act,
courts considering cases in which defendants lied about the purport-
ed benefits of sexual intercourse as a therapeutic treatment generally
have found that no rape occurred. Courts have adopted two differ-
ent approaches in rejecting a rape charge: the force requirement
was not satisfied or consent deprived the conduct of its criminali-
ty.62 One of the oldest examples of this genre is the 1872 opinion
in Don Moran v. People," -in which a doctor induced a fifteen-
year-old girl to have sexual intercourse with him. The defendant
persuaded the young woman to acquiesce using a panoply of de-
ceptive statements: the girl's father had authorized the sexual con-
nection, the doctor used the same technique on all women whom
he treated, and the alternative was a painful medical procedure that
would probably kill her.64 The Michigan Supreme Court over-
turned the conviction because the trial court erred in instructing the
jury by omitting the requirement of force. Although the supreme
court held that fraud cannot substitute for force in rape,6" the court
61 See, e.g., Boro v. Superior Court, 210 Cal. Rptr. 122 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985); Com-
monwealth v. Goldenberg, 155 N.E.2d 187 (Mass. 1959); People v. Williams, 175 N.W.
187 (Mich. 1919); Don Moran v. People, 25 Mich. 356 (1872); Regina v. Harms, 81
C.C.C. 4 (1943), 2 D.L.R. 61 (1944) (Sask. C.A.); R. v. K., Rhod. L. R. 571 (1965)
(highest court in Rhodesia held no rape); see also Commonwealth v. Robinson, 462
A.2d 840 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983) (mother's live-in boyfriend told victim she had venereal
disease and persuaded her to allow him to treat it by sexual intercourse; convictions for
statutory rape and corruption of minor upheld but forcible rape count dismissed);
Limbaugh v. Commonwealth, 140 S.E. 133 (Va. 1927) (seduction when chiropractor told
patient that he could not help her unless they had sexual intercourse).
Another similar case is a civil action against Dr. Julio Soto reported in the media:
"A 21-year-old Syracuse, N.Y., woman has settled for an undisclosed amount of money
her lawsuit against a former doctor, who she claimed tricked her into having sex by
saying it was the best way to administer a secret vaccine.' James Steinberg, Noted Brief-
ly, SAN DIEGO UNION, Apr. 11, 1991, at D-2; see also Paul Leavitt, Also Wednes-
day . . . , USA TODAY, Apr. 11, 1991, at 3A, available in LEXIS, News Library, Usatdy
File; Vaccine-By-Sex Suit Settled, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Apr. 11, 1991, at 35. The judge ruled
that Soto had committed medical malpractice; his license was also revoked but no crimi-
nal charges were filed.
62 Compare Boro, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 122 (consent deprived act of criminality) with
Don Moran, 25 Mich. at 356 (force element not satisfied).
63 25 Mich. 356 (1872).
Id. at 357.
6s See also State v. Lung, 28 P. 235, 236 (Nev. 1891) (citing Don Moran and stat-
ing fraud does not supply the place of force: "Anything which merely excites the
woman's passions, leaving her at the same time in the full possession of her mental and
physical powers, capable of comprehending the nature of the act, and of exercising her
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also noted that obtaining sexual intercourse by fraud may be as
criminal as forcible rape but the legislature must outlaw it.66 It fur-
ther noted that the defendant could be convicted on retrial if the
jury found that the requirement of force was satisfied by his threat
to subject the patient to a life-endangering operation. 7
A more recent case, Commonwealth v. Goldenberg,68 reached
the same result. In Goldenberg, a young woman sought out a phys-
iotherapist for an abortion. During the course of treatment, Golden-
berg told the patient that he would have to have sexual intercourse
with her and that this might help the procedure.69 The Massachu-
setts Supreme Court, directly confronting the question of whether
rape can be committed when the woman's consent is procured by
fraud, held that it could not: "The essence of the crime is not the
fact of intercourse but the injury and outrage to the feelings of the
woman by the forceful penetration of her person .... Fraud cannot
be allowed to supply the place of the force which the statute makes
mandatory."' A concurring judge in a later case, Commonwealth
v. Keevan,7' questioned the continued vitality of Goldenberg in
light of recent scholarship. 2
In an even more recent case, Boro v. Superior Court,73 the is-
own volition in the matter, is classed rather among the arts of the seducer than the
weapons of him who would destroy female virtue by force.); Walter v. People, 50
Barb. 144 (N.Y. App. Div. 1867) (fraud insufficient for rape).
6 Don Moran, 25 Mich. at 364-65. Other courts have made similar overtures to
their respective legislative bodies. See, e.g., Mathews v. Superior Court, 173 Cal. Rptr.
820, 822 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981); Bloodworth v. State, 65 Tenn. 614, 619-21 (1872).
67 Don Moran, 25 Mich. at 366.
' 155 N.E.2d 187 (Mass. 1959).
19 Id. at 190.
70 Id. at 191-92 (citation omitted).
7. 511 N.E.2d 534 (Mass. 1987).
72 Id. at 543 (Abrams, J., concurring).
7' 210 Cal. Rptr. 122 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985); see also Lauren Blau, Police Seek More
Victims in 'Cure' Fraud; Man Charged with Getting Women to Have Sex as Treatment,
L.A. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1987, at 12, available in LEXIS, News Library, LAT File; Ken
Chavez, Woman Says Ruse Tricked Her into Sex; 'Wanted to Save Myself A Lot of
Pain," Witness Testifies, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1987, at 4, available in LEXIS, News Li-
brary, LAT File; "Dr. Feelgood' to Plead Guilty to Sex by Fraud, REUTER LIBR. REP., Aug.
5, 1987; "Feelgood' Accused of Duping Women, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Mar. 29, 1987,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Stpete File; Orange County Digest: Fullerton; Man Ac-
cused of Sex By Fraud to Stand Trial, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 23, 1987, at 2, available in
LEXIS, News Library, LAT File; UPI, Aug. 6, 1987, available in LEXIS, News Library,
UPSTAT File (court's decision in Boro prompted legislature to pass law in 1986 making
it a felony to obtain sex through fear or fraud); UPI, Mar. 28, 1987, available in LEXIS,
News Library, UPSTAT File; UPI, Apr. 2, 1984, available in LEXIS, News Library, UPST-
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sue was not one of force, but of lack of consent. Boro, whom the
press nicknamed "Dr. Feelgood," posed as a doctor and tricked
women into sexual intercourse by telling them that such act was
necessary to cure their fatal blood disease. The defendant explained
that the choice was either to undergo a painful and expensive sur-
gery or have sexual intercourse with a donor (Boro) who had been
injected with a special serum. The state prosecuted Boro for rape
after he persuaded at least four women to engage in sexual inter-
course, claiming that his actions fell under a statute prohibiting
sexual intercourse with a victim who is unconscious of the nature of
the act.74 Boro appealed arguing that the rape statute did not cov-
er his case; the appellate court agreed and prohibited his prosecu-
tion. Drawing a distinction between fraud in the factum and fraud
in the inducement, the court held that only the former vitiates con-
sent.7" In discussing a previous case raising a similar issue, it
wrote:
It is not difficult to conceive of reasons why the Legislature may have
consciously wished to leave the matter where it lies. Thus, as a matter of
degree, where consent to intercourse is obtained by promises of travel,
fame, celebrity and the like-ought the liar and seducer to be chargeable
as a rapist? Where is the line to be drawn?76
The dissent pointed to a separate portion of California's statute
defining consent, arguing that while not expressly repealing the
factum-inducement distinction, it restricted consent to "cases of true,
good faith consent, obtained without substantial fraud or deceit."77
The California legislature, in response to Boro, passed a new statute
specifically criminalizing this conduct.78 Boro was apprehended
again in 1987 for the same scam and prosecuted under the new
statute specially designed for him.
AT File. Boro faced similar charges in other jurisdictions.
7' CAL. PENAL CODE § 261 (West 1997).
7- Boro, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 122; see also People v. Ogunmola, 238 Cal. Rptr. 300
(Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (physician obtaining sexual intercourse under pretext of medical
exam constitutes fraud in the factum); People v. Harris, 155 Cal. Rptr. 472 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1979) (fraud in the inducement does not vitiate consent); infra Part III.B.
76 Boro, 210 Cal Rptr. at 1230 n.5.
7 Id. at 1232 (Holmdahl, J., dissenting).
78 CAL PENAL CODE § 266c (West 1997 & Supp. 1998). See infra notes 339-340 and
accompanying text.
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c. Intermediate Cases
Three recent cases involve a factual pattern that lies between
the two traditional categories of fraudulent medical treatment cas-
es.79 Here, the patients agreed to various forms of intimate touch-
ing, falling short of sexual intercourse, in the mistaken belief that
such touching constituted medical treatment. These cases differ from
the first category-deception as to the act-because the patients
were aware of the nature of the contact and not caught by surprise.
They diverge from the second group-sexual intercourse as neces-
sary medical treatment-because none of the patients consented to
engage in sexual conduct; the ambiguous nature of the sexual con-
tact reinforces this uncertainty. These cases also illustrate alternative
answers to the question of whether the defendant's behavior consti-
tutes rape or sexual assault.
In State v. Quinlan,8° the defendant, working as a respiratory
therapist, convinced a twenty-six-year-old patient to allow him to
digitally penetrate her under the guise of performing a cardio-neuro-
logical-respiratory exam.' The patient believed that Quinlan's con-
9 Linda Fairstein's book SEXUAL VIOLENCE: OUR WAR AGAINST RAPE provides another
example of a doctor using his position to induce women to allow him to examine
them. See supra note 47, at 193. Hugh Richards described himself as a therapist who
specialized in holistic healing. Under the guise of therapy, Richards made breast and
vaginal examinations of his patients. Each of the women said that the sole reason that
they had allowed "the intimate touching was because Richards had maintained that it
was an essential part of the therapy or 'medical' treatment. Id.
Two assault cases raise a similar issue. In Commonwealth v. Gregory, I A.2d 501
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1938), the defendant, pretending to be a doctor, persuaded a woman to
allow him to examine her artificial leg and stub. He convinced her to take off her dress
and to pull down her underwear. He was convicted of indecent assault and assault and
battery. The court opined:
[A]ny consent claimed to have been given was obtained by the perpetuation
of a fraud, was vitiated by such fraud and is not a defense . . . .The deceit
practiced was a fraud on the will of Mrs. Harkins equivalent to force. The
legal reasoning involved is the same as that followed in the consideration of
larceny by trick.
Id. at 505 (citations omitted). In Boyett v. State, 159 So. 2d 628 (Ala. Ct. App. 1964),
the defendant impersonated a doctor and took indecent liberties with patient; he was
convicted of assault and battery. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 55 cmt. a,
illus. 4 (1965 & appendix 1977); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892B cmt. e, illus.
7 (1977) ("A, believing B to be a physician, removes her clothing and permits B to lay
hands on her person for the purpose of a medical examination. B is not a physician
and knows that A believes him to be one. B is subject to liability to A for battery.").
8 596 N.E.2d 28 (III. App. Ct. 1992).
8, David Heckelman, High Court to Rule on Sexual Assault by Therapist, CHI. DAILY
L. BULL., Aug. 26, 1992, at 3, available in LEXIS, News Library, Chidlb File.
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duct was a legitimate medical procedure for diagnosing her respira-
tory problems.82 Quinlan appealed arguing that his conduct did
not constitute criminal sexual assault because the victim consent-
ed.83 The appellate court affirmed Quinlan's conviction noting that
Illinois's statute criminalized sexual penetration when the accused
knew the victim was unable to understand the nature of the act or
was unable to give knowing consent.84 The court reasoned that the
patient had consented to a medical procedure, not to sexual pene-
tration and that her consent was vitiated because it was obtained by
deceit." The court also noted that Illinois's statute exempted legiti-
mate medical treatment and, therefore, illegitimate medical exami-
nations fell within the statute's reach.86
In a similar case reaching the opposite result, David J.
Broderson, a phlebotomist, induced three women to allow him to
intimately examine them with his fingers and cotton swabs.87
When prosecutors charged Broderson with rape, a reviewing court
dismissed the case asserting that Kansas's rape law required force or
fear. The district attorney did argue, however, that the legislature
should enact a new statute covering similar situations because
"'Technically, it's just as much rape as someone attacking a stranger
on a jogging trail,' .... 'It's just as serious, it's only accomplished in
a different manner." 8 Two years later, Kansas amended its rape
statute to include instances in which the victim's consent was ob-
tained through a knowing misrepresentation that intercourse was a
medically or therapeutically necessary procedure or a legally re-
quired procedure within the scope of offender's authority.89
Similarly, State v. Tizard ° involved a seventeen-year-old male
who visited a doctor to inquire about taking steroids. During some
82 596 N.E.2d at 30.
83 Id. at 30.
Id. at 31.
s Quinlan, 596 N.E.2d at 31. Later, the court stated: "It was only after defendant
used deceit to convince [plaintiff] D.S. that the test would get to the root of her medi-
cal problems that she consented." Id.
86 Id.
87 Tony Rizzo, Case Shows Need for Rape Law Change, Prosecutors Say; Judge
Drops Felony Charges in Incident that Didn't Involve Force, KANSAS CrrY STAR, July 29,
1995, at C2.
8 id.
89 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3502(a)(3)-(4) (1996 & Supp. 1997); see also Jim Sullinger,
Legislature Expands Rape Law to Include Deception, KANSAS CiTY STAR, Apr. 30, 1996,
at B4, available in LEXIS, News Library, Kcstar File.
' 897 S.W.2d 732 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994).
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of these visits, the doctor rubbed the patient's genitals and, on one
occasion, masturbated him to climax.91 The state prosecuted Tizard
under its sexual battery statute that includes an explicit fraud provi-
sion. The defendant citing Boro argued that the statute reached only
fraud in the factum, not fraud in the inducement, but the court
rejected the distinction as being irrelevant to Tennessee law.92 The
court further noted that the legislature had explicitly included fraud
as an alternative to force in the context of its rape and sexual bat-
tery laws.93 The court convicted Tizard, concluding that he had
accomplished the touching by fraud since he did it under the guise
of providing medical treatment.94
9' Id. at 737.
92 Id. at 741.
93 Id at 742.
' Id. at 742-43. An appellate court later overturned the conviction based on the
admission of improper evidence. Id. at 735.
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2. Psychiatric and Psychological Treatment"
Several cases implicate defendants' use of fraud in the context
of psychological treatment. In one example, State v. Leiding,"
a male psychologist persuaded his male patient to have sexual rela-
tions with him.98 The state prosecuted Leiding under a relatively
new, gender-neutral statute that punished various forms of criminal
sexual penetration accomplished through the use of force or coer-
cion.99 The state theorized that Leiding had used force or coercion
under the definition that "the perpetrator knows or has reason to
know that the victim ... suffers from a mental condition which
renders the victim incapable of understanding the nature or conse-
quences of the act."" ° It argued that the patient had a condition
9' See SUSAN BAUR, THE INTIMATE HOUR: LOVE AND SEX IN PSYCHOTHERAPY (1997)
(discussing legal aspects of psychotherapist-patient sex); Gregory G. Samo, Annotation,
Criminal Responsibility for Physical Measures Undertaken in Connection with Treatment
of Mentally Disordered Patient, 99 A.L.R. 3D 854 (1980) (collecting a few cases
involving sex). Feinberg suggests psychiatric treatment is a new frontier in rape by
fraud cases:
It is almost impossible to imagine similar frauds occurring today, except-and
here is the late twentieth-century analogue-in the offices of psychiatrists. Few
persons are so ignorant these days as to believe, even on the immense au-
thority of a doctor, that sexual intercourse (with him) will cure or prevent
cancer, but even the sophisticated (especially when desperately neurotic) will
accept a similar opinion on the authority of their psychoanalyst. And the des-
perately neurotic are especially vulnerable to pain and injury.
Feinberg, supra note 18, at 336-37.
1 See also Ferguson v. People, 824 P.2d 803 (Colo. 1992) (sexual penetration by
psychotherapist); Shapiro v. State, 696 So. 2d 1321 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (sexual
misconduct by psychotherapist); State v. Nierras, 1980 Ohio App. LEXIS 10118 (5th App.
Dist. 1980) (attempted sexual intercourse with psychiatrist's client); Regina v. Fiqia, 87
C.C.C. 3d 377 (1993); Diana Coulter, Duped into Sex, Woman Testifies; Fiqia's Therapy
Issue in Trial, EDMONTON J., Feb. 21, 1992; Diana Coulter, Self-Styled Therapist Guilty
of Sex Assault on Teen, EDMONTON J., Mar. 5, 1992 (One victim of sexual abuse by a
therapist said 'We have to change the laws regarding consent in power-based relation-
ships . . . ."); Sicko Therapist Denied New Trial, TORONTO SUN, June 3, 1994, at 45,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Torsun File (Defendant told fifteen-year-old client that
she had fictitious disease that would drive her insane or kill her and that to cure her
he must administer aversion therapy that included sexual intercourse).
9' 812 P.2d 797 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991).
' See also State v. vonKlock, 433 A.2d 1299 (N.H. 1981), overruled by State v.
Smith, 503 A.2d 774 (N.H. 1985) (involving male therapist and young male patient);
Commonwealth v. Frank, 577 A.2d 609 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990), postconviction relief
denied, 640 A.2d 904 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) (involving male therapist and young male
patient).
Id. at 797-98.
"G Leiding, 812 P.2d at 798 (citation omitted).
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known as transference that prohibited him from fully consenting to
the sexual relationship.'' The court, however, concluded that tran-
sference did not render the patient incapable of consenting to the
sexual act. Noting that Minnesota had enacted a criminal statute
addressing sexual relations between a psychotherapist and pa-
tient,"°2 the opinion stated: "[Ihf the legislature desires to make
psychologist/patient sex a crime, it can certainly do so, subject only
to constitutional limitations. But doing so requires legislative thera-
py, not judicial surgery."0 3 In 1993, New Mexico amended its
statutes by expanding force or coercion to include penetration or
contact "by a psychotherapist on his patient, with or without the
patient's consent, during the course of psychotherapy or within a
period of one year following the termination of psycho-
therapy; .... ,"
3. Religious Guidance
A number of defendants have used a clerical office or spiritual
authority to persuade persons to consent to sexual relations. In State
v. Dutton,' the defendant, a church pastor, began counselling a
woman, eventually enticing her into a sexual relationship by sug-
gesting that it would be good for her.' 6 Dutton was convicted of
four counts of criminal sexual conduct under a Minnesota statute
that, while not directly addressing clergy members, criminalized
psychotherapist-patient contact.0 7 Dutton was presumably aware
of Minnesota's law as he asserted that while sexual intercourse be-
tween a counselor and counselee was a felony, his behavior did not
qualify. 8 The court, however, found sufficient evidence of both
emotional dependency on the victim's part and therapeutic decep-
tion by Dutton to satisfy the statutory requirements of the of-
fense.0 9 It wrote: "These statutes are meant to protect vulnerable
101 Id. at 798.
102 MINN. STAT. § 609.345(I)(j) (1996 & Supp. 1997).
'0o Leiding, 812 P.2d at 800.
104 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-10(A)(5) (Law. Co-op. 1994).
1- 450 N.W.2d 189 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
106 Id. at 191-92.
'0' MINN. STAT. §§ 609.344(1)(h)-(j), 609.345(1)(h)-(j) (1996 & Supp. 1997); see also
MINN. STAT. §§ 609.344(), 609.345(l) (1996 & Supp. 1997) (punishing criminal sexual
conduct with clergy members).
'00 450 N.W.2d at 191-92.
109 Id. at 192-93.
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persons and allow them to reposit trust in those who can help them.
The legislature has recognized the emotional devastation that can
result when a psychotherapist takes advantage of a patient."" ' Fol-
lowing Dutton and a similar case,"' the Minnesota legislature
amended its sexual conduct statutes to include specific provisions
regarding the clergy." 2
Similarly, in People v. Cardenas,"' the defendant held him-
self out as a faith healer in the Curanderismo religion. Cardenas
used a combination of abuse of trust, religious authority, psycholog-
ical coercion, physical deprivation, and a small amount of actual
physical force to coerce two women, one a minor, into multiple
sexual acts." 4 After his conviction of seventy counts of sexual mis-
conduct, Cardenas appealed arguing that he did not satisfy the
statutory element of "force, violence, duress, menace, of fear of
immediate and unlawful bodily injury" and that the women had
consented to his conduct as part of a cure." ' The court rejected
Cardenas's arguments and upheld his conviction, noting that the
women had only consented to treatment, which did not necessarily
translate into consent for defendant's sexual acts. Moreover, the
court found that Cardenas's behavior amounted to duress, which it
defined broadly to include threats of force as well as hardship or
retribution sufficient to coerce a reasonable person of ordinary sus-
110 Id. at 194.
... James Hoogenboom, described as "a manipulative minister who persuaded vul-
nerable women in the congregation that having sex with him was the right thing to do,'
was tried under the same statute. Pat Doyle, Church Brochure Says Sex-Assault Defen-
dant Indeed was Counselor, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis, MN), Dec. 31, 1992, at 51, avail-
able in LEXIS, News Library, Busdtl File; see also Pat Doyle, A State of Mind: Minister
Used Guile to Seduce True Believers, Elk River Jury Told, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis, MN),
Dec. 26, 1992, at 1B, available in LEXIS, News Library, Busdtl File; Pat Doyle, Ex-Minis-
ter is Acquitted of Sex Assault; Hoogenboom Still Faces Charges in 2 Other Cases, STAR
TRIB. (Minneapolis, MN), Jan. 9, 1993, at 1B, available in LEXIS, News Library, Busdtl
File; Pat Doyle, Ex-Pastor Testifies that Parishioner Initiated Sex Affair, STAR TRIB. (Minne-
apolis, MN), Dec. 30, 1992, at 2B, available in LEXIS, News Library, Busdtl File. Two
juries acquitted Hoogenboom of criminal charges and a civil jury found him not guilty.
Jury Clears Elk River Pastor, Church in Sex Case, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis, MN), Dec. 3,
1993, at 4B, available in LEXIS, News Library, Busdtl File; 2 Women Sue Minister,
Charge that He Sexually Exploited Them, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis, MN), Nov. 17, 1991,
at 3B, available in LEXIS, News Library, Busdtl File.
112 MINN. STAT. §§ 609.344(l), 609.345(l) (1996).
113 21 Cal. App. 4th 927 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
... Id. at 932-36.
15 Id. at 930.
1998]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
ceptibilities. 16 The court was unpersuaded by defendant's final
argument that the women's compliance was unreasonable because
"Even unreasonable fear of immediate bodily injury may suffice if
the accused knowingly takes advantage of that fear in order to ac-
complish a sexual offense."' 1 7
Other cases implicating similar fact patterns include a Florida
minister who abused his position of authority by having sex with
three parishioners under the guise of confirming their virginity."8
Another instance occurred in Israel, where a man posing as a rabbi
was convicted of nine counts of sexual assault and fraud." 9 The
defendant sexually assaulted a sixteen-year-old woman telling her
that it was necessary to take a sample of her vaginal secretion. 2
The defendant had multiple victims and was dismissed from the
army after involvement in a sexual assault. 2'
4. Musical Education
Finally, to complete the list of instances in which defendants
persuaded persons that sexual acts were necessary for their medical,
psychiatric, or spiritual treatment, one case involved a choirmaster
who duped two young women into sexual acts by telling them it
was necessary to improve their singing.'22 In Rex v. Williams, the
defendant told one sixteen-year-old girl that her breathing was not
right, inducing her into a position to engage in sexual inte-
rcourse.'23 When she asked what he was doing, he responded:
"It is quite right; do not worry.... This is my method of training. Your
breathing is not quite right and I have to make an air passage to make it
t16 Id. at 939.
117 Id. at 940 (citation omitted).
118 Nicole Sterghos & Sarah Lundy, Portrait of a Pastor: 2 Claim Sex, Betrayal; Minis-
ter Says He's Victim of Church Politics, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale, FL), Sept. 18,
1997, at 1A, available in LEXIS, News Library, Sunsen File.
"' Raine Marcus, Fake Rabbi Guilty of Raping Woman He Promised to Cure, JERU-
SALEM POST, Jan. 27, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, JPost File.
120 Id.
121 Id.; see also DeStefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275 (Colo. 1988) (husband brought
civil case against priest and diocese for enticing wife into sex during marital counsel-
ling).
122 Rex v. Williams, 27 Cox C.C. 350 (1922), excerpted in JOHN M. MACDONALD,
RAPE: OFFENDERS AND THEIR VIcTIMS 235-36 (1971).
123 Id.
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right. Your parents know all about it, it has all been arranged; before
God, Vera, it is quite right. I will not do you any harm. "12 "
Williams was convicted of rape for this conduct and of indecent
assault for digitally penetrating another female student. 2 '
5. Conclusion
Fraudulent medical treatment decisions, perhaps due to their
greater longevity or sheer number, offer an encapsulated view of
the fundamental problems inherent in rape by fraud cases. First,
courts confronting factually similar behavior seem to arrive at dif-
ferent conclusions regarding the importance of the force and
nonconsent elements of traditional rape law. The absence of force
was critical for some, while consent deprived the act of criminality
for others. Courts' characterization of the pivotal issue as one of
force or nonconsent subsequently affected the jurisdiction's statutory
enactments. Michigan, where Don Moran arose, altered its statute
by enlarging the force requirement, while California, the site of
Boro, passed new legislation altering the consent requirement.126
Second, the fraudulent medical treatment cases, perhaps more than
any other category, illustrate the dialectic relationship between
courts and legislatures in criminalizing rape by fraud. Boro and
Broderson prompted statutory innovation in medical contexts, Leid-
ing preceded its state's psychotherapist legislation, and Dutton
antedated specific clergy provisions. Thus, at least in some states,
judicial invitations were answered by the legislature.
B. Fraud as to the Defendant's Identity
The second major case law category involves defendants who
impersonate others in order to accomplish sexual intercourse. The
archetypical fact pattern for such category is a defendant imperson-
ating a woman's husband by getting into bed with her and engaging
in sexual intercourse before the woman becomes aware of his real
identity. Husband impersonation cases have reached differing out-
comes, largely as a result of disagreement about whether such con-
1 MACDONALD, supra note 122, at 236.
25 Jocelynne A. Scutt, Fraud and Consent in Rape: Comprehension of the Nature and
Character of the Act and Its Moral Implications, 18 CRIM. L.Q. 312, 315 (1976).
126 See infra notes 280, 339-340 and accompanying text.
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duct constitutes fraud in the factum or fraud in the inducement. 127
Newer cases provide even more twists by introducing interesting
variations on the husband impersonation theme, i.e., men who pretend-
to be women's fianc~es, boyfriends, or lovers. In one case, the
defendant impersonated a famous person to maneuver women into
vulnerable positions.
1. Husband Impersonation
The classic husband impersonation case with a twist is Lewis v.
State.128 Lewis, a slave, climbed into bed and had sexual inter-
course with a white woman who believed Lewis was her hus-
band.'29 The court reluctantly held that force, actual or construc-
tive, is a necessary ingredient of rape. 3 ' If the woman consents,
the court reasoned, no rape occurred even though consent was ob-
tained by fraudulent impersonation.' It added:
We depart from our usual course, for the purpose of inviting the attention
of the legislature to this subject. Under our penal laws, one who obtains
the goods of another under false and fraudulent pretenses, is held guilty
in the same degree as if he has feloniously stolen them. He who contami-
nates female purity under like fraudulent pretenses, goes unwhipped of
justice.32
Other courts have upheld rape charges in husband impersonation
cases finding fraud in the factum vitiating consent.'33 One court,
for example, reasoned that husband impersonation cases really
involve fraud in the factum because the woman has consented to
127 See generally B.K. Carpenter, Annotation, Rape by Fraud or Impersonation, 91
A.L.R. 2D 591 (1963).
1 30 Ala. 54 (1857). But see Boyett v. State, 159 So. 2d 628 (Ala. Ct. App. 1964)
(distinguishing Lewis and holding consent obtained by fraud did not prevent conviction
for assault and battery). Other husband impersonation cases include State v. Navarro,
367 P.2d 227 (Ariz. 1961) (rape by deception conviction affirmed), and Pinson v. State.
518 So. 2d 1220 (Miss. 1988) (rape conviction affirmed).
A few cases involve sexual relations accomplished by sham marriages. See, e.g.,
Bloodworth v. State, 65 Tenn. 614 (1872) (rape conviction reversed); Lee v. State, 72
S.W. 1005 (Tex. Crim. App. 1902) (same); see also Cop Couple in Sex Battle, SCOnsH
DAILY REc., Aug. 13, 1994, at 21 (male cop tricked female cop into marriage and sex
before confessing he was not divorced).
129 Lewis, 30 Ala. at 54-55.
130 Id. at 56.
131 Id.
132 Id. at 57.
133 See supra note 127.
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marital intercourse not adultery and, therefore, the impersonator's
fraud vitiates her consent."'
2. Fianc6lBoyfriend/Lover Impersonation
One of the most notorious recorded sexual scams is the case of
Raymond Mitchell, dubbed the "Fantasy Man" by the press.13
Mitchell telephoned women, pretended to be their fianc6s or boy-
friends, explained that he had had a fantasy about having sex with a
blindfolded woman, and persuaded them to leave their doors un-
locked and to wait in bed blindfolded.' 6 He also instructed his
victims not to touch him during sex.'37 Mitchell was convicted un-
der a Tennessee statute specifically criminalizing rape by fraud-the
only one of its kind in the United States.'38 Although arguing that
the women consented to the sexual intercourse, the court held that
consent is ineffective if obtained by deception. 9 Presently, Mitch-
ell is arguing on appeal that the statute is too vague as it does not
specifically set forth the types of fraud which would lead to
conviction.140
134 Regina v. Dee, 15 Cox 579 (1884); see also Jocelynne A. Scutt, Fraudulent Imper-
sonation and Consent in Rape, 9 U. QUEENS. L.J. 59, 63-65 (1975) [hereinafter Fraudu-
lent Impersonation] (discussing this case).
"I Susan Ager, 'Fantasy Man' Fooled so Many Women Because . , HOUSTON
CHRON., Jan. 30, 1996, at 2, available in LEXIS, News Library, Hchm File; Mark
Ippolito, Fraud-Sex Link Deep in History, TENNESSEAN, Jan. 16, 1996, at 1A, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Tennes File; Kirk Loggins, Lawyers: Dismiss Rape Case, TENNESSEAN,
Jan. 9, 1996, at 1A, available in LEXIS, News Library, Tennes File; "Fantasy Man'
Guilty of Rape in Blindfolded Encounters, MILWAUKEE 1. SENTINEL, Jan. 19, 1996, at 9,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Miljnl File; 'Fantasy Man' is Guilty of Rape, KNOX-
VILLE NEWS-SENTINEL, Jan. 19, 1996, at A6, available in LEXIS, News Library, Knews File;
Prosecutors Face Tough Question: Was it Rape or Fantasy Fulfillment, FORT WORTH
STAR-TELEGRAM, Feb. 3, 1995, at 7; Women Who Waited for Fantasy Man Now Accuse
Him of Rape, STAR TRiB. (Minneapolis, MN), Feb. 3, 1995, at SA [hereinafter Women
Who Waited].
1 See Ager, supra note 135, at 2.
1 See Ager, supra note 135, at 2.
" The statute provides that rape occurs if, inter alia, "The sexual penetration is
accomplished by fraud.' TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-503 (1997). News accounts suggest
that the statute was an update of an 1870 criminal provision on husband impersonation.
Women Who Waited, supra note 120, at 5A; Ippolito, supra note 135, at 1A.
£39 Loggins, supra note 135, at IA.
' Fantasy Man' Pleads Guilty to Sexual Battery in 4th Case, NASHVILLE BANNER,
Oct. 1, 1996, at B2.
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Similarly, in People v. Hough,14 1 the defendant impersonated
his twin brother in order to have sexual intercourse with the brot-
her's girlfriend. The court phrased the question in the case as
"whether a female actually consents to sexual intercourse with a
male who procures the female's consent by impersonating the
female's boyfriend." 142 The court found New York's nonconsent
statute required either forcible compulsion or incapacity to consent
and did not include fraud:
In general, in the absence of a statute, where a woman is capable of
consenting and does consent to sexual intercourse, a man is not guilty of
rape even though he obtained the consent through fraud or surprise....
The reason is that in the traditional definition of the crime of rape, the
sexual intercourse must have been achieved "by force", or "forcibly". 43
The court also pointed out that New York's statute, unlike other
jurisdictions', did not contain a husband impersonation provision. It
concluded that the legislature had intentionally excluded cases of
fraud or impersonation and dismissed the information. 44
The case of United States v. Booker 4 provides a third varia-
tion on the impersonation theme. Booker had sexual intercourse
with a sleeping or unconscious woman shortly after she had con-
sensual intercourse with another man, arguably impersonating the
woman's voluntary lover. He was tried for rape under military
law.'46 The court struggled with whether his action constituted
rape by fraud and whether such fraud was in the factum or in the
inducement. 147 The court ultimately held that fraud as to the iden-
tity of a sexual partner constitutes fraud in the factum which vitiates
consent because: "The better view is that the 'factum' involves both
141 124 Misc.2d 997, 607 N.Y.S.2d 884 (1994); see also Mathews v. Superior Court,
173 Cal. Rptr. 820 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (boyfriend impersonation case in which at-
tempted rape charges were dismissed); Maureen Fan, Twin Cleared for Now, NEWSDAY
(N.Y.), Jan. 14, 1994, at 40 (A member of the district attorney's office said "It creates a
glaring hole in the protection afforded to victims of sexual offenses.'"). The concurring
judge in Mathews pointed out the different treatment of married and unmarried persons
because California criminally punished husband impersonation. 173 Cal. Rptr. at 822.
142 Hough, 159 Misc.2d at 999, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 885.
,3 Id. at 1000, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 886.
'44 Id. at 1001-02, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 887.
4's 25 M.J. 114 (CMA 1987); see also Two Men Charged in Rape Case, IDAHO FALLS
PosT REG., Feb. 28, 1993, at C1, available in LEXIS, News Library, ldfall File (two
friends tricked woman into having sex with both of them).
4 Booker, 25 M.J. at 114.
141 Id. at 116.
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the nature of the act and some knowledge of the identity of the
participant."'48 Thus, Booker was convicted of rape.
3. Impersonating a Famous Person
Oscar E. Kendall impersonated fashion photographer Richard
Avedon in a pervasive ruse to persuade women to sleep with him
and give him money.149 Although news coverage of this unpub-
lished case is scant, Kendall apparently used fraud to induce wom-
en into vulnerable locations, such as their hotel rooms, and then
forcibly assaulted them.' His conduct was calculated and delib-
erate: "Kendall told a police detective in California that he knew 'it
is difficult to prosecute a rapist who, by fraud, gains the confidence
and companship (sic) of a woman . *...i,,," Once apprehended,
Kendall admitted guilt to four crimes in four cities in exchange for
the police dropping seventeen other charges."5 2  He had
been convicted of the same charge in Florida in 1968.-
3
4. Conclusion
The traditional husband impersonation cases provide a telling
illustration of the problematic elasticity of the factum-inducement
'" Id.; see also Scutt, Fraudulent Impersonation, supra note 134, at 63-65 (making
similar argument).
"'1 Laura A. Kieman, Avedon Impostor Admits Guilt in 4 Crimes in 4 Cities; Man
Admits Guilt in Crime in Avedon Impostor Case, WASH. POST, Apr. 6, 1978, at C1
[hereinafter Avedon imposter Admits]; Laura A. Kieman, Avedon Impostor Draws 7
Years, WASH. POST, May 6, 1978, at C2 [hereinafter Avedon Imposter Draws]; Bill
Roeder, Prose and Con, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 5, 1977, at 23; Ron Shaffer & Alfred E. Lewis,
Avedon Suspect Held on $1 Million Bail; Avedon Impostor Suspect is Held on $1 Mil-
lion Bail, WASH. POST, Sept. 17, 1977, at Al; Overexposed, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 26, 1977,
at 39. Kendall's criminal activity was the basis of the movie Love Crimes. Robert S.
Cauthom, 'Love Crimes' as Moving as Molasses, ARIZONA DAILY STAR, Jan. 29, 1992, at
1C; see also Feinberg, supra note 18, at 344 (discussing example of man impersonating
rock star to induce woman into sex).
350 Kieman, Avedon Imposter Admits, supra note 149, at Cl; see also Commonwealth
v. King, 434 A.2d 1294 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981) (defendant lured women with an adver-
tisement about having their pictures taken, then physically attacked them); Donna Wares,
Man With 30 Aliases to Go on Trial for RapellInvestigators Say Jailhouse Lawyer Used
his Camera to Lure Young Girls, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Feb. 28, 1988, at B01 (defen-
dant pretended to be a photographer).
15, Kieman, Avedon Imposter Draws, supra note 149, at C2.
152 Kendall had dealt with 33 women in 25 cities. He pleaded guilty to assault with
intent to commit rape. Kieman, Avedon Imposter Admits, supra note 149, at Cl.
' Kieman, Avedon Imposter Admits, supra note 149, at C1.
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
distinction in the context of assessing a victim's consent. One cour-
t's recharacterization of the consented-to act, as one of marital inter-
course not adultery, allowed it to subsume the defendant's conduct
under rape law. However, such legal sleight of hand is inadequate
to address the newer variations involving sexual partners other than
spouses.5 4 In addition, Kendall's case poses a more difficult chal-
lenge because it involves a different type of impersonation. Instead
of relying on the factum-inducement dichotomy, a superior ap-
proach may be simply to outlaw fraud as to identity in securing
sexual compliance-the standard used in England.'
C. Sexual Scams: Talent Agents, Psychologists, and Psychics
Recently, courts have been confronted with a third major cate-
gory, a new genre of cases involving a different kind of fraud-con
men who prey on women by perpetrating some form of sexual
scam, many predictably involving the entertainment industry. These
cases are difficult because they lack the historical development and,
more importantly, the intuitive appeal of the traditional fraudulent
treatment and impersonation cases. They typically involve business
settings, not professional-treatment contexts, in which the defen-
dants deceive the victims into sexual intimacy by false promises of
benefit. Because these fact patterns more closely resemble fraudu-
lent commercial transactions and trigger discussion of sexual bar-
gains,'56 they demand careful consideration as to the potential lim-
its of rape by fraud. To date, attempts to prosecute these defendants
for sexual crimes, based on exploitation of victims under the guise
of the casting couch or similar stratagems, have been largely unsuc-
cessful. Most of these sexual con men have escaped criminal sanc-
tion or, more rarely, have been convicted of fraud or property
crimes rather than the underlying sexual offense.
" In Regina v. Elbekkay, [1995] Crim LR 163 (C.A. 1994), available in LEXIS, UK
Library, ALLCAS File, a British court eschewed the distinction between married and
unmarried persons: 'How could we conscientiously hold that it is rape to impersonate a
husband in the act of sexual intercourse, but not if the person impersonated is merely,
say the long-term, live-in lover, or in the even more modem idiom, the 'partner' of the
woman concemed?"; see also Scutt, Fraudulent Impersonation, supra note 134, at 64
(arguing marriage irrelevant).
155 See, e.g., Regina v. Linekar, [1995] Crim LR 320 (C.A. 1994), available in LEXIS,
UK Library, ALLCAS File; see also infra notes 590-592 and accompanying text.
116 See Berger, supra note 8, at 76; see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 213 commentary(Proposed Official Draft 1962) (discussing distinction between coercion and bargain).
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1. Talent Agents, Acting Coaches, and Movie Producers" 7
In United States v. Condolon,'s5 the defendant engaged in an
elaborate scheme designed "solely ... to gratify his sexual de-
sires."'5 9 He rented an apartment, obtained a business license, and
placed newspaper ads offering to find women acting and modeling
jobs. 6 Condolon propositioned many of the women who con-
tacted him and a number submitted to his advances. In reality,
Condolon had neither the means nor the intention of assisting his
clients in obtaining work.' 6' He was convicted of wire fraud: "The
federal statute was not used to punish Condolon for his sexual
activities. Condolon was prosecuted for establishing a bogus com-
mercial enterprise and then using the telephone to accomplish his
fraudulent intentions."'62 Without resort to the wire fraud statute,
Condolon would likely have gone unpunished.
In Goldberg v. State, the defendant held himself out to be a
free-lance agent, telling his victim that she would make a good
model.' 63 He brought her to a condo and smooth-talked her into
removing her clothing (the victim stated that she was frightened of
the defendant at this point) and eventually engaged in sexual inter-
course. Goldberg appealed his conviction of second-degree rape.
The appellate court reversed, finding insufficient evidence of force
and holding that in the absence of force, the victim's lack of con-
sent is irrelevant.'64 The court also considered whether the victim
resisted or had been prevented from resisting because of fear; how-
ever, it concluded "unreasonable subjective fear of resisting cannot
convert the conduct of the defendant from that which is non-crimi-
157 See Schulhofer, Feminist Challenge, supra note 8, at 2185 (analyzing casting
couch ploy).
,s 600 F.2d 7 (4th Cir. 1979).
159 Id. at 8.
160 Id.; see also United States v. Altman, 901 F.2d 1161 (2d Cir. 1990) (defendant
convicted of sexual exploitation of minor, interstate transportation of minor with intent to
engage in illegal sexual activity, and wire fraud). "Altman posed as an owner of a mod-
eling agency and induced women to pay him money to become his models. He then
plied the women with the amphetamine Didrex diet pills, had intercourse with them,
and took sexually explicit photographs of them.' Id. at 1162.
161 Condolon, 600 F.2d at 8.
162 Id. at 9. Florida is the only state to have a statute, a civil one, regulating sexual
misconduct in the operation of a talent agency. FLA. STAT. ch. 468.415 (1996).
16 395 A.2d 1213 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979).
164 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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nal to that which is criminal." 16' Because the jury had been in-
structed not to return a verdict on any lesser-included offense,
Goldberg escaped all criminal liability. 66
Similarly, in the civil case of Micari v. Mann,167 an elderly
acting teacher persuaded his young female students to have sexual
intercourse with him and each other by saying that it would im-
prove their acting. After the jury was instructed that "consent...
would be a complete defense 'unless i) the defendant falsely repre-
sented to the plaintiffs that their performance of such acts was relat-
ed to their training as actresses, and ii) plaintiffs relied upon such
misrepresentation," 1 68 it found Mann liable and awarded the plain-
tiffs compensatory damages. The reviewing court determined puni-
tive damages were appropriate, ordering a new trial on that issue:
Here the testimony indicated that defendant, playing upon the emotional
needs of his insecure students, actively sought to be ensconced as their
trusted father figure-indeed, one of the plaintiffs described defendant's
behavior after a sexual experience as "fatherly". It is this studied effort at
domination under the guise of acting in loco parentis, coupled with both
his actual and apparent ability to affect plaintiffs' dearest aspirations, that
renders defendant's actions so heinous. This gross violation was not mere-
ly of their bodies but of their trust as well, an invasion so reprehensible as
to cry out for the imposition of a sanction expressing the moral outrage of
society. Under these circumstances one would be hard pressed to find a
situation where punitive damages were more warranted.'69
Author Linda A. Fairstein devotes an entire chapter of her book
SEXUAL VIOLENCE to sexual scams. 70 One case she describes per-
tains to acting coach Paul Hannon who singled out women from his
large classes for special acting lessons, during which he persuaded
several of them to perform fellatio on him. 7' The pattern is almost
165 Goldberg, 395 A.2d at 1220.
11 John MacDonald's book RAPE: OFFENDERS AND THEIR VICTIMS, supra note 122, pro-
vides the example of a Denver personnel manager who claimed to be searching for
models for his store. The manager told one young woman that she would make a
great model and induced her to allow him to measure her for a diaphragm, which he
claimed was needed because so many models were becoming pregnant. The perpetrator
digitally penetrated the young woman and proposed inserting himself, but she declined.
The man succeeded in persuading a second, more gullible, woman to have intercourse
with him to enlarge her to a size sufficient for the job. He told a third woman that she
had a vaginal disease and that he had some pills.
167 126 Misc.2d 422, 481 N.Y.S.2d 967 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1984).
' Id. at 423, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 969.
169 Id. at 429, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 972.
'70 FAIRSTEIN, supra note 47, at 185-197.
171 FAIRSTEIN, supra note 47, at 185-191.
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identical to Micari: "Each conceded that she had not been 'forced'
to submit to him with a weapon or verbal threats, but that his pres-
ence was itself overpowering. He was in a position of responsibility
and authority, and obviously aware that he was, at least psycho-
logically, coercing his students into this behavior."172  The
women's testimony was presented to a grand jury, but it
declined to indict.
173
A sensational case from Hong Kong completes this Article's
overview of entertainment industry sex scam cases. In one of the
most notorious cases of sexual con men, defendant Chin Chi-Ming,
pretended to be influential in the film industry, using promises of
movie stardom, apartments, and cars to lure at least five women,
some well-known starlets, into bed. 74 Afterwards, Chin black-
mailed them with pictures taken at the sexual encounters. He was
convicted of three counts of blackmail, one of procurement, one of
172 FAIRSTEIN, supra note 47, at 190.
173 Steve Davidson is a third example of a man who used an acting ploy to secure
sexual relations with women. Davidson, who was actually an agent for the Internal
Revenue Service, pretended to audition women for a movie role and got them to spank
him purely for his sexual gratification. The state cleverly prosecuted Davidson for a
scheme to defraud, a property crime, rather than a sexual offense. The property was the
women's videotaped performances. Davidson pleaded guilty and was sentenced to five
years of probation; he was also fired. FAIRSTEIN, supra note 47, at 195-97. Similarly,
news accounts describe the case of Dale Normand who tricked young women, some
minors, into having sex with him by telling them that he would give them parts in a
movie he was producing. He also pleaded guilty to two counts of securities violations
in Ohio. H.G. Reza, Sex Offender Pleads Guilty to Stock Swindle, L.A. TiMES, Sept. 7,
1990, at B8, available in LEXIS, News Library, LAT File.
' ' Norma Connolly, Police Hold ABC' Man After Woman Makes Rape Claim, H.K.
STANDARD, Sept. 23, 1997; Hugo Gurdon, Sex and the Stars Draw Crowds in Colony
Court, DAILY TELEGRAPH, July 27, 1991, at 11; Kevin Hamlin, Tales from the Casting
Couch Pack HK Court, INDEPENDENT (London), Aug. 17, 1991, at 1, available in LEXIS,
News Library, lndpnt File; Kevin Hamlin, 'Terrible Sex' Brings Four Years' Jail, INDEPEN-
DENT (London), Oct. 29, 1991, at 14, available in LEXIS, News Library, Indpnt File; An-
drew Higgins, The World of Mr. Chin, INDEPENDENT (London), Oct. 13, 1991, at 14,
available in LEXIS, News Library, lndpnt File; Carol Scott & Bonny Tam, Hong Kong.
Jailed Chin to Appeal on Blackmail Verdict, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 29, 1991, at
P1, 8; Hedley Thomas, Sex Conman Free to Cash in on Memoirs, S. CHINA MORNING
POsT, Feb. 3, 1994, at 5, available in LEXIS, News Library, Schina File; Chin Loses Ap-
peal on Sex Trial Delay, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 12, 1993, at 8, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Schina File; Hong Kong: Businessman on Sex Charges, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Sept. 19, 1990, at P2; No Kiss and Tell From Hong Kong Sex
Conman . . . Yet, REUTER WORLD SERV., Feb. 4, 1994.
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attempted procurement, and four counts of theft; he served almost
four years in prison.17 Recently, Chin was arrested on new rape
charges. 76
2. "The Abominable Snowman"
The entertainment industry is not the only environment foster-
ing sexual scams. The defendant in People v. Evans177 met his
victim, Peterson, at the local airport where he struck up a conver-
sation with her by claiming to be a psychologist writing a magazine
article involving sociological experimentation.178 Defendant Evans
and another woman took Peterson to a singles bar to allegedly con-
duct such an sociological experiment. Evans then enticed Peterson
to accompany him to an apartment, saying it was one of his offices,
where he continued his psychological-interviewing ploy.79 After
several hours, Evans grabbed Peterson and tried to disrobe her.
When she resisted, defendant's tactics changed, he told that she had
failed the test and he was disappointed.' Evans then told Peter-
son to consider her situation, saying among other things: "'I could
kill you. I could rape you. I could hurt you physically."" 8' The
defendant ultimately had sexual intercourse with Peterson several
times. 2 Later, Evans claimed that the acts were consensual and
told the police that "the whole psychology bit was a 'game that he
played with girls' heads."" 83 The court overturned Evans' convic-
tion, finding an absence of forcible compulsion or threat.' 84 The
175 Chin Loses Appeal on Sex Trial Delay, supra note 175, at 8.
176 Connolly, supra note 174.
'7 85 Misc.2d 1088, 379 N.Y.S.2d 912 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1975).
1 I include Evans in the sexual scam section because defendant Evans's behavior
more closely resembles the other defendants in this section than those in the fraudulent
treatment cases.
"7 85 Misc.2d at 1092, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 916.
180 Id.
' Id. at 1093, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 917.
182 Id.
183 Id. at 1094, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 918.
" The court stressed the defendant had not resorted to physical force; it drew a line
between seduction and rape:
As we have become more civilized, we have come to condemn the more
overt, aggressive and outrageous behavior of some men towards women and
we have labeled it "rape'. We have attempted to control or deter it by pro-
viding for extremely heavy sentences ....
At the same time we have recognized that there are some patterns of
aggression or aggressive male sexual behavior toward females which do not
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prevailing view, according to the court, was that no rape occurs
when sexual intercourse is achieved by fraud, trick, or stratagem:
"Provided there is actual consent, the nature of the act being un-
derstood, it is not rape, absent a statute, no matter how despicable
the fraud, .... ,'I' Although the court reasoned that larceny by
trick did not apply because a woman's right to her body was not a
thing of value within the meaning of theft law, the court did voice
its strong disapproval of Evans's conduct in the final portion of its
opinion, calling him "The Abominable Snowman."18
3. A Psychic
In an English case involving a bizarre sex scam, James
Finningham posed as a wealthy psychic and pretended to be inhab-
ited by a dead American Indian chief.'87 He persuaded a gullible
victim to sleep with him by telling her during a seance that she
should physically give herself to him.'88 Following both sexual
deserve such extreme penalties, in which the male objective may be achieved
through charm or guile or protestations of love, promises or deceit.
Where force is not employed to overcome reluctance, and where consent,
however reluctant initially, can be spelled out, this we label "seduction,"
which society may condone, even as it disapproves.
85 Misc.2d at 1090, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 914.
s Id. at 1095, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 919.
t' The Evans court wrote:
The testimony in the case reveals that the defendant was a predator, and that
naive and gullible girls . . . were his natural prey. He posed. He lied. He
pretended and he deceived. He used confidences which were innocently be-
stowed as leverage to effect his will. He used psychological techniques to
achieve vulnerability and sympathy, and the erosion of resistance. A young
and inexperienced girl like Beth Peterson was then unable to withstand the
practiced onslaught of the defendant. The defendant apparently got his kicks
through the exercise of these techniques. He apparently spumed the readily
available women, the acquiescent women, like Bridget, who was living in the
same apartment. To him, the game was worth more than the prize. He boast-
ed to the police that this was a game he played with girls' heads. The Court
finds his conduct, if not criminal, to be reprehensible. It was conquest by con
job. Truly, therefore, this defendant may be called "The Abominable Snow-
man.'
Id. at 1099, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 921-22.
18' Pat Clarke, "Rasputin" Conman Held Woman Prisoner, PRESs ASS'N NEWSFILE, Oct.
25, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Panews File; Conman Termed Modern-Day
Rasputin Gets Seven Years, REUTER LIBR. REP., Oct. 25, 1993.
18 Clarke, supra note 187.
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and financial exploitation of the woman, Finningham was convicted
of fraud and false imprisonment, "but cleared of obtaining property
by deception and causing her actual bodily harm."" 9
4. Conclusion
The sexual-scam cases push the frontiers of rape by fraud by
exceeding the boundaries set by traditional fraudulent treatment and
husband impersonation cases. Their judicial reception has been
mixed. Most defendants in these cases escape criminal sanction
because courts, hampered by the poverty of statutory enactments,
are reluctant to extend the coverage of sexual offenses to them.
However, because many of these con men also stole money or
property from their victims, a few courts have managed to punish
such defendants for fraud or property offenses, leaving the sexual
aspects of their crimes untouched. While notable, this result is trou-
bling because it fails to protect citizens' rights to be free of fraudu-
lent pressures in the sexual context,9 exalting the protection of
property rights over sexual integrity. 9' Further, such result fails to
vindicate the unique and qualitatively more serious harm of sexual
offenses.'92
D. Sexual Theft: Prostitutes93
A fourth category of potential rape by fraud cases, closely relat-
ed to sexual scams, involves perhaps the most controversial of vic-
tims, persons who sell their sexual services. In some senses, these
cases are easier than those involving sexual scams because the
terms of exchange between defendants and victims are less ambigu-
ous. However, given that prostitution remains illegal in most states,
the victims of sexual theft may appear unworthy of sympathy be-
cause they engage in societally opprobrious behavior and may lack
189 Clarke, supra note 162.
'9o Larson calls this the sex exception to fraud. Larson, Women Understand, supra
note 24, at 412.
"'1 Estrich points out that if Goldberg and Evans had been stealing property, they
would have been punished. ESTRICH, supra note 7, at 70.
192 Estrich emphasizes that the loss of bodily integrity is greater than the loss of
money. Estrich, Rape, supra note 7, at 1121.
"' I use the term "theft' narrowly here to include only cases in which the victim of-
fered to sell sexual services.
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legally enforceable rights to complain about the perpetration of
fraud in their profession. 94
In a recent case from England, Regina v. Linekar,'95 the de-
fendant approached a part-time prostitute and negotiated a price of
twenty-five pounds for sexual intercourse. Afterwards, the defendant
refused to pay and the woman alleged rape.'96 According to one
author, the court conceptualized the question as: "whether the
complainant's consent to sexual intercourse was vitiated by the
defendant's decision not to pay her, namely by fraud."' 97 The trial
court instructed the jury that consent obtained by fraud is invalid,
and it returned a guilty verdict. The appellate court quashed the
conviction because the prostitute had consented to the intercourse
and the fraud went to a collateral matter: "The reality of that con-
sent is not destroyed by being induced by the appellant's false
pretence that his intention was to pay the agreed price of £25 for
her services."'98 The court held that the only forms of fraud negat-
ing consent are those that go to the nature of the act itself or the
identity of the person."'9 The court also emphasized that it is the
absence of consent, not the presence of fraud, that turns sexual
intercourse into rape.2" The court opined that Linekar should
have been prosecuted under a different English statute, making it a
crime to procure a woman by false pretenses or representations to
have sexual intercourse.20'
In a similar case from Canada, Regina v. Petrozzi,21 2 the de-
fendant solicited a prostitute and told her that he would pay her
$100 for sexual services, although he had no intention of doing so.
'9' See Panel Discussion, Men, Women, and Rape, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 125
[hereinafter Men, Women, and Rape] (1994) (remarks by Dripps) (Professor Dripps argues
that sexual fraud will not be criminally punished until civil law enforces contracts for
sexual services). He writes: "What seems to be at the heart of the problem of sexual
fraud is that a pristine contract for prostitution is itself 9 crime under the criminal law,
and unenforceable under the law of contracts because contrary to public policy." Id. at
144-45.
,9' [1995] Crim LR 320 (C.A. 1994), available in LEXIS, UK Library, ALLCAS File; see
also Fraud Affecting Consent in Rape; Law Report, TiMES (London), Oct. 26, 1994.
19 [1995] Crim LR at 320.
197 Alan Reed, Contra Bonos Mores: Fraud Affecting Consent in Rape, 145 NEw L.J.
174, 174 (1995).
'9 Linekar, [1995] Crim LR 320.
'99 Id.
Id.
201 Id.; see also Reed, supra note 197, at 176 (agreeing with Court's suggestion).
202 35 C.C.C. 3d 528, 2 W.C.B. 2d 109 (1987).
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After Petrozzi had isolated the woman, he physically attacked
her." 3 The trial judge instructed the jury that if it found there was
a causal connection between the fraud and the victim's submission,
then no consent existed, and the defendant was guilty of rape. 4
The jury convicted Petrozzi, but the case was overturned on appeal.
The reviewing court held that the only types of fraud vitiating con-
sent were those that went to the nature or quality of the act or the
identity of the person,"0 the same standard as Linekar. In a famil-
iar refrain, the court said that if the legislature wanted to expand the
range of fraud vitiating consent, it must do so explicitly."6 It also
worried about the outer limits of a broader rule, asking whether it
would be sexual assault if one adult simply lied to another.207
The Second Restatement of Torts adopts a similar example to
illustrate the difference between fraud as to an essential matter and
fraud affecting only a collateral issue in the context of the tort of
battery:
1. A, to induce B to submit to intimate familiarities, offers her a paper
which A represents to be a twenty dollar bill but which he knows to be
counterfeit. B, believing the paper to be a genuine bill, submits. A is not
liable to B for battery.
2. The same facts as in Illustration 1, except that the paper is offered if B
will submit to a blood transfusion. A is subject to liability to B for the
harm done by the operation to which A has fraudulently induced him to
submit.
28
203 Id.
204 Id.
205 Id.
20 The Legislature had already changed the language of the statute when Canada
replaced rape with sexual assault, but the court did not find this change sufficient. Id.
207 See also Regina v. Clarence, (1888) 22 Q.B.D. 23, a case involving a man infect-
ed with a venereal disease who had sexual intercourse with his wife without disclosing
his condition. In dicta, the majority wrote:
That consent obtained by fraud is no consent at all is not true as a general
proposition either in fact or in law. If a man meets a woman in the street
and knowingly gives her bad money in order to procure her consent to inter-
course with him, he obtains her consent by fraud, but it would be childish to
say that she did not consent.
Clarence, 22 Q.B.D. at 23, quoted in Beale, supra note 5, at 319. The court also pro-
vided an example of a man who passed himself off as a person of good family and
standing when in fact he was a jailbird. Clarence, 22 Q.B.D. at 23, quoted in Reed,
supra note 197, at 175; see also Regina v. Cuerrier, 111 C.C.C. 3d 261 (1996) (involv-
ing man with HIV who lied about his status to two women to have sexual intercourse).
210 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 57 cmt. a, illus. 1 & 2 (1965); see also RE-STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892B cmt. g, illus. 9 (1977) (describing virtually same
fact pattern); Puttkammer, supra note 5, at 422 (using example of paying prostitute with
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A cursory review of the above illustrates that the difference between
the two examples is not entirely clear. Therein lies the problem.
Commentators have suggested the real reason that the law does not
recognize rape (or battery) under these circumstances is that society
often views the prostitute's behavior as immoral and illegal." 9
E. The Abuse of Authority
Turning to rape by coercion, a fifth category of cases embraces
situations in which a defendant uses an authoritative position or
manipulates a power relationship to achieve sexual compliance. In
these cases, defendants coerce victims to consent by threats or
pressure falling short of physical force, rather than deploying de-
ceptive measures. Cases falling into this category cover a broad
spectrum of contexts. In three cases, the defendant held a position
of trust or authority over a minor. Two cases involved real or
feigned police officers. In a final case, the defendant was the
victim's employer.
1. Teachers, Principals, and Guardians of Minors
The issue of coerced sex is successfully raised in Scadden v.
State.2"' Scadden, a high school teacher and girls' volleyball
coach, "encouraged the victims to become dependent on him in an
atmosphere of trust, and ... then used this influence to impose his
sexual will on those students."2 . Wyoming's statute criminalized
sexual conduct when a defendant used his position of authority to
cause a victim to submit;212 submit was defined to mean that the
counterfeit money).
10 See, e.g., 1 STUDIES IN AMERICAN TORT LAW 133 (arguing Restatement's two illus-
trations, the gigolo and blood seller, unhelpful: "The distinction between these two situa-
tions-if it exists at all-is surely too elusive to provide useful guidance to the courts or
the public. The drafters of the Restatement's illustration may have assumed, without
making their premises clear, that selling sexual services is more objectionable than sell-
ing blood."); Reed, supra note 197, at 176; Men, Women, and Rape, supra note 194, at
144-45 (remarks by Dripps).
210 732 P.2d 1036 (Wyo. 1987).
211 Id. at 1039.
212 The statute punishes second-degree sexual assault if 'The actor is in a position of
authority over the victim and uses this position of authority to cause the victim to sub-
mit.' Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-303(a)(vi) (Michie 1997).
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person "does not give free, full and reasoned consent."2 13 On ap-
peal, Scadden challenged the statute as being void for vagueness,
arguing that the position-of-authority definition could include exam-
ples such as inducing someone to have sex by using emotional
involvement. The Wyoming Supreme Court rejected this interpreta-
tion, stating it would use common sense in applying the statute and
affirmed.214
In a comparable case from a different jurisdiction without a
similar statute, State v. Thompson,21 the defendant was a high-
school' principal who threatened to prevent the graduation of a
female student unless she complied with his sexual demands. Be-
fore trial, the defendant sought to have the charges dismissed as
failing to allege a criminal offense under Montana law.2"' The dis-
trict court agreed and the Montana Supreme Court affirmed noting
that the element of force was lacking." 7 It opined that force could
not be stretched "to include intimidation, fear, or apprehension,"
but rather must be given its ordinary meaning." 8 In the final para-
graph of its opinion, the court opined:
This case is one of considerable difficulty for us, as indeed it must have
been for the District Court judge. The alleged facts, if true, show disgust-
ing acts of taking advantage of a young person by an adult who occupied
a position of authority over the young person. If we could rewrite the stat-
utes to define the alleged acts here as sexual intercourse without consent,
we would willingly do so. The business of courts, however, is to interpret
statutes, not to rewrite them, nor to insert words not put there by the
legislature. With a good deal of reluctance, and with strong condemnation
of the alleged acts, we affirm the District Court.219
This opinion is remarkably similar to Don Moran and other cases
discussing the limitations imposed on the courts by the language of
their jurisdiction's rape statutes.
213 Scadden, 732 P.2d at 1040.
214 Id. at 1042-43; see also State v. Carter, 663 A.2d 101 (N.H. 1995) (defendant
eighth-grade teacher convicted of sexual assault for using his position of authority to
coerce student to submit).
215 792 P.2d 1103 (Mont. 1990).
2 6 Id. at 1105.
217 Id. at 1106.
218 Id.
29 Id. at 1107.
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Finally, in Commonwealth v. Mlinarich,220 the defendant
guardian threatened a fourteen-year-old girl in his care with return
to a juvenile detention facility if she did not accede to his sexual
demands. The question that the court had to address was whether
such threat constituted "forcible compulsion" or the "threat of forc-
ible compulsion that would prevent resistance by a person of rea-
sonable resolution" within the meaning of Pennsylvania's rape
law.22' The court answered the question in the negative. It noted
that forcible compulsion includes both physical force and psycho-
logical duress,222 but the latter must be of sufficient intensity to
overpower the will to resist and here it did not.223 The court stat-
ed: "Notwithstanding, she was left with a choice and therefore the
submission was a result of a deliberate choice and was not an invol-
untary act."224 One dissenter characterized this fact pattern as clea-
rly involving psychological coercion.22 Another dissenting judge
wrote: "The question is not whether she could make a choice to
yield or be confined, but whether the law should allow such a
choice at all."226 In a subsequent Pennsylvania case involving sex-
ual acts by a male therapist with his adolescent male patient,22 7
the court found the forcible element of rape was satisfied by the
therapist's position of authority.228
220 542 A.2d 1335 (Pa. 1988). But see United States v. Palmer, 33 MJ. 7 (1991)
(agreeing with State v. Etheridge and discussing "compulsion of parental command');
State v. Etheridge, 352 S.E.2d 673 (N.C. 1987) (finding constructive force in parent-child
relationship).
22 Mlinarich, 542 A.2d at 1338.
222 Id.
213 Id. at 1342.
2214 Id. at 1341. The court elaborated:
The purpose of the term was to distinguish between assault upon the will and
the forcing of the victim to make a choice regardless how repugnant. Certainly
difficult choices have a coercive effect but the result is the product of the rea-
son, albeit unpleasant and reluctantly made. The fact cannot be escaped that
the victim has made the choice and the act is not involuntary.
Id. at 1342.
225 Id. at 1344.
226 Mlinarich, 542 A.2d at 1350 (McDermott, J., dissenting).
' Commonwealth v. Frank, 577 A.2d 609 (Pa. 1990).
22' The Frank court wrote: 'Appellant occupied a position of authority such that it
may be reasonably inferred that the victim would feel coerced to submit to appellant's
demands out of a sense of duty to obey not only the appellant, but also the wishes of
his then adoptive mother." Id. at 619.
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2. Real and Feigned Police Officers229
In Commonwealth v. Caracciola23 , the defendant pretended
to be a police officer and threatened to imprison a woman unless
she submitted to his sexual advances. The defendant moved to dis-
miss the indictment, arguing that the force requirement of rape had
not been satisfied. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held
that the defendant's conduct fell within the purview of its rape
statute. It sought, however, to distinguish the case from one involv-
ing fraud, although the defendant in this case was impersonating a
police officer.23 ' The court analogized to the state's robbery stat-
ute, stating that the force requirement for rape could be satisfied by
constructive force because: "The defendant's argument that physical
force is a required element in rape cases asks us to assume that the
Legislature intended to give greater protection to property than to
bodily integrity. We decline to make such an unwarranted assump-
22 See generally Diane C. Sheiring, Annotation, Sexual Misconduct or Irregularity as
Amounting to 'Conduct Unbecoming an Officer,' Justifying Officer's Demotion or
Removal or Suspension from Duty, 9 A.L.R. 4TH 614 (1981); Hightower v. State, 443
So. 2d 1270 (Ala. crim. App. 1982), rev'd, 443 So. 2d 1272 (Ala. 1983) (officer
prosecuted for sexual misconduct for threatening woman with jail if she did not submit
to sexual intercourse); Douglas v. Daniels, 382 N.E.2d 90 (111. App. Ct. 1978) (police
officer coerced woman into sexual relationship in exchange for not enforcing his duty);
State v. Beugli, 868 P.2d 766 (Or. Ct. App. 1994) (officer charged with sexual abuse,
official misconduct, and harassment for inappropriately touching four women suspects);
Julie Irwin, Man Charged with Posing as Police/Lincoln Heights Firefighter Arrested,
CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, June 25, 1995, at C6, available in LEXIS, News Library, Cinnqr
File; Melissa Martinez, Cop Accused of Fondling Women/Tucson Police Officer Charles
Thomas Robb is Suspended after Being Indicted on Six Counts of Abuse While He was
on Duty, TUCSON CITIZEN, May 25, 1996, at 1C; Cheryl Martinis, Case Against State
Trooper's Searches Goes to Jury, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, July 2, 1996, at B3; Cheryl
Martinis, Trial Under Way for State Trooper, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, June 21, 1996, at
C3; Steve Ryfle, 2 Women Accuse Officer of Harassment; Police: Suit Alleges Lewd
Conduct by Glendale Patrolman During a Traffic Stop/Department Declines to Comment,
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1995, at B4; Around the Tristate News Tips, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER,
June 22, 1995, at C2, available in LEXIS, News Library, Cinnqr File; State Trooper
Charged with Sex Abuse, UPI, Feb. 14, 1991; Trooper Acquitted of Touchy Searches,
BULL. (Bend, Or.), July 3, 1996, at B4; Trooper Sidelined as Prosecutors, OSP Spar,
BULL (Bend, Or.), Jan. 16, 1997, at B3; see also People v. Cavanaugh, 158 P. 1053
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1916) (involving both physical threats and coercive impersonation of
an officer). The court reversed the conviction because the woman may have acceded to
the defendant's sexual demands not because of physical force but rather from his
impersonation of a police officer, which would not be sufficient for rape. Id. at 1055-56.
230 569 N.E.2d 774 (Mass. 1991).
21 Id. at 777.
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tion."232 The dissent argued that rape requires either physical force
or a threat of bodily injury, citing Goldenberg (a fraudulent medical
treatment case).233
Likewise, in State v. Felton,234 the defendant, a Louisiana po-
lice officer, was convicted of extortion, not a sex crime, for forcing
a woman to have sexual intercourse with him by threatening to
arrest her.23 The defendant appealed, arguing that the state statute
was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. The appellate court
rejected both arguments.2 3
3. Employers237
In State v. Caprio,235 the defendant manager of a time-share
condominium company called an employee into his office, maneu-
vered her between his legs, and fondled her. The young woman
repeatedly told the defendant to stop, but he continued his advanc-
es.239 A jury convicted Caprio of five counts of third-degree sexual
assault based on strong compulsion, the physical force he used in
232 Id.
233 Id. at 783 (citing Commonwealth v. Goldenberg, 155 N.E.2d 187 (1959)); see also
State v. Burke, 522 A.2d 725, 736 (R.I. 1987) (interpreting Rhode Island's sexual assault
statute as encompassing case of police officer using his position of authority to intimi-
date victim into sex: "[T]he defendant's position of authority, in and of itself, carried
with it an implied threat, and this appearance of authority, combined with the fact that
defendant was armed, and the peculiar vulnerability of the victim, are sufficient to sup-
port a jury verdict that defendant coerced submission by impliedly threatening the victim
within the meaning of § 11-37-1(c).').
2 339 So. 2d 797 (La. 1976); see also State v. Robertson, 649 P.2d 569 (Or. 1982)
(embodying a similar fact pattern although the case turns on the constitutionality of the
statute). The court wrote: "[D]efendants are accused of coercing the victim into sexual
conduct by threatening to 'expose a secret and publicize an asserted fact [not further
described in the indictment] which would tend to subject [her] to hatred, contempt, and
ridicule." Id. at 589 (brackets in original).
23s Id. at 799.
2 Id. at 799-800.
"' See also State v. Trevino, 833 P.2d 1170 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991), aff'd sub nom.
State v. Orosco, 833 P.2d 1146 (N.M. 1992) (position of employer does not
automatically translate into using position to coerce, but jury could infer employer had
used coercion); Thoreson v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 149 Misc.2d 150, 563 N.Y.S.2d 968
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1990) (a civil case in which defendant allegedly caused plaintiff
to engage in sexual acts as condition of employment); Carrie N. Baker, Sexual Extortion:
Criminalizing Quid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment, 13 L. & INEQ. J. 213 (1994); Regina v.
Hon, 2 HKC 599 (1995), 1995 LEXIS 660 (employer persuaded foreign employee to
allow him to examine her breasts under pretext of medical exam).
"a 937 P.2d 933 (Haw. Ct. App. 1997).
29 Id. at 936.
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securing the woman between his legs.24° Caprio challenged his
conviction, claiming that the trial judge should have instructed the
jury on the lesser offense of fourth-degree sexual assault, which
only requires compulsion-"a threat ... that places a person in fear
of public humiliation, property damage, or financial loss.1124 1 The
appellate court agreed with such assertion because the evidence
supported the inference that Caprio had also threatened financial
loss.242
4. Conclusion
The abuse-of-authority cases, like the fraudulent treatment deci-
sions, illustrate that the availability of specific statutory enactments
is frequently outcome-determinative. In the trio of opinions involv-
ing minors, defendant Scadden's behavior was no more blamewor-
thy or outrageous than defendants' Thompson's or Mlinarich's.
However, Scadden lived in a jurisdiction with an abuse-of-authority
provision while his cohorts did not. The one exception to this trend
was Caracciola where the court upheld the defendant's conviction
by invoking the constructive force doctrine and analogizing to the
state's robbery statute. Collectively, however, these cases clearly
highlight the problem of selective coverage as a result of the
diversity of extant statutory law.
F. Sexual Extortion
Closely related to the abuse-of-power cases, several opinions
implicate the use of fraudulent or nonfraudulent extortion to obtain
sexual intercourse, thereby blurring the line between rape by fraud
and rape by coercion. These cases differ from abuse-of-power situa-
tions because they generally do not involve defendants in formal-
ized positions of authority but rather individuals who exploit power
derived from circumstantial contact with the victim.
In a 1948 case from California, People v. Cassandras,243 the
defendant accosted a married woman outside an employment office,
240 Id. at 938.
241 HAW. REv. STAT. § 707-700 (1996).
242 Caprio, 937 P.2d at 938-39. This case is of interest because Hawaii's sexual
assault statutes are rather unique in that they include nonphysical threats.
243 188 P.2d 546 (Cal. Ct. App. 1948); see also Harris, supra note 12, at 644 (dis-
cussing case).
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told her about a possible job, and persuaded her to get into a car
with him. Cassandras then drove the woman to a hotel room where
he used various threats-including advising the police that she was
a prostitute so they would take her children away-to cause her to
submit to sexual intercourse.244 Appealing his conviction, Cassan-
dras alleged that he did not fall under California's rape statute
which required either force or threat.24 The court rejected such
assertion, finding that the defendant had used sufficient threats to
secure the woman's compliance.24
In a more recent case, State v. Lovely,247 the defendant be-
friended the male victim, hired him as an employee, and paid his
rent and restitution for a past theft committed by the victim. Lovely
then coerced the male victim into various sexual acts by threatening
to fire, evict, sue, and turn him over to the police.248 The jury
convicted Lovely of twelve counts of aggravated felonious sexual as-
sault and seven counts of sexual assault.249 He appealed arguing
that threats of financial retribution are not covered by the state's
sexual assault statutes, which are limited to threats of violence."'
The New Hampshire Supreme Court upheld the convictions relying
on complex statutory interpretation. First, it noted that the sexual
assault statutes prohibited coercion based on retaliation. Second, it
found that retaliation was defined to include extortion.25' Because
extortion was not defined in the sexual assault context, the court
looked to the state's theft by extortion statute, which defined extor-
tion to include causing official action or harming someone in their
financial condition.52 The court concluded, therefore, that "[t]hre-
ats of mental punishment, extortion (as defined ... to include
threats of economic reprisal) or public humiliation or disgrace clear-
ly extend beyond threats of physical violence to reach acts that
undermine consent through the use of non-violent coercion."
2 3
24 Cassandras, 188 P.2d at 548.
245 Id. at 549.
24 Id. at 549-50. A second issue in the case was the admissibility of evidence of a
similar act committed with another woman; the court upheld its admission. Id. at 550-
52.
247 480 A.2d 847 (N.H. 1984).
214 Id. at 849-50.
249 Id. at 848.
25 Id. at 849.
251 Id. at 850.
212 Lovely, 480 A.2d at 850.
253 Id. at 850.
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Following denial of his motion for reconsideration, Lovely filed an
unsuccessful petition for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the
state supreme court's interpretation was unconstitutional; the First
Circuit upheld the dismissal.254
A third illustration of sexual extortion involves newspaper
accounts which describe a scheme by which a man fraudulently
blackmailed two women into sexual intercourse."' The man tele-
phoned the women and offered not to testify against their husbands
in traffic-accident cases if they would bring money to a hotel room.
He told one wife to wear a low-cut blouse and a slit skirt. When
the women arrived, the blackmailer took the money and also co-
erced the women into sex. Unfortunately, no additional information
is available regarding this case.
Finally, several civil cases involve sexual extortion by attorneys
who have used their professional relationship to pressure women
into sexual acts.2"6 In In re Piatt, an attorney disciplinary case, a
lawyer told one client that if she did not sexually cooperate, he
could not represent her without more money. He informed a sec-
ond client, who had declined his sexual advances, that she would
have to accept an undesirable settlement agreement or it would cost
her more money." 7 Piatt was found guilty and "sentenced" to
public censure. Similarly, In re Rinella involved a domestic relations
2s4 Lovely v. Cunningham, 796 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1986).
255 UPI, Sept. 16, 1982, available in LEXIS, News Library, UPSTAT File; UPI, Sept.
17, 1982, available in LEXIS, News Library, UPSTAT File. Newspaper articles reveal the
existence of several cases alleging sex by extortion. See, e.g., Cheryl Devall & Patrick
Reardon, Sawyer Ends Advisory Panel at CHA, CHI. TRIB., July 27, 1988, at C1, avail-
able in LEXIS, News Library, Chitrib File (Chicago Housing Authority administrators);
Gary Rotstein, UPI, Jan. 13, 1982 (male students of female sixth-grade teacher); Officers
Resign in Face of Sex Scandal, UPI, Oct. 8, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library,
UPI File (army officers); Police Probe Computer Sex Net, UPI, Dec. 23, 1985 (civilian
with minors).
256 See, e.g., In re Gilbert, 194 A.2d 262, 606 N.Y.S.2d 478 (1993); see also
McDaniel v. Gile, 230 Cal. App. 3d 363 (1991) (finding lawyer malpractice in threaten-
ing to withhold services unless client complies with sexual demands); Barbara A. v. John
G., 193 Cal. Rptr. 422 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (fraud action by woman against her attor-
ney for misrepresenting his sterility in order to have sexual intercourse with her).
257 951 P.2d 889 (Ariz. 1997).
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attorney who coerced three clients into sexual relationships and lied
about it later. The attorney was suspended for three years:58
The Board found that this conduct by respondent constituted overreaching
because he used his position of influence over the clients to pressure
them to engage in sexual relations. The Board noted that all of the wom-
en testified that they did not want to engage in sexual relations with re-
spondent but felt that they had to in order to ensure that they were effec-
tively represented and because they could not afford to hire another
lawyer.2"9
Although these cases do not involve criminal charges, the conduct
involved closely resembles that of others who extorted sexual
intercourse."'
In summary, defendants in sexual extortion cases used coer-
cive, sometimes fraudulent, threats to compel sexual submission.
These cases emphasize the coercive nature of threats involving, for
example, the police or legal system, even when the defendant does
not hold an authoritative position such as a law enforcement officer.
Moreover, by exploiting their clients' financial vulnerability to ac-
complish sexual conduct, the attorney disciplinary cases raise the
specter of economic threats for the first time in this case review.261
G. Conclusion
The foregoing review of cases involving criminal actors who
used fraud or coercion to accomplish sexual penetration or contact
documents some important trends. First, these cases collectively
paint a disturbing picture of sexual exploitation in a variety of con-
texts through a panoply of means. Defendants (all male) misrepre-
sented to their prey (mostly female) that sexual intercourse was
essential to their victims' medical treatment, psychological well-
258 In re Rinella, 677 N.E.2d 909 (III. 1997), cert. denied sub nom. Rinella v. Robin-
son, 118 S. Ct. 371 (1997).
259 Id. at 913.
21 William D. Langford, Jr., Note, Criminalizing Attorney-Client Sexual Relations:
Toward Substantive Enforcement, 73 TEx. L. REv. 1223 (1995); Lawyer Liable for Co-
erced Sex: Jury Awards Ex-Client $225,000 for Malpractice Despite Competent Represen-
tation, A.B.A. J. Feb. 1993 at 24; see also Barbara A., 193 Cal. Rptr. at 433 n.1 1 (quot-
ing the Board of Governors of the Oregon State Bar: "'The attorney-client relationship is
a fiduciary relationship, one of trust. The nature of that fiduciary relationship tends to
make the client intellectually and, in many cases, emotionally dependent upon the at-
tomey. If the client becomes involved in a love affair with. the attorney, that dependen-
cy would only be increased.").
261 See also State v. Caprio, 937 P.2d 933 (Haw. Ct. App. 1997).
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being, or spiritual salvation or beneficial to their professional ca-
reers; they lied about their identities and intentions of paying for
sexual services; and some wielded naked power derived from au-
thoritative positions, while others used extortionate threats. Rape by
fraud and rape by coercion are not unitary phenomena but compre-
hend a broad spectrum of conduct. Thus, the criminalization of this
behavior will not be susceptible of simple solution; the legal
response will need to be as innovative as these actors' conduct.
Second, a portrait emerges of the criminal defendants in these
cases as a distinct class of nonviolent sexual predator not simply
individuals in poor romantic or sexual relationships. Many of these
perpetrators were repeat offenders. Boro ("Dr. Feelgood"), Mitchell
("The Fantasy Man"), and Kendall (the Avedon impersonator) had
large numbers of victims. Even the Florida minister, the New York
acting coach, and the bogus-traffic-accident blackmailer had more
than one. More importantly, a significant number of offenders em-
ployed fraudulent or coercive stratagems that would have resulted
in criminal liability if their goal had been to obtain property instead
of accomplish sexual intercourse262-prompting frequent judicial
references to, if not adoption of, analogies to theft offenses.263 The
fact that many of these criminal actors also stole money or property
from their victims only serves to underscore this similarity.
Third, in terms of legal analysis, these cases turned on courts'
interpretation of the force or nonconsent elements of the
jurisdiction's rape or sexual assault statutes-the two traditional
requirements of rape law. Courts' most common approach to this
genre of cases was to hold that the force requirement was not satis-
fied by defendants' use of fraudulent or coercive pressures, declin-
ing to extrapolate beyond the literal wording of the statutory lan-
guage or acknowledge the similar effects these mechanisms may
have on consent. Alternatively, courts held that the nonconsent
element was not satisfied because victims had ostensibly consented
to the sexual act. In confronting the subsidiary question of whether
fraud or coercion vitiates that consent, courts relied on the tradition-
al factum-inducement distinction to hold that defendants' fraud went
to a collateral matter and, therefore, victim consent was valid.
Courts conspicuously failed to explore the parameters of legally
effective consent in these sexual offenses beyond this paradigmatic
262 ESTRICH, supra note 7, at 70.
263 See infra Part III.A.
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approach and as interpreted in other legal contexts. In the final
analysis, courts frequently side-stepped the difficult issues embed-
ded in these cases by asking their respective legislatures to consider
expanding statutory coverage. Several state legislatures have re-
sponded to such judicial invitations by altering their criminal codes
to bring some of this conduct within the purview of rape or sexual
assault statutes. Part II reviews the results of these legislative efforts.
II. CRIMINAL STATUTES PROHIBITING RAPE BY FRAUD OR RAPE BY
COERCION
[L]egislatures should replace the independent crime of rape with a variety
of statutory offenses that would more clearly and more justly define crimi-
nal liability for culpable conduct aimed at causing other individuals to
engage in sexual acts.2"
This Part provides a descriptive review of legislative state of the
art with respect to what may be denominated rape by fraud or rape
by coercion. The review reveals a surprisingly comprehensive array
of state criminal statutes prohibiting various forms of nonforcible or
nonconsensual sexual conduct, some more specifically focusing on
fraud or coercion. Every state has at least one relevant criminal
provision, and many have civil statutes and disciplinary rules cover-
ing similar behavior, although these are beyond the scope of the
present analysis.2
Dripps, Beyond Rape, supra note 8, at 1780.
s See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 08.64.326(a)(9) (Michie 1996) (discipline for medical
practitioners); ALASKA STAT. § 08.86.204(8) (Michie 1996) (discipline for psychologists);
CAL CIV. CODE § 43.93 (Supp. 1998) (action against psychotherapist); CAL. Bus. & PROF.
CODE § 2960 (Supp. 1998) (discipline for psychologists); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§ 4982 (1990 & Supp. 1998) (discipline for marriage, family, and child counselors); CAL.
Bus. & PROF. CODE § 4992.3 (1990 & Supp. 1998) (discipline for social workers); CAL
Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6106.9 (Supp. 1998) (attorney discipline); COLO. REv. STAT. § 12-
41-115 (1997) (discipline for physical therapists); CoLo. REv. STAT. § 12-43-704 (1997)
(prohibited activities for psychotherapists); FLA. STAT. ch. 401.411 (1998) (discipline for
medical transportation services); FLA. STAT. ch. 458.329 (repealed for review 1996) (sexu-
al misconduct in medicine); FLA. STAT. ch. 459.0141 (repealed for review 1996) (sexual
misconduct in osteopathic medicine); FLA. STAT. ch. 460.412 (repealed for review 1996)
(sexual misconduct in chiropractic); FLA. STAT. ch. 464.017 (repealed for review 1996)
(sexual misconduct in nursing); FA. STAT. ch. 466.027 (repealed for review 1996) (sexual
misconduct in dentistry); FLA. STAT. ch. 468.415 (1991 & Supp. 1998) (repealed for
review 1996) (sexual misconduct in operation of talent agency); FLA. STAT. ch. 468.715
(Supp. 1998) (repealed for review 1996) (sexual misconduct in athletic training); FLA.
STAT. ch. 490.009 (1991 & Supp. 1998) (repealed for review 1996) (discipline for psy-
chologists); FLA. STAT ch. 490.0111 (1991 & Supp. 1998) (repealed for review 1996)
(sexual misconduct by psychologists); 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 140/1, 140/2 (West 1993 &
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This panoply of statutes is the logical successor to the rape-
reform movements of the 1950s and 1970s which changed the face
of rape law in significant ways.266 Specifically, these earlier move-
ments altered two of the traditional elements of rape: sexual inter-
course (generally limited to vaginal penetration) and a female victim
not married to the defendant. Currently, statutes subsume multiple
forms of sexual penetration and contact, not only vaginal inter-
course,26 7 and employ gender-neutral language to cover perpetra-
tors and victims of both sexes;268 a growing trend also exists, mov-
ing toward the elimination of the marital exemption.269 In addi-
tion, these reform movements were instrumental in dismantling sub-
stantive obstacles to rape prosecutions that were statutorily engraft-
ed onto rape laws,27----such as resistance and corroboration re-
quirements.27' They changed rape's evidentiary landscape by
spawning the enactment of rape shield laws272 and the reformation
of suspicion-engendering jury instructions modeled after Hale's
cynical maxim. 273  Finally, these reforms precipitated changes in
the terms used to describe sexual crimes. Many modern statutes
have replaced "rape" with offense categories such as criminal sexual
Supp. 1998) (sexual exploitation in psychotherapy); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 2806
(West Supp. 1997) (sexual exploitation by law enforcement officer); MINN. STAT.
§ 148.261 (1998) (discipline for nurses); MINN. STAT. § 148A.01 (1998) (sexual exploita-
tion by psychotherapist); MINN. STAT. § 148B.68 (1998) (discipline for mental health
practitioners); MINN. STAT. § 148C.09 (1998) (discipline for alcohol and drug counselors);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-203 (Supp. 1997) (therapist sexual misconduct victims' com-
pensation); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 81.001 et seq. (1996) (sexual exploitation by
mental health services provider); Wis. STAT. § 895.70 (1997) (sexual exploitation by
psychotherapist).
26" Schulhofer, Feminist Challenge, supra note 8, at 2171 ("There have been two
important waves of statutory reforms, the Model Penal Code revision in the 1950s and
revisions inspired by feminist reformers in the 1970s.") (footnote omitted); see also
Schulhofer, Sexual Autonomy, supra note 9, at 36-40 (discussing rape reforms).
267 ESTRICH, supra note 7, at 83.
268 ESTRICH, supra note 7, at 81.
269 ESTRICH, supra note 7, at 81.
270 ESTRICH, supra note 7, at 81 n.101; Dripps, Beyond Rape, supra note 8, at 1783.
27, Chamallas, supra note 17, at 799.
272 Id.
273 Id. at n.101. Hale wrote: 'It is true, rape is a most detestable crime, and there-
fore ought severely and impartially to be punished with death; but it must be remem-
bered that it is an accusation easily to be made and hard to be proved; and harder to
be defended by the party accused, though never so innocent." 1 M. HALE, PLEAS OF THE
CROWN 633, 635 (1680); cf. Schafran, supra note 60, at 1013 ("Contrary to Lord Hale's
allegation, rape is extremely difficult crime to charge and the easiest of all to defend.");
see, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-408 (1997) (outlawing Hale's maxim and requiring
jury be instructed not to allow gender bias to affect its decision).
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conduct, criminal sexual penetration, aggravated felonious sexual
assault, sexual battery, and sexual misconduct. 4
Despite these many important reforms, what had not changed
much, until fairly recently, was the hegemony of force and
nonconsent, in conjunction, as the essential requirements of rape
law."' The newest wave of legislation, however, begins to accom-
plish what its predecessors did not and what would have been
essentially unthinkable without these earlier reform mov-
ements-changing the importance and meaning of these two ele-
ments. Many of the reviewed statutes explicitly alter either the force
or the nonconsent requirements in innovative ways to embrace the
behavior of sexual predators who use fraud or coercion to secure
sexual compliance. In short, these new statutes finally tackle a prob-
lem that has been troubling courts, legislatures, and commentators
for more than a century-the criminalization of fraudulent or
coercive sexual practices.
These new statutory enactments cluster around five organiza-
tional themes, provisions that outlaw sexual penetration or contact
accomplished by: (1) abuse of trust, (2) abuse of authority, (3) fraud,
(4) coercion, and (5) nonconsent. The first category carves out for
special treatment defined groups of potential offenders who abuse
positions of trust and have access to vulnerable victims, e.g., medi-
cal personnel. The second prohibits sexual conduct when the crimi-
nal actor abuses a position of authority over a victim, e.g., a prison
guard. The third group specifically outlaws the use of fraud or de-
ception in securing sexual compliance. The fourth substitutes coer-
cion or other types of nonphysical pressure for the traditional re-
quirement of physical force. Finally, the fifth class simply punishes
nonconsensual intercourse without reference to force, fraud, or
coercion.
274 Schulhofer, Sexual Autonomy, supra note 9, at 39.
275 See, e.g., ESTRICH, supra note 7, at 84 (noting reforms less expansive on force and
nonconsent issues); Dripps, Beyond Rape, supra note 8, at 1784 ("the gravamen of rape
remains the conjunction of force and nonconsent.'); Schulhofer, Sexual Autonomy, supra
note 9, at 39-40 (In one form or another, however, nearly all states still preserved as
essential requirements both force and nonconsent." But, he adds: 'Beneath the seemingly
universal and long-standing consensus that rape means forcible nonconsensual inter-
course, there remains profound disagreement about what rape is.'); Schulhofer, Feminist
Challenge, supra note 8, at 2171 (same).
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A. The Abuse of Positions of Trust: Doctors, Psychotherapists, and
the Clergy
In modern statutory enactments, state legislatures have sought
to protect victims from sexual exploitation by defining classes of
individuals who occupy positions of trust. The most common class-
es encompassed by these statutes-doctors, psychotherapists, and
clergy members-roughly correspond to the categories of offenders
discussed in Part I.A. In a broader sense, these categories demon-
strate internal logical coherence because they represent potential
offenders who have access to victims under circumstances where
the victims might be either physically or mentally vulnerable.""
Many of these statutes articulate the basis of victim vulnerability and
explicitly negate consent as a defense. Idaho's statute is instructive;
it defines medical care provider as a "person who gains the trust
and confidence of a patient or client for the examination and/or
treatment of a medical or psychological condition, and thereby
gains the ability to treat, examine and physically touch the patient
or client."277 Although analyzed separately below, these potential
offender categories overlap. Delaware, for instance, covers all three
groups in one statute.278
276 Colorado articulates the basis of civil liability for psychotherapists, medical pro-
fessionals, and member of the clergy in its evidence code: 'In any civil action for dam-
ages by an alleged victim which alleges damages resulting from a sexual assault on a
client by any person who enters into a professional-client relationship that permits pro-
fessional physical access to the client's person or the opportunity to affect or influence
the thought processes or emotions of such client, ... ." COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-
131(1) (1997); see also Ferguson v. People, 824 P.2d 803 (Colo. 1992) (articulating
notion of victim vulnerability); Shapiro v. State, 696 So. 2d 1321 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1997) (covering particularly vulnerable members of society); State v. Carter, 663 A.2d
101, 103 (N.H. 1995) (noting victim vulnerability in teacher case).
277 IDAHO CODE § 18-919(a)(2) (1997); see also D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 22-4415, 4116
(1997) ("in a professional relationship of trust with the actor'); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
17-A, § 253(2)(1) (West Supp. 1997) ("[M]ental health therapy' means psychotherapy or
other treatment modalities intended to change behavior, emotions or attitudes, which
therapy is based upon an intimate relationship involving trust and dependency with a
substantial potential for vulnerability and abuse; . . .).
278 DEL CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 761(g)(4) (1995). No state criminally punishes lawyer-
client sex, although some states prohibit it. Langford, supra note 260 (arguing for the
criminal punishment of lawyer-client sexual intercourse).
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1. Medical and Health Care Professionals
Perhaps due to the fact that sexual relations accomplished
under the auspices of medical care is one of the most common
instances of sexual exploitation, sixteen jurisdictions contain crimi-
nal provisions regarding sexual intercourse obtained through sup-
posed medical treatment." 9 While varying somewhat, these stat-
279 ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.41.410(a)(4)(A)-(B), 11.41.420(a)(4)(A)-(B) (Michie 1996); CAL
Bus. & PROF. CODE § 729 (West 1990 & Supp. 1998); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-3-
403(I)(h), 18-3-404(1)(g) (1997); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53a-71(a)(7), 53a-73a(a)(5) (1995);
DEL CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 761(g)(4) (1995); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 22-4115, 224116
(1997); IDAHO CODE § 18-919 (1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3502(a)(3) (Supp. 1997);
MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 750.520b, 750.520c(1)(f), 750.520d(1)(b), 750.520e(1)(b)(iv) (1991
& Supp. 1998); MINN. STAT. §§ 609.344(k), 609.345(k) (1997); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 632-A:2(g) (1996); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-37-2(4), 11-37-4(3) (1994 & Supp. 1997); TEx.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011 (West Supp. 1998); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-406(12) (Supp.
1998); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9A.44.050(l)(d), 9A.44.100(1)(d) (Supp. 1998); WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 6-2-303(a)(vii) (Michie 1997); see also ALA. CODE § 13A-6-65(a)(1) (1996) (statute
does not explicitly mention health-care providers, but commentary suggests that it might
cover cases of fraud in medical treatment); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 97-3-95(2), 97-5-23(2)
(1994 & Supp. 1997) (includes physician, physical therapist, and chiropractor as those in
position of trust or authority over minors for purposes of sexual battery and child touch-
ing statutes); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-13-503, 39-13-505 (1997) (interpreted in State v.
Tizard, 897 S.W.2d 732 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994), as covering cases of supposed medi-
cal treatment). Tennessee had a statute specifically outlawing sexual penetration under
the guise of medical treatment, but it was repealed. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-3705(A)(4)
(1978) ("Where the actor engages in sexual penetration on the pretext of performing a
medical examination or treatment for the purpose of achieving sexual penetration.');
McNair v. State, 825 P.2d 571, 575 (Nev. 1992) (,We hold that sufficient evidence of
sexual penetration against the victim's will exists under Nevada's statute when the pene-
tration is accomplished under a pretext of medical treatment and without the victim's
foreknowledge or consent.') (citations omitted).
Cases have interpreted Illinois' sexual assault statute as covering instances of illegiti-
mate medical treatment. In People v. Quinlan, 596 N.E.2d 28 (111. App. Ct. 1992), the
court noted that Illinois has a medical treatment exception to its sexual assault statutes.
720 ILL COMP. STAT. 5/12-18(b) (West Supp. 1998) provides: "Any medical examination
or procedure which is conducted by a physician, nurse, medical or hospital personnel,
parent, or caretaker for purposes and in a manner consistent with reasonable medical
standards is not an offense under [sexual assault statutes] . . . .' The Quinlan court
opined: 'This section evidences a legislative intent that illegitimate medical examination
are covered by the criminal sexual assault statutes.' 596 N.E.2d at 31; see also 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 3125 (Supp. 1998) ('a person who engages in penetration . . . for any
purpose other than good faith medical, hygienic or law enforcement procedures commits
aggravated indecent assault .... )
Although not outlawing sexual relations between doctors and patients, two states
proscribe situations involving the administration of drugs which may include medical
personnel. Ohio's gross sexual imposition law prohibits sexual contact if:
The offender knows that the judgment or control of the other person or of
one of the other persons is substantially impaired as a result of the influence
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utes fall into four general categories, i.e., those that: (1) expand the
force requirement, (2) amplify the nonconsent requirement, (3)
create a separate offense addressing sexual exploitation by medical
personnel, or (4) include the conduct as one alternative in broader
rape or sexual assault statutes.
Michigan, with the oldest statute, adopts the first approach.
Michigan's statute includes sexual penetration accomplished by
medical practitioners under the definition of force or coercion for
purposes of sexual offenses. Criminal sexual conduct occurs if the
actor uses force or coercion, which includes "When the actor en-
gages in the medical treatment or examination of the victim in a
manner or for purposes which are medically recognized as
unethical or unacceptable."
280
Delaware's statutory law exemplifies the second approach by
incorporating its provision on health-care professionals within the
definition of lack of consent. According to its statute, "without con-
sent" includes: "under the guise of providing professional diagnosis,
counseling or treatment and where at the times of such acts the
victim reasonably believed the acts were for medically or profes-
of any drug or intoxicant administered to the other person with his consent
for the purpose of any kind of medical or dental examination, treatment, or
surgery.
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2907.05(A)(3) (Anderson Supp. 1997). Maine's gross sexual
assault statute covers instances in which the actor administered drugs to the victim, but
provides for a defense based on voluntary consumption except "it is no defense when
the other person is a patient of the actor and has a reasonable belief that the actor is
administering the substance for medical or dental examination or treatment.) ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 253(3) (West Supp. 1997).
280 MICH. COMP. LAws § 750.520b(iv) (1996) (emphasis added) (felony); see also
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.520c(1)(f (1996) (felony of second-degree criminal sexual
conduct); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.520d(1)(b) (1996) (felony of third-degree criminal
sexual conduct); MICH. COMP. LAws § 750.520e(1)(b)(iv) (1996) (misdemeanor of fourth-
degree criminal sexual conduct). Michigan grades the severity of the offense based on
whether the actor engages in sexual penetration or contact or causes physical injury.
Michigan also has an older statute on its books, passed in 1883:
Any person who shall undertake to medically treat any female person, and
while so treating her, shall represent to such female that it is, or will be,
necessary or beneficial to her health that she have sexual intercourse with a
man, and shall thereby induce her to have carnal sexual intercourse with any
man, and any man, not being the husband of such female, who shall have
sexual intercourse with her by reason of such representation, shall be guilty of
a felony, punishable by imprisonment in the state prison not more than ten
[10] years.
MICH. CoMp. LAws § 750.90 (1996); see also People v. Williams, 175 N.W. 187 (Mich.
1919) (involving this statutory provision). Query whether Michigan passed this statute in
response to Don Moran?
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sionally appropriate diagnosis, counseling or treatment, such that
resistance by the victim could not reasonably have been manifest-
ed."28' Texas and Utah also specify that certain forms of sex are
without consent when they are accomplished by a health-care pro-
fessional.282 Although no other state alters the consent require-
ment for sexual offenses in the same fashion as Delaware, Texas,
and Utah, several explicitly negate consent as a defense to medical
exploitation.283
California, the District of Columbia, and Idaho adopt the third
approach by creating separate crimes of sexual exploitation by a
medical-care provider.8 4 Other states simply add language to ex-
isting sexual assault or rape statutes covering instances in which the
offender is a health-care provider.28 Several of these statutes spe-
cifically mention some form of fraud or deceit,286 others empha-
8I DEL CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 761(g)(4) (1995).
282 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011(b)(9) (West Supp. 1998) (recently amended to
include health-care-services provider in addition to mental health services provider); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-5-406(12) (Supp. 1998) (recently amended to include health professional
and religious counselor).
"53 D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-4117 (1997) (consent no defense); IDAHO CODE § 18-919(a)
(Supp. 1997) (consent no defense); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3502(a)(3) (Supp. 1997) (con-
sent obtained through knowing misrepresentation that sexual intercourse is medically or
therapeutically necessary); MINN. STAT. §§ 609.344(k), 609.345(k) (1996) (consent no de-
fense). But see WASH. REv. CODE §§ 9A.44.050(1)(d), 9A.44.100(1)(d) (Supp. 1998) ('It
is an affirmative defense that the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the client or patient consented to the sexual intercourse with the knowledge
that the sexual intercourse was not for the purpose of treatment; . . ').
2 CAL Bus. & PROF. CODE § 729 (West 1990 & Supp. 1998) (sexual exploitation of
patient or client by physician and surgeon, or psychotherapist); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 22-
4115, 22-4116 (1997) (sexual abuse of patient or client); IDAHO CODE § 18-919 (1997)
(sexual exploitation by medical care provider).
285 ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.41.410(a)(4)(A)-(B), 11.41.420(a)(4)(A)-(B) (Michie 1996) (sexual
assault); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-3-403(I)(h), 18-3-404(1)(g) (1997) (sexual assault); CONN.
GEN. STAT. §§ 53a-71(a)(7), 53a-73a(a)(5) (1995 & Supp. 1998) (sexual assault); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 21-3502(a)(3) (Supp. 1997) (rape); MINN. STAT. §§ 609.344(k), 609.345(k)
(Supp. 1997) (criminal sexual conduct); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:2(g) (1996) (aggra-
vated felonious sexual assault); R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 11-37-2(4), 11-37-4(3) (1996) (sexual
assault); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9A.44.050(1)(d), 9A.44.100(1)(d) (1998) (rape and indecent
liberties); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-303(a)(vii) (Michie 1997) (sexual assault).
"6 CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53a-71(a)(7), 53a-73a(a)(5) (1995 & Supp. 1998) ('by means
of false representation that the sexual intercourse [contact] is for a bona fide medical
purpose'); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3502(a)(3) (Supp. 1997) (consent obtained through
knowing misrepresentation that sexual intercourse is medically or therapeutically neces-
sary); MINN. STAT. §§ 609.344(k), 609.345(k) (Supp. 1997) (by means of deception or
false representation that the penetration [contact] is for a bona fide medical purpose.');
see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 76 1(g)(4) (1995) (under guise of professional treat-
ment).
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size the unprofessional or unethical nature of the conduct.2 7
Washington and Alaska specify that the sexual conduct must occur
in the course of professional treatment; Alaska also requires that the
victim be unaware that it is occurring. 8
2. Psychotherapists and Mental Health Professionals
Twenty-two jurisdictions have criminal statutes prohibiting
various forms of sexual conduct by psychotherapists or mental
health professionals with their patients.289 Minnesota's statute, one
of the most expansive, punishes criminal sexual assault if
287 COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-3-403(1)(h), 18-3-404(1)(g) (1997) (*The actor engages in
treatment or examination of a victim for other than bona fide medical purposes or in a
manner substantially inconsistent with reasonable medical practices.); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 632-A:2(g) (1996) ("When the actor provides therapy, medical treatment or exam-
ination of the victim in a manner or for purposes which are not professionally recog-
nized as ethical or acceptable.'); R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 11-37-2(4), 11-37-4(3) (1996) ("The
accused engages in the medical treatment or examination of the victim for the purpose
of sexual arousal, gratification, or stimulation.'); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-303(a)(vii)
(Michie 1997 & Supp. 1998) ("The actor inflicts sexual intrusion in treatment or exami-
nation of a victim for purposes or in a manner substantially inconsistent with reasonable
medical practices.').
28a ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.41.410(a)(4)(A)-(B), 11.41.420(a)(4)(A)-(B) (Michie 1996) (victim
is unaware of sexual act and sexual penetration/contact by health-care worker in course
of professional treatment); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9A.44.050(1)(d), 9A.44.100(1)(d) (Supp.
1998) ("When the perpetrator is a health care provider, the victim is a client or patient,
and the sexual contact occurs during a treatment session, consultation, interview, or
examination.').
289 ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.41.410(a)(4)(A)-(B), 11.41.420(a)(4)(A)-(B), 11.41.470(1) (Michie
1996); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-1418 (1996); CAL Bus. & PROF. CODE § 729 (1996 &
Supp. 1998); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-3-405.5(1),(2) (1997); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53a-
71(a)(6), 53a-73a(a)(4), 53a-65(9)-(12) (1995 & Supp. 1998); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§ 761 (1995); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 22-4115, 4116 (1997); FLA. STAT. ch. 491.0112
(1996); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-5.1(c)(2) (1996); IDAHO CODE § 18-919(a) (1997); IOWA
CODE § 709.15 (1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3502(a)(3) (Supp. 1997); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 17-A, § 253(2)(1) (West Supp. 1997); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.344(1)(h)-(j),
609.345(1)(h)-(j) (Supp. 1997); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:2(g) (1996); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 30-9-10(A)(5) (Michie 1996); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 2.1-20-06.1 (1995); S.D. CODI-
FIED LAw §§ 22-22-28, 22-22-29 (Michie 1998); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011(b)(9)
(West Supp. 1998); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-406(12) (Supp. 1998); WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 9A.44.050(1)(d), 9A.44.100(l)(d) (Supp. 1998); Wis. STAT. § 940.22 (1997); see also
MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 97-3-95(2), 97-5-23(2) (1996) (counselor, psychiatrist, and psychol-
ogist included as those in position of trust or authority over minors for purposes of
sexual battery and child touching statutes); State v. Nierras, 1980 Ohio App. LEXIS
10118 (psychiatrist convicted of attempted sexual conduct with patient using coercion
sufficient to overcome will of ordinary person-cessation of treatment and referral to
another therapist).
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(h) the actor is a psychotherapist and the complainant is a patient of the
psychotherapist and the sexual penetration occurred during the psycho-
therapy session. Consent by the complainant is not a defense.
(i) the actor is a psychotherapist and the complainant is a patient or for-
mer patient of the psychotherapist and the patient or former patient is
emotionally dependent upon the psychotherapist; or
(j) the actor is a psychotherapist and the complainant is a patient or for-
mer patient and the sexual penetration occurred by means of therapeutic
deception. Consent by the complainant is not a defense;2"'
Two of Minnesota's three provisions explicitly negate consent as a
defense. The third invalidates consent by referring to the patient as
emotionally dependent which occurs when he or she is "unable to
withhold consent to sexual contact or sexual penetration by the
psychotherapist."29' Minnesota's statute also emphasizes therapeu-
tic deception, the therapist's representation that sexual contact is
"consistent with or part of the patient's treatment."292
The other twenty-one states appear to follow the same pattern
as the medical-treatment enactments. New Mexico's statute alters
the force or coercion requirement.293 Delaware, Texas, and Utah
include mental health professionals within their definitions of lack
of consent for purposes of sexual offenses.294 Although not rewrit-
29 MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.344(1)(h)-(j) (Supp. 1997); see also MINN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 609.345(1)(h)-(j) (Supp. 1997) (fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct when the actor
obtains sexual contact, rather than penetration).
29 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.341(19) (Supp. 1997).
292 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.341(20) (1996). Other states also rely on the notions of
emotional dependence or therapeutic deception. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-3-405.5(l),(2)
(1997) (therapeutic deception); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53a-65(9)-(12); 53a-71(a)(6), 53a-
73a(a)(4) (1995) (during psychotherapy session, patient is emotionally dependent, or
therapeutic deception); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 22-4115, 4116 (1997) ("actor represents
falsely that the sexual act is for a bona fide medical or therapeutic purpose" or "the
patient or client is impaired from declining participation in the sexual act.'); FLA. STAT.
ch. 491.0112 (1991 & Supp. 1998) (use of therapeutic deception increases grade of
crime); iOWA CODE § 709.15(I)(f(2) (1993 & Supp. 1998) (emotionally dependent patient
or client); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3502(a)(3) (Supp. 1997) (knowing misrepresentation that
sexual intercourse medically or therapeutically necessary); S.D. CODIFIED LAW §§ 22-22-
27, 22-22-28, 22-22-29 (Michie 1998) (emotionally dependent patient); TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 22.011(b)(9) (West Supp. 1998) (causes other person to submit by exploiting
emotional dependency); see also GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-5.1(c)(2) (1996) (if treatment or
counseling relationship is used to facilitate sexual contact).
19 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-10(A)(5) (Michie 1996) (force or coercion includes "the
perpetratinn of criminal sexual penetration or criminal sexual contact by a psychothera-
pist on his patient, with or without the patient's consent, during the course of psycho-
therapy or within a period of one year following the termination of psychothera-
py; . . . ."). But see N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-12(B) (1996) (specifying exceptions such as
inadvertent or legitimate contacts).
29 DEL CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 761 (1995); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011(b)(9)
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ing the consent requirement itself, many other state statutes rule out
consent as a defense.29 Seven states have statutes specifically ad-
dressing sexual exploitation by psychotherapists;296 another three
include therapists within specialized statutes dealing with the broad-
er category of medical-care providers.297 The remaining states in-
clude psychotherapist-patient sexual contact within general sexual
(West 1998) ('actor is a mental health services provider or a health care services provid-
er who causes the other person, who is a patient or former patient of the actor, to
submit or participate by exploiting the other person's emotional dependency on the
actor .... ); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-406(12) (1998).
Delaware punishes unlawful sexual intercourse in three degrees: "A person is guilty
of unlawful sexual intercourse in the third degree when the person intentionally engages
in sexual intercourse with another person and any of the following circumstances exist:
(1) The intercourse occurs without the victim's consent; .... " DEL CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§ 773 (1995). -Without the victim's consent" includes exploitation by health
professionals:
For purposes of this paragraph, "health professional" includes all individuals
who are licensed or who hold themselves out to be licensed or who other-
wise provide professional physical or mental health services, diagnosis, treat-
ment or counseling and shall include, but not be limited to, doctors of medi-
cine and osteopathy, dentists, nurses, physical therapists, chiropractors, psychol-
ogists, social workers, medical technicians, mental health counselors, substance
abuse counselors, marriage and family counselors or therapists and
hypnotherapists; ....
DEL CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 761 (1995).
'9 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 729(b)(5) (West 1990 & Supp. 1998) (consent no
defense); CoLo. REV. STAT. § 18-3-405.5(3) (1997) (consent no defense); D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 22-4117(a) (1981 & Supp. 1998) (consent no defense); FLA. STAT. ch. 491.0112(3)
(1996) (consent no defense); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-5.1(c)(3) (1996) (consent no de-
fense); IDAHO CODE § 18-919(a) (1997) (consent no defense); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-
3502(a)(3) (1995 & Supp. 1997) (consent obtained through knowing misrepresentation
that sexual intercourse is medically or therapeutically necessary); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 609.344(1)(h)-(j), 609.345(1)(h)-(j) (West 1987 & Supp. 1997) (consent no defense);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-10(A)(5) (Michie 1996) ('with or without the patient's consent);
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 2.1-20-06.1 (1995) (consent no defense); S.D. CODIFIED LAW §§ 22-
22-28, 22-22-29 (Michie 1997) (consent no defense); Wis. STAT. § 940.22(2) (1995-1996)
(consent not an issue). But see WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9A.44.050(1)(d), 9A.44.100(1)(d)
(1996) (affirmative defense).
29 ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-1418 (1996) (sexual misconduct by behavioral health profes-
sionals); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-3405.5 (1997) (sexual assault by psychotherapist); FLA.
STAT. ch. 491.0112 (1996) (sexual misconduct by psychotherapist); IOWA CODE § 709.15
(1996) (sexual exploitation by counselor or therapist); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-20-06.1
(1997) (sexual exploitation by therapist); S.D. CODIFIED LAW §§ 22-22-28, 22-22-29
(Michie 1997) (sexual contact/penetration by psychotherapist); Wis. STAT. § 940.22 (1995-
1996) (sexual exploitation by therapist).
29 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 729 (West 1990 & Supp. 1998) (sexual exploitation of
patient or client by physician and surgeon or psychotherapist); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 22-
4115, 22-4116 (1981 & Supp. 1997) (sexual abuse of patient or client) (includes thera-
peutic or counseling services); IDAHO CODE § 18-919 (1997) (psychotherapist included in
medical care provider statute).
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assault or rape statutes.298 A number of these statutes overlap with
those criminalizing sexual intercourse obtained under the guise of
medical treatment.299 Finally, one unique characteristic of the psy-
chotherapist-patient statutes is that several states place a time limit
on liability for sexual conduct by mental health professionals.3"
3. The Clergy
Twelve states explicitly outlaw sexual exploitation by clergy
members in their statutory provisions;3°1 one additional state has
2" ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.41.410(a)(4)(A)-(B), 11.41.420(a)(4)(A)-(B) (Michie 1996) (sexual
assault); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53a-71(a)(6), 53a-73a(a)(4); 53a-65(9)-(12) (1997) (sexual
assault); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-5.1(c)(2) (1996) (statute also prohibits sexual assault
against persons in custody or hospitals); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3502(a)(3) (1995 & Supp.
1997) (rape); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 253(2)(1) (West 1983 & Supp. 1997) (gross
sexual assault); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.344(1)(h)-(j), 609.345(1)(h)-(j) (1996) (criminal
sexual conduct); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:2(g) (1996 & Supp. 1997) (aggravated
felonious sexual assault); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-10(A)(5) (Michie 1996) (criminal sexual
penetration); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9A.44.050(1)(d), 9A.44.100(1)(d) (1996) (rape and
indecent liberties).
ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.41.470(l), 11.41.410(a)(4)(A)-(B), 11.41.420(a)(4)(A)-(B) (Michie
1996 & Supp. 1997) (definition of health care worker includes mental health counselor,
psychiatrist, psychologist, and psychological associate); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3502(a)(3)
(1995 & Supp. 1997) (knowing misrepresentation that sexual intercourse is medically or
therapeutically necessary); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:2(g) (1996 & Supp. 1997)
(actor provides therapy; see State v. vonKlock, 33 A.2d 1299 (N.H. 1981), overruled by
State v. Smith, 503 A.2d 774 (N.H. 1985); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9A.44.050(1)(d),
9A.44.100(1)(d) (1996) (definition of health care provider includes mental health profes-
sionals).
30 ARIz. REV. STAT. § 13-1418(c) (1996) (does not apply after patient has completed
course of treatment); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 729(a) (1990 & Supp. 1998) (with for-
mer patient or client when the relationship was terminated primarily for the purpose of
engaging in those acts, unless' patient referred); FLA. STAT. ch. 491.0112 (1996) (former
client when relationship terminated primarily for purpose of engaging in sexual contact);
IOWA CODE § 709.15 (1996) (former client presumed to be emotionally dependent for
one year following therapy); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-10(A)(5) (Michie 1994) (within one
year following termination of therapy).
"I ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.41.410(a)(4)(B), 11.41.420(a)(4)(B), 11.41.434(a)(3)(B),
11.41.436(a)(5)(B), 11.41.470(1), 11.41.470(5) (Michie 1996 & Supp. 1997); DEL CODE
ANN. tit. 11, § 761(g)(4) (1995); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 22-4115(a), 22-4116(a) (1996);
Iowa Code § 709.15(0)(a) (1996); MINN. STAT. §§ 609.344(e), 609.345(e) (1996); MISS.
CODE ANN. §§ 97-3-95(2), 97-5-23(2) (1994 & Supp. 1997); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-9-
10(A)(5), 30-9-10(F)(11) (Michie 1994); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-06.1(2) (1997); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-22-28, 22-22-29 (Michie 1997); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 22.011(b)(10) (West 1994 & Supp. 1998); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-406(12) (Supp.
1998); WiS. STAT. § 940.22(1)(i) (1995-96); see also COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-25-131(1)
(1997) (civil suits against clergy members).
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done so through judicial interpretation." 2 Minnesota's statute,
which has the most extensive coverage provides:
(I) the actor is or purports to be a member of the clergy, the complainant
is not married to the actor, and:
(i) the sexual penetration occurred during the course of a meeting in
which the complainant sought or received religious or spiritual advice,
aid, or comfort from the actor in private; or
(ii) the sexual penetration occurred during a period of time in which
the complainant was meeting on an ongoing basis with the actor to seek
or receive religious or spiritual advice, aid, or comfort in private.
Consent by the complainant is not a defense. 3
Seven states define health care provider, psychotherapist, or thera-
pist as encompassing clergy members for the purposes of their sexu-
al assault statutes;" 4 other states incorporate clerics in laws pro-
hibiting abuse of positions of authority over minors.05 Finally,
Delaware, Texas, and Utah define lack of consent for sexual
offenses to include exploitation by clergy members." 6
012 Florida's statute does not mention the clergy, but a court recently ruled that they
are covered under the statute dealing with abuse of a position of "familial or custodial
authority" over a minor. FLA. STAT. ch. 794.011(8) (1996); Sterghos & Lundy, supra note
118, at 1A.
'o' MINN. STAT. § 609.344(l) (1966); see also MINN. STAT. § 609.345(l) (1996) (same
provision for sexual contact).
301 ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.41.470(l), 11.41.410(a)(4), 11.41.420(a)(4) (Michie 1996 &
Supp. 1997) (definition of health care worker includes "religious healing practitioner);
D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 22-4115(a), 22-4116(a) (1996) (sexual abuse of patient or client in-
cludes circumstances of spiritual counseling); IOWA CODE § 709.15(1)(a) (1996) (defines
counselor or therapist to include clergy); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-910(A)(5), 30-9-I0(F)(11)(Michie 1994) (includes "minister, priest, rabbi or other similar functionary of a religious
organization acting in his role as a pastoral counselor" in definition of psychotherapist);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-06.1(2) (1997) (defines therapist to include clergy); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-22-27, 22-22-28, 22-22-29 (Michie 1997) (defines psychotherapist
to include clergy); Wis. STAT. § 940.22(I)(i) (1995-96) (defines therapist to include cler-
gy).
I'- ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.41.470(5), 11.41.434(a)(3)(B), 11.41.436(a)(5)(B) (Michie 1996
& Supp. 1997) (position of authority over minor includes religious leader for purposes of
sexual abuse statutes); MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 97-3-95(2), 97-5-23(2) (1994 & Supp. 1997)(position of trust or authority over child includes minister and priest for sexual battery
and child touching statutes); see also FLA. STAT. ch. 794.011(8) (1996) (interpreted to
include clergy).
6 DEL CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 761(g)(4) (1995) (without consent includes health pro-
fessional or "minister, priest, rabbi or other member of a religious organization engaged
in pastoral counseling"); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011(b)(10) (West 1994 & Supp.
1998) (defines without consent to include if "the actor is a clergyman who causes the
other person to submit or participate by exploiting the other person's emotional depen-
dency on the clergyman in the clergyman's professional character as spiritual adviser.');
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-406(12)(b) (Supp. 1998) (defines "religious counselor' as "minis-
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4. Conclusion
These abuse-of-trust provisions are laudatory because they
explicitly outlaw a type of criminal conduct, fraudulent medical
treatment, that has been troubling the courts since the last centu-
ry-Don Moran's 1872 call to legislative arms has been answered.
The psychotherapist provisions beneficially expand statutory cover-
age to instances that may be even more common in the modern
era;3 7 the clergy enactments signal an expansion based more on
substantive similarity than health-care credentials. Collectively, these
enactments embody legislative judgments that fraud and coercion
are totally inappropriate in certain alliances between holders of po-
sitions of trust and their patients. Larson, in discussing a tort of
sexual fraud notes:
It is perhaps understandable that courts [and legislatures] are more con-
cemed about sexual fraud in confidential relationships. The behavior
involved is often outrageous, and it is perpetrated by a person sanctioned
by society as a trustworthy individual. Abuse of a confidential relationship
thus not only offends the victim but also undermines the credibility of
other professionals by transgressing fundamental social and ethical norms.
Against this background of formalized obligations, the professional defen-
dant is much less sympathetic and the victim more credible." 8
Because legislatures enacted these statutes to subsume an identifi-
able class of offenders, however, their major shortcoming lie in their
very specificity. Covering only fraudulent or coercive practices
occurring in medical, psychiatric, and religious alliances, these laws
leave potential victims unprotected from similar conduct occurring
outside them.
B. The Abuse of Positions of Authority
The second major approach to criminalizing nontraditional
sexual offenses is one that punishes offenders who abuse their posi-
tions of authority over the victim. These provisions avoid the major
ter, priest, rabbi, bishop, or other recognized member of the clergy.').
307 See, e.g., EsTRiCH, supra note 7, at 87; Feinberg, supra note 18, at 336.
' Larson, Women Understand, supra note 24, at 411 (footnotes omitted); see also
FAIRSTEIN, supra note 47, at 197 (arguing that legislation particularly needed when the
defendant is serving professionally as the victim's caretaker or in a similar position of
trust). But see Jeffrey A. Barker, Comment, Professional-Client Sex: Is Criminal Liability
an Appropriate Means of Enforcing Professional Responsibility?, 40 UCLA L. REv. 1275
(1993).
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drawback of the abuse-of-trust approach by covering a broader
range of possible offenders. Forty jurisdictions have at least one
criminal provision outlawing the abuse of a position of power to
obtain sexual intercourse." 9 The theme of victim vulnerability is
3 S9 see ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.41.410(a)(3), 11.41.420(a)(2) (Michie 1996 & Supp. 1997)
(sexual assault); ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.41.434(a)(3)(A)-(B), 11.41.436(a)(5)(A)-(B) (Michie
1996) (sexual abuse of minor); ARIz. REV. STAT. § 13-1419 (199) (unlawful sexual con-
duct); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-103(a)(2) (Michie 1997) (rape); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-
108(a)(3) (Michie 1997) (sexual abuse); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-14-120, 5-14-121 (Michie
1997) (violation of minor); CAL. PENAL CODE § 261(a)(7) (West 1988 & Supp. 1998)(public official with power to incarcerate, arrest, or deport); CoLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-3-
403(I)(g), 18-3-404(l)(0 (1997) (sexual assault); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-405.3 (1997)(sexual assault on child by one in position of trust); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53a-
71(a)(4)(5); 53a-73a(a)(1)(E) (1995) (sexual assault); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 763 (1997)(sexual harassment); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 22-4113, 22-4114 (1996) (sexual abuse of
ward); FLA. STAT. ch. 794.011(4)(g), 794.011(8), 794.011(9) (1996) (sexual battery); FLA.
STAT. ch. 944.35(3)(b) (1996) (sexual misconduct with inmate); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-
5.1(b)-(c) (1996) (sexual assault); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 707-731, 707-732 (1993 & Supp.
1997) (sexual assault); IDAHO CODE § 18-6110 (1997) (sexual contact with inmate); 720
ILL COMP. STAT. 5/11-9.2 (West 1997) (custodial sexual misconduct); 720 ILL COMP.
STAT. 5/12-13(a)(4) (West 1997) (criminal sexual assault); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-16(0
(West 1997) (aggravated criminal sexual abuse); IND. CODE § 35-44-1-5 (1997) (sexual
relations between service provider and detainee); IOWA CODE § 709.4(2)(c)(3) (1996)
(sexual abuse); IOWA CODE § 709.16 (1996) (sexual misconduct with offenders); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 21-3502(a)(4) (1995 & Supp. 1997) (rape); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3520(1996) (unlawful sexual relations); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 253(2)(E)-(G) (West
1983 & Supp. 1997) (gross sexual assault); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 254(I)(C)
(West 1983 & Supp. 1997) (sexual abuse of minors); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A,§ 55(1)(E),(F),(I),() (West 1993 & Supp. 1997) (unlawful sexual contact); MICH. COMP.
LAWS §§ 750.520b(1)(b)(iii), (1)(h)(ii), 750.520c(I)(b)(iii), (1)(h)(ii); 750.520e(1)(d)-(0 (1996)
(criminal sexual conduct); MINN. STAT. §§ 609.343(I)(b), 609.344(I)(e), 609.345(1)(b),(e)(1996) (criminal sexual conduct); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-95(2) (1994 & Supp. 1997)(sexual battery); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-5-23(2) (1994 & Supp. 1997) (child touching);
NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 201.540, 201.550 (1997) (sexual contact with pupils and students);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 212.187 (1997) (sexual conduct with prisoner); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 632-A:2,1(k),(n), 632-A:3,lV (1996 & Supp. 1997) (felonious sexual assault); N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 2C:14-2.a(2)(b), 2C:14-2.c(3),(4)(e) (West 1995) (sexual assault); N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 2C:14-3 (West 1995) (criminal sexual contact); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-9-11(D)(1)-(2)(Michie 1994) (criminal sexual penetration); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-13 (Michie 1994)
(criminal sexual contact of minor); N.Y. PENAL LAw § 130.05(3)(e)-(O (Consol. 1997) (lack
of consent); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.7 (1993) (sexual offense); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-
395.1 (1997) (sexual harassment); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-07(I)(d) (1997) (sexual as-
sault); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-06 (1997) (sexual abuse of wards); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2907.03(A)(6)-(9) (Anderson 1997) (sexual battery); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21,§ 1111(A)(7) (1996) (rape); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-25-24 (1997) (sexual relations with
inmates); S.C. CODE ANN.§ 16-3-655(3) (Law Co-op. 1996) (criminal sexual conduct with
minors); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-23-1150 (Law Co-op. 1996) (sexual intercourse with pa-
tient); S.D. CODIFIED LAWs § 24-1-26.1 (Michie 1998) (sexual acts between prison em-
ployees and prisoners); TENN. CODE ANN. § 41-21-241 (1997) (sexual contact with pris-
oners); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011(b)(8) (West 1994 & Supp. 1998) (sexual assault);
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evident in the wording of provisions that rely on language such as
"position of authority" or "supervisory or disciplinary authority,"
while others describe custodial settings in which abuse of authority
is implicit. 1 In addition, some of these statutes specifically re-
quire that the actor use their position of authority to cause the vic-
tim to submit, " thus emphasizing the coercive, if not forcible,
nature of these offenses." 2 With respect to nonconsent, one of the
traditional requirements for rape, many of these enactments explicit-
ly negate consent as a defense13 or alter the definition of consent
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 39.03 (West 1997) (official oppression); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-5-406(10) (1953 & Supp. 1997) (sexual offenses without consent of victim); V.I.
CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 1700 (1997) (aggravated rape); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 1708
(1997) (unlawful sexual contact); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.050(1)(c),(e) (1996) (rape);
WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.100(1)(c),(e) (1996) (indecent liberties); WiS. STAT.
§ 940.225(2)(g) (1995-96) (sexual assault); Wis. STAT. § 948.095(2)(e) (1995-96) (sexual
assault of student); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-303(a)(vi) (Michie 1997) (sexual assault); see
also Commonwealth v. Frank, 577 A.2d 609 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (male therapist held
position of authority with respect to adolescent male patient); State v. Burke, 522 A.2d
725 (R.I. 1987) (interpreting Rhode Island's sexual assault statute as encompassing case
of police officer using his position of authority to intimidate victim into sex).
310 California and Texas have provisions that simply outlaw the use of power by a
public servant or official. CAL. PENAL CODE § 261(a)(7) (West 1988 & Supp. 1998)
(threaten to use authority of public official to incarcerate, arrest, or deport); TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 22.011(b)(8) (West 1994 & Supp. 1998) (public servant coerces); see also
MACDONALD, supra note 122, at 230 (in Yugoslavia "whoever through misuse of his
position procures a female person subordinated or dependent upon him to have camal
knowledge shall be punished by detention for no more than three years.').
311 COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-3-403(1)(g), 18-3-404(l)(0 (1997) (uses position of authority
to coerce victim to submit); IOWA CODE § 709.4(2)(c)(3) (1996) (uses authority to coerce
other participant to submit); MICH. COMP. LAwS §§ 750.520b(1)(b)(iii), (1)(h)(ii),
750.520c(1)(b)(iii), (1)(h)(ii) (1996) (uses authority to coerce victim to submit); MINN.
STAT. §§ 609.343(I)(b), 609.344(1)(e), 609.345(1)(b),(e) (1996) (uses authority to cause or
induce complainant to submit); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 632-A:2,1(k),(n), 632-A:3,1V
(1996 & Supp. 1997) (uses authority to coerce victim to submit); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§§ 30-9-11(D)(1), 30-9-13(2)(a) (Michie 1994) (uses authority to coerce child to submit);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-655(3) (Law Co-op. 1997) (position of familial, custodial, or
official authority to coerce victim to submit); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011(b)(8) (West
1994 & Supp. 1998) (without consent includes when actor is public servant and coerces
other person to submit); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 14, §§ 1700, 1708 (1997) (position of au-
thority used to accomplish); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-303(a)(vi) (Michie 1996) (uses posi-
tion of authority to cause victim to submit).
"' In Scadden v. State, 732 P.2d 1036, 1040 (Wyo. 1987), the court instructed the
jury: "Submit' as used in this case means that the person subjected to sexual intrusion
by an actor, who is in a position of authority over that person, does not give free, full
and reasoned consent.' New Mexico's jury instructions provide: "The defendant was a
person who by reason of his relationship to [name of victim] was able to exercise un-
due influence over [name of victim] and used his position of authority to coerce her to
submit . . . . to sexual penetration or contact. N.M. UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CRIMI-
NAL 14-945, 14-926 (1997).
113 D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-4117(a) (1996) (consent no defense); FLA. STAT. ch.
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to exclude certain protected classes. 14 While a rich diversity of
statutory language and coverage exists in this context, the statutes
may be organized into three major categories, those involving: (1)
custodial settings, (2) minors or mentally handicapped persons, and
(3) criminal sexual harassment.
1. Custodial Settings: Prisons, Hospitals, and Other Institutions
A number of state statutes protect those in custodial settings
such as hospitals or prisons.31 A typical provision, this one from
Maine, reads:
2. A person is guilty of gross sexual assault if that person engages in a
sexual act with another person and:
794.011(4)(g), 794.011(9) (1996) ("acquiescence . . . does not constitute consent'); FLA.
STAT. ch. 794.011(8) (1996) ("without regard to the willingness or consent of the victim,
which is not a defense'); FLA. STAT. ch. 944.35(3)(b)(3) (1996) (consent no defense); GA.
CODE ANN. § 16-6-5.1(c)(3) (1996) (consent no defense); IND. CODE § 35-44-1-5(c) (1997)(not a defense that act consensual); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3502(a)(4) (1995 & Supp.
1997) (consent obtained by knowing misrepresentation); MINN. STAT. §§ 609.343(I)(b),
609.344(1)(e), 609.345(1)(b),(e) (1996) (consent no defense); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-5-
23(2)" (1994 & Supp. 1997) (with or without consent); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 632-
A:2,1(n) (1996 & Supp. 1998) (consent no defense); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.7 (1993)(consent no defense); Wis. STAT. §§ 9 40.2 25 (2 )(g), 940.225(4) (1995-96) (consent not an
issue). But see 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-17(a) (West 1997) (consent as defense).
114 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-9.2 (West 1997) (consent not a defense because '[a]
person is deemed incapable of consent ...when he or she is a probationer, parolee,
releasee, or inmate in custody of a penal system."); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.05(3)(e)-((Consol. 1997) (persons incapable of consent include those in correctional facilities and
hospitals); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011(b)(8) West 1994 & Supp. 1998) (without
consent includes when actor is public servant and coerces other person to submit);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-406(10) (1953 & Supp. 1997) (sexual act is without consent if
actor was parent, guardian, or occupied position of special trust in relation to minor).
315 COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-3403()(g), 18-3-404(1)( (1997) ('The victim is in custody
of law or detained in a hospital or other institution and the actor has supervisory or
disciplinary authority over the victim and uses this position of authority ...to coerce
the victim to submit"); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53a-71(a)(5); 53a-73a(a)(1)(E) (1997) (super-
visory or disciplinary authority); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 22-4113, 22-4114 (1996) (superviso-
ry or disciplinary authority); FLA. STAT. ch. 944.35 (1996) (prohibiting sexual misconduct
with prisoners, consent no defense); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-5.1(c) (1996) (supervisory or
disciplinary authority-consent no defense); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-2(3) (West 1996)(supervisory or disciplinary authority); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.7 (1993) (parent or per-
son with custody in private, charitable, or governmental institution, consent no defense);
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-20-06 (1997), 12.1-20-07(1)(d) (1997) (supervisory or disciplin-
ary authority); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2907.03(A)(6) (Anderson 1997) (supervisory or
disciplinary authority); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-23-1150 (Law Co-op. 1997) (mental health
facility or correctional facility).
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E. The other person, not the actor's spouse, is in official custody as a
probationer or a parolee, or is detained in a hospital, prison or other
institution, and the actor has supervisory or disciplinary authority over the
other person; ... 316
Many of these statutes specifically employ abuse-of-authority lan-
guage, but some merely describe custodial situations in which sex is
prohibited. Illinois, for instance, recently passed new legislation
punishing sexual contact in custodial settings: "A person commits
the offense of custodial sexual misconduct when he or she is an
employee of a penal system and engages in sexual contact or pene-
tration with a person who is in the custody of that penal sys-
tem." 17 Several additional states have recently enacted legislation
covering prisoners. 18 Moreover, Hawaii has gone even further. It
recently amended its sexual assault statute on prisons and other
custodial settings to include police and law enforcement
officers.31
316 ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 253(2)(E) (West 1983 & Supp. 1997); see also
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 255(0)(E) (West 1983 & Supp. 1997) (unlawful sexual
contact) (same).
117 720 ILL COMP. STAT. 5/11-9.2(a) (West 1997).
318 ARIz. REv. STAT. § 13-1419 (1996) (unlawful sexual conduct); FLA. STAT. ch.
944.35(3)(b) (1996) (sexual misconduct with inmate or offender); HAw. REV. STAT.
§§ 707-731, 707-732 (1993 & Supp. 1997) (sexual assault while person employed by
state correctional facility or police or law enforcement officer); 720 ILL COMP. STAT.
5/11-9.2 (West 1997) (custodial sexual misconduct); IDAHO CODE § 18-6110 (1997) (sex-
ual contact with inmate); IND. CODE § 35-44-1-5 (1997) (sexual relations between service
provider and detainee); IOWA CODE § 709.16 (1996) (sexual misconduct with offenders);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3520 (1995) (corrections or parole officer); MICH. COMP. LAWS
§§ 750.520e(1)(d)-(O (1996) (actor is employee of and victim is under corrections depart-
ment, prisoner or probationer, or juvenile detainee); NEV. REV. STAT. § 212.187 (1997)
(recently amended to include penalties); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 632-A:2(n), 632-A:3(n)
(1996 & Supp. 1997) (recently amended to include prisoners, juvenile detainees, parol-
ees, and probationers); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-11(D)(2) (Michie 1994) (inmate confined
in correctional facility or jail); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.05(3)(e)-(f) (Consol. 1997) (persons
incapable of consent include those in correctional facilities and hospitals); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 11-25-24 (1997) (correctional employees); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-23-1150 (Law
Co-op. 1997) (amended to include inmates of state or local correctional facility); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 24-1-26.1 (Michie 1997) (person employed in state prison or detention
facility); TENN. CODE ANN. § 41-21-241 (1997) (law enforcement and correctional offi-
cers). Many of these provisions do not appear in the sexual offense portions of codes
but in sections dealing with inmates.
119 HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 707-731, 707-732 (1993 & Supp. 1997); see also FLA. STAT.
ch. 794.011(4)(g) (1996) (law enforcement, correctional, or correctional probation offi-
cers).
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2. Minors and Mentally Handicapped Persons
A large number of the abuse-of-authority provisions are de-
signed to protect minors in various settings, including foster care,
detention facilities, schools, or hospitals.3 2' A few states also have
abuse-of-authority or in-custody provisions for mentally handi-
capped persons.32' These statutes further underline the theme of
victim vulnerability.
320 ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.41.434, 11.41.436 (Michie 1996 & Supp. 1997) (minors); ARK.
CODE ANN. §§ 5-14-120, 5-14-121 (Michie 1997) (minors); COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-3-
405.3 (1997) (child); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53a-71(a)(8); 53a-73a(a)(6) (1997) (school
students); FLA. STAT. ch. 794.011(8) (1996) (minors); 720 ILL CoMP. STAT. 5/12-13(a)(4)
(West 1997) (minors); 720 ILL CoMP. STAT. 5/12-16(0 (West 1997) (minors); IOWA CODE
§ 709.4(2)(c) (1993) (minors); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 17-A §§ 253(2)(F)-(H), 254(l)(C),
255(1)(F),(G),(J) (West 1983 & Supp. 1997) (minors); MICH. COMP. LAWS§§ 750.520b(1)(b)(iii), 750.520c(I)(b)(iii) (1996) (minors); MINN. STAT. §§ 609.343(I)(b),
609.344(1)(e), 609.345(1)(b),(e) (1996) (minors); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 97-3-95(2), 97-5-
23(2) (1994 & Supp. 1997) (child); NEv. REV. STAT. §§ 201.540, 201.550 (1997) (pupils
and students); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 632-A:2,1(k) (1996 & Supp. 1997) (minors); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-2.a(2)(b), 2C:14-2.c(4) (West 1996) (minor); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-
9-11(D)(1) (Michie 1994) (child); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-13 (Michie 1997) (minor);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.03(A)(7)-(9) (Anderson 1997) (student or minor); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 16-3-655(3) (Law Co-op. 1996) (minors); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-406(10) (1953
& Supp. 1997) (minors); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 14, §§ 1700, 1708 (1997) (minors in same
household as offender); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 948.095 (West 1996 & Supp. 1997) (sexual
assault of student by school instructional staff).
"' ALAsKA STAT. §§ 11.41.410(a)(3), 11.41.420(a)(2) (Michie 1996 & Supp. 1997)(mentally incapable in offender's care by authority of law or in facility or program li-
censed by state); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-4-103(a)(2), 5-4-108(a)(3) (Michie 1997) (rape and
sexual abuse statutes amended to include residents of hospitals etc. who are incapable
of consent because they are mentally incapacitated); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 17-A
§§ 253(2)a), 255(l)(1) (West 1983 & Supp. 1997) (mentally retarded in state facility); see
also ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 34-B §§ 3008, 5004 (West 1983 & Supp. 1997) (sexual activ-
ity with recipient of mental health or mental retardation services prohibited); MICH.
COMP. LAws §§ 750.520b(1)(h), 750.520c()(h) (1996) (mentally incapacitated); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2907.03(A)(6) (Anderson 1997) (in custody or patient in hospital or other
institution); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9A.44.050(1)(c), 9A.44.100(1)(c) (1996) (developmentally
disabled), §§ 9A.44.050(1)(e), 9A.44.100(1)(e) (1996) (resident of facility for mentally dis-
ordered or chemically dependent); Wis. STAT. § 940.225(2)(g) (1995-96) (patient or resi-
dent of adult family home, community-based residential facility, inpatient health care
facility, or state treatment facility). Many other rape or sexual assault statutes cover cases
in which a the victim is a mentally incapacitated person.
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3. Criminal Sexual Harassment
Three states criminally punish sexual harassment.322 Delaware
criminalizes a broad range of such behavior by defining sexual
harassment as "threaten[ing] to engage in conduct likely to result in
the commission of a sexual offense against any person; ....//323
North Carolina limits its offense to property lessors and defines
sexual harassment as "unsolicited overt requests or demands for
sexual acts when (i) submission to such conduct is made a term of
the execution or continuation of the lease agreement, or (ii) submis-
sion to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used to
determine whether rights under the lease are accorded."324 Texas
limits the reach of its statute to public servants, defining sexual ha-
rassment as: "unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual fa-
vors, or other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature, sub-
mission to which is made a term or condition of a person's exercise
or enjoyment of any right, privilege, power, or immunity, either
explicitly or implicitly."32 Georgia rejected a recent bill making it
a felony to solicit sex from a worker or job applicant as a condition
of employment. 26
4. Conclusion
The abuse-of-authority enactments, more than their abuse-of-
trust counterparts, emphasize the legislative judgment that it is the
misuse of naked power in securing sexual compliance that is blame-
worthy, rather than the abuse of a professional trust or a confiden-
tial, fiduciary relationship. In some senses, these enactments are
similar to statutory rape provisions that protect victims thought to be
too young and vulnerable to make informed choices about sexual
conduct from overreaching by those in superior positions. 27 Mor-
3,2 See also MAcDONALD, supra note 122, at 230 ("Unlike American jurisdictions,
some other countries-U.S.S.R., Switzerland and Yugoslavia-regard sexual intercourse in-
duced by economic coercion as a form of rape.'); Baker, supra note 237, at 247 (pro-
posing model statute); Chamallas, supra note 17, at 821 (noting Swiss and Soviet crimi-
nal codes prohibit employers from sexually exploiting employees); Harris, supra note 12,
at 644 (noting that several foreign jurisdictions prohibit economic coercion in obtaining
effective consent to sexual intercourse).
3 DEL CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 763(1) (1995).
314 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-395.1(b)(1) (1997).
325 TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 39.03(c) (West 1994).
326 Baker, supra note 237, at 213.
327 "The cases left out are handled by development of a status concept, one which
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eover, because these provisions disaggregate power from physical
force, they delegitimatize conduct that has previously escaped crim-
inal punishment, like that of the defendants in Thompson (the high-
school principal) and Mlinarich (the guardian). In addition, the focus
in many of these provisions on particularly vulnerable persons such
as minors or prisoners underscores the power differential between
defendants and victims-roughly corresponding with the abuse-of-
authority cases discussed in Part I.E. Finally, the widespread adop-
tion of these statutes, the broadest of any category, renders less
meaningful the selective-coverage problem discussed in connection
with those cases.
C. Sexual Penetration or Contact by Fraud or Deception
In addition to the plethora of state statutes that criminally pun-
ish individuals who abuse a position of trust or authority, some
states have enacted specific statutes dealing with sexual contact
obtained by fraud or deceit. 2 First, two states punish defendants'
use of unspecified forms of fraud to obtain sexual intercourse: Ten-
nessee for the felonies of rape and sexual battery and Alabama for
the misdemeanor of sexual misconduct. Second, in response to
egregious acts by putative rapists and the lack of available statutory
remedies, California and Kansas recently enacted provisions carving
out certain circumstances in which a specific type of fraud will
render a defendant criminally responsible for rape. Additionally,
several states retain older criminal provisions relating to specific
forms of fraud in obtaining sexual relations such as husband imper-
sonation, fraud as to the nature of the act, or fraudulent administra-
tion of drugs. Third, ten states have global consent provisions men-
takes the prohibitions on sexual activities involving children (and certain others) as mani-
festing a distinct set of concerns-partly paternalistic, partly prohibitions on seriously
exploitive conduct." J.H. Bogart, On The Nature of Rape, 5 PUB. AFF. Q. 117, 131
(1991).
328 Some foreign countries also have statutes punishing species of rape by fraud. In
England, Parliament passed the Sexual Offenses Act of 1956 making it a misdemeanor to
procure a woman by false pretenses or false representation in order to have sexual inter-
course. K. L. Koh, Consent and Responsibility in Sexual Offenses, 1968 CRiM. L. REV.(ENG.) 81. New Guinea's Criminal Code provides: "Any person who has carnal knowl-
edge of a woman, or girl, not his wife, without her consent, or with her consent, if the
consent is obtained by . . . means of false or fraudulent representations as to the nature
of the act, or in the case of a married woman, by impersonating her husband, is guilty
of a crime which is called rape." Quoted in Scutt, Fraudulent Impersonation, supra note
134, at 64.
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tioning deception that may arguably affect their jurisdiction's sexual
offense statutes, although they are not explicitly part of these codes.
This Part also considers remnants of the past, statutes punishing
various forms of fraud in the context of separate crimes such as
seduction and pandering. The common thread uniting all these
statutes is their reference to fraud, artifice, or deceit; many of these
enactments also explicitly alter the nonconsent requirement. 29
1. General Types of Fraud
Two states provide for global treatment of fraud in relation to
rape or other sexual offenses-Tennessee and Alabama. The distin-
guishing characteristic of both states' statutes is that they do not
specifically set forth the exact types of fraud at issue. In contrast to
the statutes in the next part which explicitly articulate the precise
types of fraud needed to commit the offense, the following statutes
can encompass a variety of deceptive behavior on the part of
perpetrators.
a. Tennessee: Rape and Sexual Battery by Fraud
Under Tennessee's rather sophisticated grading structure, four
categories of sexual offenses exist: aggravated rape, rape, aggravated
sexual battery, and sexual battery.33 Aggravated rape and aggra-
vated sexual battery statutes punish defendants' use of force or coer-
cion when they are armed with a weapon, cause bodily injury, or
have accomplices. 31 On the other hand, Tennessee's rape statute
covers cases in which "The sexual penetration is accomplished by
fraud."332 Its sexual battery statute covers instances in which the
' The one exception is the U.S. Military's treatment of fraud. 10 U.S.C. § 920
(1997). The Manual for Courts-Martial provides in pertinent part: 'If there is actual con-
sent, although obtained by fraud, the act is not rape, but if to the accused's knowledge
the victim is of unsound mind or unconscious to an extent rendering him or her incapa-
ble of giving consent, the act is rape.' MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES §
45(c)(1)(e), at iv-65 1995. However, in United States v. Booker, 25 M.J. 114 (CMA
1987), the United States Court of Military Appeals interpreted this language as pertaining
to fraud in the inducement but not fraud in the factum.
3-o TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-13-502, 39-13-503(a)(4), 39-13-504, 39-13-505(a)(2), (a)(4)
(1997).
331 TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-502 (1997) (aggravated rape); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-
13-504 (1997) (aggravated sexual battery).
332 TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-503(a)(4) (1997).
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defendant achieves sexual contact, rather than penetration, and also
includes a provision on fraud.33 Such fraud is defined as "used in
normal parlance and includes, but is not limited to, deceit, trickery,
misrepresentation and subterfuge, and shall be broadly construed to
accomplish the purposes of this title; . . . ,.34 Finally, Tennessee
provides that consent is not effective when it is induced by
deception.33
b. Alabama: Sexual Misconduct
Unlike Tennessee's incorporation of fraud into its rape and
sexual battery provisions, Alabama criminally punishes certain lesser
forms of sexual misconduct as misdemeanors. One section of Alaba-
ma's statute punishes sexual misconduct if: "Being a male, he en-
gages in sexual intercourse with a female ... with her consent
where consent was obtained by the use of any fraud or arti-
fice; . ,.." The commentary to this statute provides:
Section 13A-6-65 is not concerned with aggravated cases of
rape,... rather it is directed toward the more unusual situations where a
person has acquiesced to sexual intercourse ... as a result of some fraud,
artifice or stratagem.
Section 13A-6-65(a) offers an offense in instances where the line be-
tween criminal and noncriminal sexual conduct has been transgressed to
an extent which requires punishment of the actor and vindication of the
victim. It comprehends specific instances presently criminal (see below),
but it is broad enough to include other situations where the naivete of the
victim or guile of the actor is sufficient to allow the actor to gain sexual
access to the person of another through some artifice or fraud, e.g., "nec-
essary medical treatment."... Section 13A-6-65(a)(1) also includes the
offense of seduction ....
Alabama's sexual misconduct statute operates when the victim has
consented, thus the defendant cannot claim consent as a
defense. 38
33 TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-505(a)(2), (a)(4) (1997).
334 TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-106(a)(13) (1997).
335 TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-106(a)(9)(A) (1997).
336 ALA. CODE § 13A-6-65(a)(1) (1994) (emphasis added); see also Hightower v. State,
443 So. 2d 1272 (1983) (dismissing case because of fatal variance in indictment under
this statute).
317 ALA. CODE § 13A-6-65 Commentary (1994).
338 ALA. CODE § 13A-6-65(a)(1) (1995).
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2. Specific Types of Fraud
a. Recent Enactments
i. California: Inducing Consent by Fear Based on Fraud
The California legislature in response to Boro v. Superior
Court,339 discussed in Part I.A., amended its rape laws by includ-
ing a new category of offense called "Inducing consent to sexual act
by fraud or fear" which provides:
Every person who induces any other person to engage in sexual inter-
course... when his or her consent is procured by false or fraudulent
representation or pretense that is made with the intent to create fear, and
which does induce fear, and that would cause a reasonable person in like
circumstances to act contrary to the person's free will, and does cause the
victim to so act, is punishable by imprisonment ... 340
The statutory title is slightly inaccurate because fraud must induce
fear and is insufficient alone. However, in this section, California
has explicitly described one set of circumstances in which consent
will be ineffective.
ii. Kansas: Consent Obtained Through Knowing
Misrepresentation
Kansas recently amended its rape statute to include two distinct
categories of rape by fraud:
(3) sexual intercourse with a victim when the victim's consent was
obtained through a knowing misrepresentation made by the offender that
the sexual intercourse was a medically or therapeutically necessary proce-
dure; or
(4) sexual intercourse with a victim when the victim's consent was
obtained through a knowing misrepresentation made by the offender that
the sexual intercourse was a legally required procedure within the scope
of the offender's authority.
3 41
Like the California statute, Kansas's enactment renders consent
based on certain types of fraud ineffective in the context of rape.
Kansas's provisions closely resemble the abuse-of-trust and abuse-of-
339 210 Cal. Rptr. 122 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
340 CAL. PENAL CODE § 266c (West Supp. 1998) (emphasis added).
4' KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3502(a) (Supp. 1997) (emphasis added).
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authority statutes in Parts II.A. and ll.B., but employ the unique
standard of "knowing misrepresentation." Kansas, like California,
enacted the above-referenced legislation to close a loophole that
allowed a defendant who allegedly raped three women, under the
guise of performing a medical examination, to escape punishment
because his behavior fell outside the extant statute. 42
b. Traditional Provisions
i. Husband Impersonation
One traditional category of rape by fraud is provisions in rape
and sexual assault statutes covering cases of husband imperson-
ation. Eleven jurisdictions have statutes explicitly punishing this
form of fraud in order to obtain sexual intercourse.343
342 Rizzo, supra note 87, at C2.
3 ARIZ. REv. STAT. §§ 13-1401(5)(d) (Supp. 1997) (without consent includes if "victim
is intentionally deceived to erroneously believe that the person is the victim's spouse");
CAL PENAL CODE § 261(a)(5) (West Supp. 1998) (victim submits under belief actor is
victim's spouse, and "this belief is induced by any artifice, pretense, or concealment
practiced by the accused, with intent to induce the belief"); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-
403(1)(d) (1997) (actor knows victim submits "erroneously, believing the actor to be the
victim's spouse"); IDAHO CODE § 18-6101(6) (1997) (victim submits under belief that
actor is her husband, and "the belief is induced by artifice, pretense or concealment
practiced by the accused, with intent to induce such belief.'); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 14:43(A)(3) (West 1997 & Supp. 1998) (female victim submits under belief intentional-
ly induced by any artifice, pretence, or concealment practiced by offender); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 28-318(8)(a)(iv) (1995) (without consent includes "consent, if any was actually
given, was the result of the actor's deception as to the identity of the actor . . .);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.03(A)(4) (Anderson Supp. 1997) ('offender knows that the
other person submits because the other person mistakenly identifies the offender as the
other person's spouse."); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1111(A)(6) (Supp. 1998) (belief induced
by artifice, pretense or concealment practiced by accused or by accused in collusion
with spouse with intent to induce such belief); P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 33, § 4061(e) (1992)(belief induced by artifice, pretense or concealment practiced by accused); UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 76-5-406(7) (1996) (without consent includes actor knowing victim submits or
participates because victim erroneously believes actor is victim's spouse); WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 6-2-303(a)(iv) (Michie 1997) (actor knows or should reasonably know that victim
submits erroneously believing actor is spouse); see also ALA. CODE § 13A-6-65(a)(1)
(1994) (commentary asserts that sexual misconduct also includes husband impersonation).
Texas had a statute that punished as rape sexual intercourse obtained by means of
force, threats, or fraud. Fraud was defined as using some stratagem to induce the wom-
an to believe that the defendant was her husband. Carpenter, supra note 127, at 606.
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ii. Fraud as to the Nature of the Sexual Act
A number of rape and sexual assault statutes have miscella-
neous provisions referring to fraud or deceit. Three states prohibit
fraud or deception as to the nature of the act. Arizona defines
"without consent" for purposes of its sexual offenses to include
instances in which: "The victim is intentionally deceived as to the
nature of the act."344 Similarly, Nebraska defines "without con-
sent" for purposes of its sexual assault statute to include deception
as to the identity of the actor, a variation of a husband imperson-
ation provision, as well as deception as to the "nature or purpose of
act on the part of the actor."34 California's rape statute prohibits
sexual intercourse when the victim is "unconscious of the nature of
the act," which it defines to include "[wias not aware, knowing, per-
ceiving, or cognizant of the essential characteristics of the act due
to the perpetrator's fraud in fact."34
iii. Fraud in Administering Drugs
Ohio's rape statute outlaws sexual intercourse if "[flor the pur-
pose of preventing resistance, the offender substantially impairs the
other person's judgment or control by administering any drug or
intoxicant to the other person, surreptitiously or by force, threat of
force, or deception."347 Ohio's provision is unique in that states
with similar drug provisions in their rape or sexual assault statutes
do not incorporate the notion of fraud.348
34 ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-1401(5)(c) (Supp. 1997).
ml NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-318(8)(a)(iv) (1995).
36 CAL PENAL CODE § 261(a)(4)(C) (West Supp. 1998); see also CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 261.6 (West Supp. 1998) (consent defined as 'positive cooperation in act or attitude
pursuant to an exercise of free will. The person must act freely and voluntarily and
have knowledge of the nature of the act or transaction involved.'); Boro v. Superior
Court, 210 Cal. Rptr. 122 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (a discussion of the two sections in a
rape case).
M7 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(A)(1)(a) (Anderson Supp. 1997); see also OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.05(A)(2) (Anderson Supp. 1997) (gross sexual imposition statute
has same provision).
3 These statutes contain a provision regarding the administration of a drug, anesthet-
ic, or alcohol to obtain the victim's compliance: ALA. CODE §§ 13A-6-60(6) (1994); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. § 13-1401(5)(b) (Supp. 199.7); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-14-101(4) (Michie 1997);
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-3-402(1)(d), 18-3-404(I)(d) (1997); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-
73a(a)(1)(B), 53a-65(5) (1996 & Supp. 1998); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 761(g)(5)
(1996); D.C. CODE ANN. § 224102(4) (1996); FLA. STAT. ch. 794.011(1)(c), (4)(d) (1996);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-700 (1993); IDAHO CODE § 18-6101(4) (1997); IOWA CODE
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3. Global Consent Provisions: Consent is Ineffective if Induced
by Force, Duress, or Deception
Some states have generic consent provisions applying to all
types of criminal offenses not just sexual crimes. These provisions
track Model Penal Code ("MPC") § 2.11 which describes when con-
sent is ineffective in relieving a criminal actor of liability for con-
duct.3 49 One enumerated circumstance, for example, is when con-
sent is induced by force, duress, or deception. Ten states' provisions
incorporate the MPC language with respect to deception."' These
generic consent statutes commonly take two slightly different forms.
One form specifies that assent does not constitute consent if: "It is
induced by force, duress or deception.""' Two states further qual-
§§ 709.1(1), 709.4(3) (1993); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.010(5) (Michie 1990 & Supp.
1996); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:43(A)(1) (West Supp. 1998); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
17-A, § 253(2)(A) (West Supp. 1997); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 3 (1996); MICH.
CoMP. LAWS § 750.520a(g) (1994); MINN. STAT. § 609.341(7)m (1996); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 97-3-97(c) (1994); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:2(I)(0 (1996); N.D. Cent. Code
§§ 12.1-20-03(1)(b), 12.1-20-07(1)(c) (Supp. 1997); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1111(A)(4)
(1996); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3121(4) (West Supp. 1998); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 22.011(b)(6) (West Supp. 1998); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-406(8) (Supp. 1998); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3252(a)(2) (Supp. 1997); W.VA. CODE § 61-8B-1(4) (1997); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 6-2-303(a)(iii) (Michie 1997).
11 It provides: "Ineffective Consent. Unless otherwise provided by the Code or by
the law defining the offense, assent does not constitute consent if: . . . it is induced by
force, duress or deception of a kind sought to be prevented by the law defining the of-
fense.' MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.11(3)(d) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). The commentary
to this section states: "Many thefts are the result of transactions to which there is assent
by the victim; the fraudulent method of inducing the assent, however, deprives it of
controlling force.' MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.11 commentary at 399 (Proposed Official
Draft 1962).
310 ALA. CODE § 13A-2-7(c)(4) (1994); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-505(3)(d) (1997); DEL
CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 453(4) (1995); HAW. REV. STAT. § 702-235(4) (1993); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 109(3)(Q (1996); MO. REV. STAT. § 556.061(5)(c) (1996); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 45-2-211(2)(c) (1997); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-10(c)(3) (West 1995); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 12.1-17-08(2)(c) (1997); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 311(0(4) (1998). But see
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 626:6 (1996) (omitting the "force, duress or deception' language
from its provision). See also TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-106(a)(9)(A) (1997) ('Consent is
not effective when: (A) Induced by deception or coercion; . . . . ); TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 1.07(a)(19) (West 1994) ("Consent is not effective if: . . . induced by force,
threat, or fraud.') This section appears to be limited to property offenses; Texas defines
"without consent" differently in its sexual assault statutes. But see Smith v. State, 873
S.W.2d 66 (1993) (court cites both section 1.07 and sexual-assault consent provision in
sexual assault case).
311 ALA. CODE § 13A-2-7(c)(4) (1994); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-505(3)(d) (1997); Mo.
REV. STAT. § 556.061(5)(c) (1996); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17-08(2)(c) (1997). In
Ferguson v. People, 824 P.2d 803 (Colo. 1992), the court cited Colorado's global con-
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ify this language by retaining the MPC language "of a kind sought
to be prevented by the law defining the offense."" 2 The other
form provides that consent does not constitute a defense under the
same circumstances.3 Therefore, in rape cases where consent is
procured by deception, such consent could be vitiated in states with
global consent provisions fashioned after the MPC. 4
One question arises, however, when determining the applica-
bility of these consent provisions-whether a conflicting definition
appears in the sexual offenses section of the criminal code. s
Eight states do not separately define consent in their sexual offense
codes;356 Delaware and Montana do. 7 Delaware's definition of
"without consent" is critical because it incorporates abuse-of-trust
provisions for doctors, psychologists, and clergy members and appe-
ars more controlling than its generic provision. 8 In Montana, the
annotator's notes to the generic consent provision make clear that it
applies to sexual crimes. 9 However, Montana defines "without
sent provision in the context of a case involving sexual imposition by a psychotherapist.
It noted that in 1989, when Colorado amended its statute to negate consent as a de-
fense, it merely clarified the application of this provision.
3"I N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-10(c)(3) (West 1995); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 311()(4)
(1998).
313 DEL CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 453(4) (1995); HAW. REV. STAT. § 702-235(4) (1993);
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 109(3)(Q (West 1996); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-
211(2)(c) (1997).
114 Hawaii has, in fact, held that its statute renders the factum-inducement distinction
irrelevant. See State v. Oshiro, 696 P.2d 846, 850 n.2 (Haw. Ct. App. 1985).
115 The MPC and seven state provisions contain language such as: "unless otherwise
provided by the Code or by the law defining the offense . . . .' MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 2.11(3) (Proposed Official Draft 1962); ALA. CODE § 13A-2-7(c) (1996); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 18-1-505(3) (1997); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 453 (1995); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 702-235 (1993); MCF. REV. STAT. § 556.061 (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-10(c) (West
1995); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 311(Q (1998). Maine and North Dakota simply provide
'within the meaning of this section.' ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 109(3) (West
1996); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17-08(2) (1997). Montana is silent on this issue. MONT.
CODE ANN. § 45-2-211 (1997).
1-6 ALA. CODE § 13A-6-60 (1994); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-401 (1997); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 707-700 (1993); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 251 (West Supp. 1997); MO.
REV. STAT. § 566.010 (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-1 (West 1995); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 12.1-20-02 (Supp. 1997); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3101 (Supp. 1998).
317 DEL CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 761(g) (1995) (definition of 'without consent' applica-
ble to sexual offense); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 45-5-501(1); 45-5-503(1) (1997) (definition
of 'without consent' for sexual intercourse without consent).
1 8 See supra note 281 and accompanying text.
319 It provides: "It is an element of the sexual offenses of Sexual Assault and Sexual
Intercourse Without Consent (citations omitted) that the sexual act was committed with-
out the consent of the victim. Thus, consent is a defense which may eliminate criminal
responsibility.' Annotator's Note accompanying MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-211 (1997)
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consent" for the purposes of the offense of "sexual intercourse with-
out consent" more narrowly.3 6' Thus, the generic consent defini-
tion arguably applies to Montana's sexual assault statute361 while
the narrower consent definition applies to the offense of sexual
intercourse without consent.
4. Remnants of the Past: The Other Crimes of Seduction,
Abduction, Marrying Under False Personation, and
Pandering
Finally, in addition to rape or sexual assault statutes, several
states retain criminal seduction statutes which implicate deception.
Criminal seduction statutes are one of the oldest types of statutory
law prohibiting the commission of sexual intercourse based upon
some form of fraud.3 62 Seduction required a chaste woman who
was induced to have sexual intercourse under the false promise of
marriage.363 Six jurisdictions presently retain seduction statutes in
their criminal codes.3" Two states statutes explicitly mention some
form of fraud; 61 three others mention the promise of mar-
riage.366 Moreover, several jurisdictions recognized in the past a
' The statute defines 'without consent' to include physical force and a victim inca-
pable of consent because mentally defective, physically helpless, or less than sixteen
years old. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-501(1)(b)(i)-(iii) (1997).
361 MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-502(1) (1997) provides: "A person who knowingly sub-
jects another person to any sexual contact without consent commits the offense of sexu-
al assault.'
362 See generally 70 AM. JUR. 2D Seduction 97 (1987); Humble, supra note 5.
363 70 AM. JUR. 2D at 104.
MICH. COMP. LAws § 750.532 (1991) (seduction); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-55
(1994) (seduction of female over 18 by promised or pretended marriage); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 97-5-21 (1994) (seduction of child under 18); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1120 (1996)
(seduction under promise of marriage); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1121-1122 (1996) (marriage
as defense and penalty for abandonment of marriage after seduction); P.R. LAws ANN. tit.
33, § 4063 (1992) (seduction); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-50 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995)
(seduction under promise of marriage); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 1981 (1997); see also
ALA. CODE § 13A-665(a)(1) (1994) (commentary to sexual misconduct statute indicates
that it includes the offense of seduction); MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 272, § 4 (1997) ("Who-
ever induces any person under eighteen of chaste life to have unlawful sexual inter-
course . . . ."); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 200.364; 200.368 (1997) (punishing statutory sexual
seduction which more closely resembles statutory rape than seduction).
365 MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-55 (1996) (obtaining carnal knowledge by feigned or
pretended marriage or false or feigned promise of marriage); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-50
(Law Co-op. 1996) (by means of deception and promise of marriage). South Carolina's
provision is quite restrictive, prohibiting conviction if the woman's testimony is uncorrob-
orated or she is lewd and unchaste and staying action if defendant marries woman.
366 OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1120 (1996); P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 33, § 4063 (1992); V.I.
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tort of seduction. Since such time, most legislatures have abolished
both criminal and civil seduction statutes as part of the anti-heartba-
Im legislation." 7 In repealing its civil seduction statute, Illinois's
legislature stated that it would leave "punishments of wrongdoers
guilty of seduction to proceedings under the criminal laws of the
state .... .368
In addition to the above, five states criminalize abduction for
the purposes of marriage, sexual intercourse, or prostitution;6 9
two provisions mention fraud. 7' Seven states prohibit falsely im-
personating someone for the purpose of marriage, closely resem-
bling the husband impersonation provisions discussed earlier.37'
California's statute, for example, provides: "Every person who false-
ly personates another, and in such assumed character marries or
pretends to marry, or to sustain the marriage relation towards anoth-
CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 1981 (1997).
"' See Larson, Women Understand, supra note 24. The commentary to New Jersey's
statutory repeal provides: 'Primary aim of Heart Balm Act barring suit based upon
breach of promise to marry was to do away with excessive claims, coercive by their
very nature and, frequently, fraudulent in nature.' N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:23-1 et seq.
(West 1996) (Notes of Decisions) (citations omitted). Minnesota issued a similar policy
declaration:
Actions based upon alleged alienation of affections, criminal conversation,
seduction and breach of contract to marry, have been subject to grave abuses,
have caused intimidation and harassment, to innocent persons and have result-
ed in the perpetration of frauds. It is declared as the public policy of this
state that the best interests of the people of this state will be served by the
abolition of these causes of action.
MINN. STAT. § 553.01 (1996).
' 740 ILL COMP. STAT. 15/1 (West 1996) (legislative declaration).
119 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 1 (1996) (abduction of unmarried person under
sixteen for purpose of marriage); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 2 (1996) (abduction for
prostitution or unlawful sexual intercourse); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.13 (1991) (enticing
away female under sixteen for prostitution, concubinage, sexual intercourse, or marriage);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-1 (1994) (abduction for purposes of marriage); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 97-5-5 (1994) (enticing child for prostitution, concubinage, or marriage); OKLA. STAT.
tit. 21, § 1119 (Supp. 1998) (abduction of person under fifteen for marriage, concubi-
nage, or any crime involving moral turpitude); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-48 (Michie Supp.
1997) (abduction with intent to defile or for child under sixteen for the purpose of
concubinage or prostitution); see also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-4(l) (Michie 1994) ("under
pretense of marriage, knowingly detaining a person or taking a person into the state or
causing a person to leave the state for the purpose of prostitution.").
310 MASS. GEN. LAwS ch. 272, § 2 (1996) ("Whoever fraudulently and deceitfully
entices or takes away a person . . . .'); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-1 (1996) ('by force,
menace, fraud, deceit, stratagem or duress . . . .. ).
371 CAL PENAL CODE § 528 (West 1996); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-5-113 (1997); IDAHO
CODE § 18-3003 (1997); MINN. STAT. § 609.83 (1996); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-19-33
(1994); NEV. REV. STAT. § 205.450 (1997); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1531 (Supp. 1998).
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er, with or without the connivance of such other, is guilty of a
felony."372
Further, thirteen states have pandering statutes, a unique blend
of fraud and sex," some pertaining only to the offender's
spouse.374 Michigan's statute provides in relevant part:
[A]ny person who by promises, threats, violence, by any device or
scheme, by fraud or artifice, or by duress of person or goods, or by abuse
of any position of confidence or authority, or having legal charge, shall
take, place, harbor, inveigle, entice, persuade, encourage or procure any
female person to enter any place within this state in which prostitution is
practiced, encouraged or allowed, for the purpose of prostitu-
tion; .... 37S
The language of this enactment is striking. In warding off the evil of
prostitution, Michigan crafted a comprehensive provision protecting
women from a broad range of pressures including force, fraud,
coercion, and other means strongly resembling more modern abuse-
of-trust and abuse-of-authority provisions. Perhaps more than any
other set of statutes reviewed in this Part, these laws demonstrate
legislative know-how in writing all-inclusive provisions. Unfortu-
nately, that knowledge has not been put to good use in drafting
rape or sexual assault statutes.
5. Conclusion
The legislative prohibition of sexual penetration or contact
accomplished by fraud that occurs outside of professional treatment
contexts continues to be a difficult problem. No doubt wary of
372 CAL. PENAL CODE § 528 (West 1996).
373 CAL. PENAL CODE § 266a (West 1996) (procurement by fraud); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 266i (West Supp. 1998) (pandering); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-2708 (Supp. 1998) (caus-
ing spouse to live in prostitution); MD. ANN. CODE OF 1957, CRIMES & PUN. § 429
(1997) (placing spouse in house of prostitution); MICH. COMP. LAws § 750.455 (1991)
(pandering); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-51 (1994) (procuring); NEV. REV. STAT. § 201.300
(Supp. 1997) (pandering); NEv. REv. STAT. § 201.310 (1997) (placing spouse in brothel);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-4 (Michie 1994) (promoting prostitution); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21,
§ 1081 (Supp. 1998) (pandering); R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-34-1 (1994) (pandering); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 16-15-100 (Law. Co-op. 1995) (prostitution); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-368
(Michie 1996) (placing or leaving wife for prostitution); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 1625
(1997) (pandering); W. VA. CODE § 61-8-7 (1997) (procuring for house of prostitution).
314 D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-2708 (Supp. 1998); MD. CODE ANN. OF 1957, CRIMES &
PUN. § 429 (1996); NEv. REv. STAT. § 201.310 (1997); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-368
(Michie 1996).
"' MICH. COMP. LAws § 750.455 (1996).
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casting their nets too wide, state legislatures have been quite con-
servative, tending to enact very specific provisions to cover a few
factual scenarios rather than passing more global fraud statutes. The
importance of the two archetypical rape by fraud cases, fraudulent
medical treatment and husband impersonation, is evident in many
of these modern enactments; California's and Kansas's specific fraud
provisions flowed from fraudulent medical cases in those jurisdic-
tions and Tennessee's rape by fraud law, although written broadly,
is an update of an older husband impersonation statute. In addition,
although some have global consent provisions, states seldom apply
them in the context of sexual offenses, underlining the point that
rape continues to be treated differently from other crimes. 76 The
few remaining seduction, abduction, and pandering statutes are
counterexamples of a broader retrenchment in protection afforded
persons from some types of sexual fraud. 77 Finally, none of the
reviewed provisions, with the exception of Tennessee's," 8 even
approaches the problem of rape by fraud in the business or com-
mercial setting. Thus, while legislatures have made considerable
progress, this area remains one of the least developed.
D. Sexual Intercourse by Coercion, Compulsion, Extortion, or
Duress
A fourth major category of statutes, appearing in approximately
twenty jurisdictions, deviate from rape laws by substituting non-
physical forms of coercion for the traditional requirement of physi-
cal force or threat of physical force. Many of these statutes provide
for a lesser degree of sexual crime than cases involving physical
force. Moreover, they differ from abuse-of-trust statutes because they
do not specify individuals by whom or circumstances in which
victims may be assailed; they also do not rely on an imbalance of
power as in abuse-of-authority provisions. Finally, these statutes ad-
dress coercive, not fraudulent, pressures, distinguishing them from
the previous category.
376 See infra Part III.
3 See also Schulhofer, Gender Question, supra note 10, at 136 (noting since aboli-
tion of seduction, criminal law has immunized all misrepresentations no matter how
egregious).
"a See supra note 332.
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1. Nonphysical Threats or Means of Causing Submission
A number of states retain criminal provisions that outlaw the
use of various threats or means to coerce a victim to submit to
sexual intercourse. One group punishes defendants' use of threats to
retaliate to secure sexual compliance, with some states defining
"threat to retaliate" narrowly to encompass only measures involving
physical force or kidnapping," 9 but six others cover at least one
nonphysical means, most commonly extortion.38 ° For example,
New Hampshire's statute, the broadest in scope, defines retaliate to
include: "[p]hysical or mental torment or abuse[;] kidnapping, false
imprisonment, or extortion[; or] public humiliation or disgrace."38'
While not employing the threat-to-retaliate formulation of these
other states, Tennessee punishes rape and sexual battery accom-
plished by coercion,382 which includes extortion and the use of
"parental, custodial, or official authority" on a child under fif-
teen.383 Similarly, Vermont prohibits "threatening or coercing the
other person" to submit to sexual intercourse. 84
37 CAL. PENAL CODE § 261(a)(6) (West Supp. 1998) (against victim's will by threat to
retaliate, i.e., threat to kidnap, falsely imprison, inflict extreme pain, serious bodily inju-
ry, or death); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-402(I)(c) (1997) (causes submission by threat to
retaliate, i.e., threat of kidnapping, death, serious bodily injury, or extreme pain); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 6-2-303(a)(i) (Michie 1996) (same); see also R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-1(2)(D)
(Supp. 1997) (defining force or coercion to include threatening to murder, inflict bodily
injury, or kidnap).
38o FLA. STAT. ch. 794.011(l)(0, (4)(c) (Supp. 1998) (coerces victim to submit by
threatening to retaliate, i.e., threats of future physical punishment, kidnapping, false im-
prisonment, forcible confinement, or extortion); MICH. CoMP. LAwS § 750.520b(1)(f)(iii),
750.520e(1)(b)(iii) (Supp. 1998) (coerces victim to submit by threatening to retaliate, i.e.,
threats of physical punishment, kidnapping, or extortion); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-
A:1 II, 632-A:2 l(d) (1996) (coerces victim to submit by threatening to retaliate, i.e.,
physical or mental torment or abuse; kidnapping, false imprisonment, or extortion; or
public humiliation or disgrace); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-10(A)(3) (Michie 1994) (force or
coercion includes threats of physical punishment, kidnapping, extortion, or retaliation);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-655(3) (Law. Co-op. 1996) (aggravated coercion includes threat-
ening to retaliate by infliction of physical harm, kidnapping, or extortion); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-5-406(4) (Supp. 1998) (coerces victim to submit by threatening to retaliate,
i.e., threats of physical force, kidnapping, or extortion).
381 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:1 11 (1996).
382 TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-13-502, 39-13-503, 39-13-504, 39-13-505 (1997).
383 TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-501(1) (1997). In State v. McKnight, 900 S.W.2d 36
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1994), the court interpreted coercion to include the defendant's threat
to expose the victim's homosexuality.
3 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3252(a)(1) (Supp. 1997).
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Six states adopt a second approach based to some degree upon
MPC § 213.1(2)(a) which prohibits sexual intercourse when the
female is compelled to submit "by any threat that would prevent
resistance by a woman of ordinary resolution."38 North Dakota's
sexual imposition statute tracks the MPC language most closely; it
prohibits a sexual act or contact "if the actor compels the other
person to submit by any threat that would render a person of rea-
sonable firmness incapable of resisting."386 Similarly, Pennsylvania
prohibits indecent assault "by threat of forcible compulsion that
would prevent resistance by a person of reasonable resolu-
tion; ... 387 The statute defines forcible compulsion broadly:
"Compulsion by use of physical, intellectual, moral, emotional or
psychological force, either express or implied." 88 California's rape
's MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). The commentary
provides in pertinent part:
Examples might include threat to cause her to lose her job or to deprive
her of a valued possession. This provision extends liability for coercion by
threat far beyond anything contemplated by prior law. It rests on the judgment
that using one's ability to cause harm in order to override the will of a reluc-
tant female is wrongful and should be punished.
Stated abstractly, the rationale ... seems self-evident. Yet there are obvi-
ous dangers in extending the prospect of criminal sanctions into the shadow
area between coercion and bargain. To take an extreme example, the man
who 'threatens' to withhold an expensive present unless his girlfriend permits
his advances is plainly not a fit subject for punishment under the law of rape.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 commentary at 314 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). Coer-
cion is overwhelming the will of the victim, while bargain is offering "an unattractive
choice to avoid some unwanted alternative.' Id.; cf. Durham, supra note 18, at 57
('Many threats other than direct bodily harm, such as loss of a job or suitor, may co-
erce a girl into submission; and though she may consider herself opposed to the act,
the law does not treat these situations as rape.") (footnote omitted).
38 N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-04(l) (1997). Compare this language to North
Dakota's duress statute which provides: "Compulsion within the meaning of this section
exists only if the force, threat, or circumstances are such as would render a person of
reasonable firmness incapable of resisting the pressure." N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-
10(1) (1997). The sexual imposition statute appears to require less by way of compulsion
because it does not specify force or threat of force, and may cover other types of "du-
ress' such as exposing a secret or causing financial hardship.
117 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3125(3), 3126(a)(3) (Supp. 1998).
11 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3101 (Supp. 1998). But see Commonwealth v. Mlinarich,
542 A.2d 1335 (Pa. 1988) (interpreting this provision quite narrowly in a rape-by-coer-
cion context).
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statute contains a separate duress provision with389 duress defined
as:
a direct or implied threat of force, violence, danger, or retribution suffi-
cient to coerce a reasonable person of ordinary susceptibilities to perform
an act which otherwise would not have been performed, or acquiesce in
an act to which one otherwise would not have submitted. The total cir-
cumstances, including the age of the victim, and his or her relationship to
the defendant, are factors to consider in appraising the existence of du-
ress.
390
Three states adapt the MPC language by substituting the term
"means" for "threat." Ohio and Wyoming criminalize coercing or
causing another person to submit "by any means that would prevent
resistance by a person of ordinary resolution."39' Colorado's sec-
ond-degree sexual assault provision outlaws if: "The actor causes
submission of the victim to sexual penetration [sexual intrusion] by
any means other than those set forth in section 18-3-402 [first-de-
gree sexual assault],392 but of sufficient consequence reasonably
calculated to cause submission against the victim's will; .... 393
Finally, Washington retains a unique provision-third-degree rape
occurs: "Where there is threat of substantial unlawful harm to
property rights of the victim."394
2. Compulsion, Coercion, or Extortion
Three states have criminal enactments providing for broader
coverage of coercion in the rape context, although they use three
different terms to address such coercion, i.e., compulsion, coercion,
and extortion. Hawaii's sexual assault statute differentiates between
strong compulsion (e.g., threats, dangerous instrument, or physical
force)395 and compulsion ("absence of consent, or a threat, express
or implied, that places a person in fear of public humiliation, prop-
'89 CAL. PENAL CODE § 261(a)(2) (West Supp. 1998).
390 CAL PENAL CODE § 261(b) (West Supp. 1998).
391 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2907.03(A)(1) (Anderson Supp. 1997) (knowingly coerces
the other person to submit"); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-303(a)(i) (Michie 1996) ('causes
submission of the victim").
11 First-degree sexual assault requires physical force, threats of force or physical retal-
iation, or a drugged or physically helpless victim. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 18-3-402(l)
(1997).
"I COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-3-403(I)(a) (1997).
'9 WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.060 (1988 & Supp. 1998).
391 HAw. REV. STAT. § 707-700 (1993 & Supp. 1996).
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erty damage, or financial loss.")396 Hawaii's first-degree sexual as-
sault statute outlaws sexual penetration accomplished by strong
compulsion;3 97 lesser degrees of sexual assault require compulsion
which vary based upon the actor's mental state and whether
penetration or contact occurred.3 98
New Jersey's sexual assault statute prohibits penetration when
the actor uses physical force or coercion, grading the offense de-
pending upon whether the victim sustains severe personal inju-
ry.399 New Jersey defines coercion for purposes of sexual assault
by reference to its criminal coercion statute.4" This latter statute
covers a broad range of conduct including: inflicting bodily injury,
accusing someone of a crime, exposing a secret, or "perform[ing]
any other act which would not in itself substantially benefit the
actor but which is calculated to substantially harm another person
with respect to his health, safety, business, calling, career, financial
condition, reputation or personal relationships.""' New Jersey's
statute punishes coercive means falling far short of the traditional
requirement of physical force or threat." 2
Delaware's sexual extortion statute, the only one in existence,
is quite similar in scope to New Jersey's sexual assault statute ad-
dressing coercion. It provides in pertinent part
A person is guilty of sexual extortion when the person intentionally com-
pels or induces another person to engage in any sexual act involving
' Id.; see also State v. Caprio, 937 P.2d 933 (Haw. Ct. App. 1997) (discussing
difference between two provisions).
191 HAW. REv. STAT. § 707-730(1)(a) (1993).
I" HAW. REv. STAT. §§ 707-731(1)(a) (Supp. 1997) (2nd degree: knowingly subjects to
sexual penetration), 707-732(1)(a) (1993) (3rd degree: recklessly subjects to sexual pene-
tration), 707-733(I)(a) (1993) (4th degree: knowingly subjects to sexual contact).
399 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:14-2(a)(6) (aggravated sexual assault), 2C:14-2(c)(1) (sexual
assault) (West 1997); see also NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-3 (West 1997) (aggravated and
non-aggravated criminal sexual contact).
410 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:13-5 (West 1997); see also N.Y. PENAL LAw § 135.60
(Consol. 1998) (coercion in the second degree); MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.5(1) (punish-
ing the separate offense of criminal coercion). Courts have interpreted New York's coer-
cion statute, which is quite similar to New Jersey's, as covering various types of sexual
activity. See, e.g., People v. Williams, 508 N.Y.S.2d 797 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986).
401 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:13-5 (West 1997).
4"2 Two states include coercion as a factor negating consent in their general
definitional sections. NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-318(8)(a)(i) (1995) (without consent includes if
victim compelled to submit by coercion); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-106(a)(9)(A) (1997)
(consent ineffective if induced by coercion). North Carolina caselaw has interpreted
"force' for purposes of its rape statutes to include 'fear, fright, or coercion.' See, e.g.,
State v. Martin, 485 S.E.2d 352, 354 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997).
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contact, penetration or intercourse with the person or another or others by
means of instilling in the victim a fear that, if such sexual act is not per-
formed, the defendant or another will:40 3
inflict physical injury, cause damage to property, or expose a secret.
Delaware's final alternative in its sexual extortion statute is almost
identical to New Jersey's formulation outlawing extortionate threats
with respect to business, financial condition, or personal relation-
ships.40 4 Finally, New Hampshire retains a provision mentioning
extortion but fails to utilize the "threat" or "means" language of
other statutes described above.05
3. Coercion or Duress Negate Consent
Four jurisdictions provide that coercion negates consent.0 6
Tennessee, for instance, provides: "Consent is not effective when:
(A) Induced by deception or coercion; ....,0 In addition, ten
states have global consent provisions that negate consent when "it
is induced by force, duress, or deception."0 8 However, duress is
usually confined to a "threat of imminent death or serious physical
injury."40 9
DEL CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 776 (1996).
4 Delaware's statute continues to find guilt where one extorts a sexual act by means
of instilling fear in the victim that another will: "Perform any other act which is calculat-
ed to harm another person materially with respect to the other person's health, safety,
business, calling, career, financial condition, reputation or personal relationships." DEL
CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 776(7) (1996).
405 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:2 l(e) (1996) (victim submits because of false im-
prisonment, kidnapping, or extortion).
4 D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-4101(4) (1996) (lack of resistance resulting from force,
threat, or coercion does not constitute consent); FLA. STAT. ch. 794.011(I)(a) (Supp.
1998) ("Consent' means intelligent, knowing, and voluntary consent and shall not be
construed to include coerced submission."); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-318(8)(a)(i) (1995) (de-
fining without consent to include "victim was compelled to submit due to the use of
force or threat of force or coercion"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-106(a)(9)(A) (1997).
401 TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-106(a)(9)(A) (1997).
40 ALA. CODE § 13A-2-7(c)(4) (1994); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-505(3)(d) (1997); DEL
CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 453(4) (1996); HAW. REV. STAT. § 702-235(4) (1993); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 109(3)(C) (West 1996); Mo. REV. STAT. § 556.061(5)(c) (Supp.
1998); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-211(2)(c) (1997); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-10(c)(3) (West
1995 & Supp. 1998); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17-08(2)(c) (1997); 18 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 311(c)(4) (1998).
4 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-3-30(a) (1994).
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4. Conclusion
A significant number of states have statutes covering situations
in which the defendant secured the victim's sexual acquiescence by
threatening various types of nonphysical harm or utilizing other
means not involving physical force. These coercion provisions are
helpful in capturing another segment of previously unpunished
criminal behavior, threats falling outside of abuse-of-authority situa-
tions. For the most part, such statutory provisions are written broad-
ly enough to encompass the sexual extortion cases discussed in Part
I.F. The statutes in Hawaii, New Jersey, and Delaware are superior
to the MPC variations, however, because they more clearly embody
a legislative judgment that extortionate practices are illegal in secur-
ing sex. As a result, they are also more likely to be invoked because
they are more specifically tailored to the problem of coercive sex.
E. Nonconsensual Sexual Relations Without Force, Fraud, or
Coercion
Finally, to complete this review of innovative rape and sexual
assault statutes, eighteen states have at least one statute that dispens-
es with force, fraud, or coercion and punishes a specie of sexual
offense that simply requires sexual penetration or contact to occur
without the victim's consent. 1 Many of these provisions, like the
coercion statutes, are designed as less serious alternatives to forcible
rape or sexual assault laws.411
1. Eliminating Force Entirely
Nevada's sexual assault statute is the simplest; it does not re-
quire force at all, but only that the act be against the will of the
victim."1 Nevada grades the offenses depending upon whether
40 See also State ex. rel M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266 (N.J. 1992) (interpreting New
Jersey's sexual assault statute's requirement of "physical force" as being satisfied with
force necessary for sexual act if victim did not consent).
41 While treated separately supra, several states also explicitly alter consent require-
ments in abuse-of-trust or abuse-of-authority statutes. See supra Part II.A-B.
412 NEv. REv. STAT. § 200.366 (1997); see also McNair v. State, 825 P.2d 571, 574
(Nev. 1992). In State ex rel. M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266 (N.J. 1992), the New Jersey Su-
preme court held its sexual assault statute's force requirement is satisfied by the force
necessary for intercourse when the act is nonconsensual.
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the perpetrator causes substantial bodily injury or the assault is
against a child under the age of sixteen. 13
2. Requiring Affirmative Consent
Two states require the defendant actor to obtain affirmative
consent from the victim prior to sexual contact in order to avoid
criminal liability. Wisconsin punishes four degrees of sexual assault;
the first two degrees require lack of consent as well as aggravating
circumstances such as force, bodily harm, or multiple offenders.414
Third-degree sexual assault covers nonconsensual sexual intercourse
and fourth-degree sexual assault involves nonconsensual sexual
contact without aggravation.415 Wisconsin defines consent as
"words or overt actions by a person who is competent to give in-
formed consent indicating a freely given agreement to have sexual
intercourse or sexual contact."416 Similarly, Vermont punishes as
sexual assault any act which compels another to participate in a
sexual act, inter alia, without the other's consent,417 defining con-
sent as "words or actions by a person indicating a voluntary
agreement to engage in a sexual act."418
3. Lack of Consent Expressed Through Words or Conduct
Three states provide for sexual offenses if the victim expresses
nonconsent through words or conduct.49 Nebraska defines first-
degree sexual assault as sexual penetration, inter alia, without the
413 NEv. REV. STAT. § 200.366 (1997).
411 Wis. STAT. § 940.225(1)-(2) (1995-1996).
41s Wis. STAT. §§ 940.225(3), 940.225(3m) (1995-1996).
416 WIS. STAT. § 940.225(4) (1995-1996); see also D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-4101 (1996)
(defining consent similarly for sexual abuse provisions); 720 ILL COMP. STAT. 5/12-17
(West 1993) (defining consent similarly as a defense); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.341(4)
(West 1996) (inserting "present' agreement); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.010 (1998) (de-
fining consent similarly for sexual offenses); cf. CAL PENAL CODE § 261.6 (West 1998)
(consent means 'positive cooperation in act or attitude pursuant to an exercise of free
will. The person must act freely and voluntarily and have knowledge of the nature of
the act or transaction involved."); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-401(1.5) (1997) ("Consent'
means cooperation in act or attitude pursuant to an exercise of free will and with
knowledge of the nature of the act.").
417 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3252(a)(1) (1997).
411 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3251(3) (1996).
419 NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-318(8)(a)(ii)-(iii) (1995); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:2 I(m)
(1996); UTAH CODE ANN. § 765-406(1) (1998).
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victim's consent42 and second- and third-degree sexual assault as
sexual contact without the victim's consent (graded based upon
whether the actor causes serious personal injury).421 "Without con-
sent" includes instances in which the victim was compelled to
submit because of force or coercion or the victim expressed a lack
of consent through words and conduct.422 Similarly, Utah defines
iwithout consent" for all sexual offenses in one statute that provides
multiple alternatives including force, coercion, unconsciousness, or
mental disability as well as when "the victim expresses lack of
consent through words or conduct; .... ,423 Specific offenses are,
in turn, defined in their own individual statutes; Utah's rape statute,
for instance, provides: "A person commits rape when the actor has
sexual intercourse with another person without the victim's con-
sent."424 Finally, New Hampshire simply outlaws sexual assault
when "the victim indicates by speech or conduct that there is not
freely given consent to performance of the sexual act."42s
4. Requiring Knowledge of Victim's Nonconsent
Six jurisdictions require both a nonconsensual sexual act and
that the defendant know that the victim is not consenting. For exam-
ple, in 1995, Tennessee amended its rape and sexual battery stat-
utes to include instances in which "The sexual penetration [contact]
is accomplished without the consent of the victim and the defen-
dant knows or has reason to know at the time of the penetration
that the victim did not consent; .... 426 Similarly, Montana's ver-
420 NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-319(1)(a) (1996). An older version of this statute provided:
'Any person who subjects another to sexual penetration and (a) overcomes the victim by
force, threat of force, express or implied, coercion, or deception . . . is guilty of sexual
assault in the first degree.' NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-319(l) (1993).
421 NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-320(1)(a) (1996).
422 NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-318(8)(a) (1996); see also NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-318(8)(b)
(1996) ('The victim need only resist, either verbally or physically, so as to make the
victim's refusal to consent genuine and real and so as to reasonably make known to the
actor the victim's refusal to consent; . . . ').
4' UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-406(1) (1997).
424 UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-402(1) (1997).
425 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:2 l(m) (1996).
426 TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-13-503(2), 39-13-505(2) (1997); see also COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 18-3404(1)(a) (1996) (prohibiting third-degree sexual assault if defendant knows victim
does not consent); 720 ILL COMP. STAT. 5/12-13(a)(2) (West 1997) (punishing criminal
sexual assault when the criminal actor engages in sexual penetration and 'knew that the
victim was unable to understand the nature of the act or was unable to give knowing
consent'); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-4106 (1997) (outlawing as misdemeanor sexual abuse
1998]
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sion defines sexual assault as "A person who knowingly subjects
another person to any sexual contact without consent ....
Montana also retains a statute entitled "Sexual intercourse without
consent." 428 The without-consent definition for this latter statute,
however, addresses only force or coercion and victims incapable of
consent because they are mentally incapacitated, physically help-
less, or less than sixteen years old.429 Thus, such statute is limited
in its applicability.
5. Miscellaneous Provisions
Pennsylvania's statutory framework contains, in addition to its
traditional rape and sodomy statutes, three crimes based on
nonconsent: sexual assault, aggravated indecent assault, and inde-
cent assault.43 ° The sexual assault statute provides that except as
provided in the crimes of rape and sodomy, it is an offense if a
"person engages in sexual intercourse or deviate sexual intercourse
with a complainant without the complainant's consent." 431 The
aggravated indecent assault and indecent assault statutes prohibit
penetration or indecent contact, respectively, if "the person does so
without the complainant's consent; .... "13' The language in both
of these statutes is followed by traditional alternatives such as forc-
ible compulsion, unconsciousness, or mental disability-which also
appear in the rape and sodomy statutes. Thus, the assault crimes
statutes recognize simple nonconsent alternatives while the rape
and sodomy statutes do not.
instances in which the actor "should have knowledge or reason to know that the act
was committed without that other person's permission,....); MO. REv. STAT.
§ 566.040(1) (1996) ("A person commits the crime of sexual assault if he has sexual
intercourse with another person knowing that he does so without that person's con-
sent.'); see also Rizzo, supra note 87, at C2 (discussing Missouri's new statute). To
cover a much broader scope of conduct, the Missouri legislature rewrote an old statute
that punished sexual assault "if he has sexual intercourse with another person to whom
he is not married and who is incapacitated or who is fourteen or fifteen years old."
MO. REV. STAT. § 566.040(1) (1993) (superseded).
427 MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-502(1) (1995).
428 MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-503 (1997).
42 MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-501(1) (1997).
430 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3124.1, 3125, 3126 (West 1998).
431 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3124.1 (West 1998).
431 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3125(1), 3126(1) (west 1998); see also Common-
wealth v. Berkowitz, 641 A.2d 1161, 1166 (Pa. 1994) (indecent assault does not require
forcible compulsion like rape).
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Georgia limits its nonconsensual sexual offenses to those that
involve physical contact or penetration with a foreign object. Its
sexual battery statute prohibits instances in which the actor "inten-
tionally makes physical contact with the intimate parts of the body
of another person without the consent of that person."4" Aggravat-
ed sexual battery occurs when the actor "intentionally penetrates
with a foreign object the sexual organ or anus of another person
without the consent of that person."434 Although Georgia does not
define "without consent" for purposes of its sexual offense statutes,
its global definition for all crimes includes: "a person whose concur-
rence is required has not, with knowledge of the essential facts,
voluntarily yielded to the proposal of the accused or of
another."43
Finally, Oregon criminalizes two degrees of sexual abuse in-
volving lack of consent on the part of the victim. Second-degree
sexual abuse addresses penetration or intercourse without con-
sent,436 and third-degree sexual abuse includes sexual contact with-
out consent as well as instances in which the victim is under
18."' Oregon does not explicitly define "consent" for its sexual
offense statutes except for a definition of "incapacity to con-
sent,"438 nor does it provide a global consent provision for all its
criminal statutes.
6. Blurring the Line Between Rape and Statutory Rape
Finally, the provisions in several states blur the line between
nonconsensual sexual contact and statutory rape by grouping the
two offenses together or using the same statute to encompass both.
Mississippi and South Dakota, for example, group sexual penetra-
tion or contact without the victim's consent with instances in which
the victim is mentally handicapped or a minor. Mississippi's sexual
battery provision outlaws sexual penetration with another person
"without his or her consent," a mentally handicapped person, or a
child under fourteen. 39 South Dakota's trilogy of statutes prohibit
411 GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-22.1(b) (1996).
44 GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-22.2(b) (1996).
435 GA. CODE ANN. § 16-1-3(19) (1996).
4 ' OR. REV. STAT. § 163.425(1) (1997).
437 OR. REV. STAT. § 163.415(I)(a) and (b) (1997).
41 OR. REV. STAT. § 163.315 (1997).
139 MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-95(1)(a) (1994).
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sexual contact with: (1) a person "who, although capable of con-
senting, has not consented... ,440 (2) a person incapable of con-
sent (i.e., physical or mental incapacity),441 and (3) a child under
the age of sixteen.442
New York"13 and Kentucky have lesser forms of sexual offens-
es denominated "sexual misconduct," which are defined as engag-
ing in sexual intercourse without consent.444 The commentary ac-
companying New York's statute indicates that it is intended to in-
clude the higher offenses of rape and sodomy as well as statutory
rape and statutory sodomy, when the victim is below the legal age
of consent, which are not included in the higher offenses.44 s By
contrast, the legislative commentary to Kentucky's statute limits its
applicability to statutory rape and statutory sodomy although case
law has questioned this limit.446
7. Conclusion
Nonconsensual sexual provisions address a genre of blame-
worthy conduct that would normally escape criminal sanction due
to failure to satisfy rape law's traditional force requirement. These
statutes break the hegemony of force as an indispensable element of
sexual offense and, thereby, disconnect the conjunction of force
440 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-22-7.4 (Michie 1998) (a misdemeanor).
441 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-22-7.2 (Michie 1998 Revision) (a felony).
442 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-22-7.3 (Michie 1998 Revision) (a misdemeanor).
" See also N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.55 (Consol. 1997) (criminalizing sexual abuse
without consent).
4 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.20(1) (Consol. 1997) ("A person is guilty of sexual miscon-
duct when: 1. Being a male, he engages in sexual intercourse with a female without her
consent; . . . ."); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.140 (Michie 1996) (OA person is guilty of
sexual misconduct when he engages in sexual intercourse or deviate sexual intercourse
with another person without the latter's consent.").
"s The Commission Staff Notes to section 130.20 of the New York Penal Law, N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 130.20 (Consol. 1997), provide that it is intended to include the higher
degrees of rape and sodomy, as well as statutory rape and statutory sodomy.
'The commentary to Kentucky statute section 510.140, KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§510.140 (Michie 1996), provides that its basic purpose is "to preserve the concept of
statutory rape and statutory sodomy. . . . In this context the ages of the defendant and
the victim are critical. Force is not an element of this offense. The victim is statutorily
incapable of consent." Id. (quoted in Cooper v. Commonwealth, 550 S.W.2d 478, 479
(Ky. 1977)). But see Yarnell v. Commonwealth, 833 S.W.2d 834 (Ky. 1992), in which
the dissenting judge argues: "The statute . . . states no age limitations. . . . The obvious
difference between this offense, as stated, and Sodomy I or Rape I is that it does not
require physical force or threats accompanying the acts sufficient to overcome earnest re-
sistance, only a lack of consent." Id. at 838-39 (Leibson, J., dissenting).
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and nonconsent. However, because these statutes continue to rely
on the notion of nonconsent, they continue to beg the question of
what constitutes legally effective consent-a question of particular
importance in cases of rape by fraud or rape by coercion.
F. Conclusion
In legislative hands, the unitary concept of violent rape has
given birth to a host of offspring differing in substantive make-up
and degrees of severity and corresponding more closely to the
varieties of sex offenders' real-world behavior. Several conclusions
may be drawn from the foregoing statutory review.
First, state legislatures have not criminalized rape by fraud or
rape by coercion wholesale, they have been conservative in their
work. The vast majority of legislatures have begun with the most
noncontroversial and unassailable factual patterns, outlawing the
use of fraudulent or coercive pressures deployed against vulnerable
victims in the context of professional, trust-based alliances or rela-
tionships involving authoritative positions or power imbalances. A
few states have been more aggressive, making inroads into the
criminalization of rape by fraud, by describing circumstances in
which fraud renders the criminal actor responsible for sexual offens-
es. Other states have attacked the problem of rape by coercion by
more expansively outlawing defendants' use of nonphysical pres-
sures in securing sexual compliance falling outside the professional,
authoritative, or institutional contexts. Finally, a minority of states
prohibit a category of nonconsensual sexual crimes which fails to
also require force, fraud, or coercion.
Second, this new wave of statutory enactments outlawing fraud-
ulent, coercive, or simply nonconsensual sexual offenses has not
come at the cost of eliminating protection of citizens from forcible
rape. Rather, states adopting these new statutes have retained their
violent rape provisions, declining to treat the criminalization of
nonviolent sexual offenses as an either-or proposition. For example,
while Tennessee provides an explicit fraud alternative in its rape
statute, it continues to punish forcible sexual penetration as aggra-
vated rape and forcible sexual contact as aggravated sexual battery.
Similarly, Hawaii distinguishes between defendants' use of strong
compulsion and compulsion, the former including violent rape and
the latter covering nonviolent variations. These statutes retain the
legislative judgment that sexual penetration or contact obtained by
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force may be a more serious harm than the same acts accomplished
by nonviolent pressures. Criminal provisions outlawing rape by
fraud or coercion supplement rather than replace violent sexual
crimes.
The final conclusion to be drawn from this Article's statutory
review is that the diversity inherent in this grouping of new statutes
is necessary to capture the broad range of defendants' conduct
undertaken to accomplish sexual intercourse by fraudulent or coer-
cive means. Because rape by fraud or rape by coercion is not an
unitary phenomenon, as discussed supra in Part I, their legislative
prohibition must be wide-ranging and multi-faceted. Individually,
the five categories of sexual offenses reviewed above fail to cover
all possible instances of using fraud or coercion to obtain sexual
intimacy. Collectively, however, they provide an excellent starting
point to address the criminalization of this problematic behavior. In
the best traditions of statutory experimentation in a multi-state sys-
tem, diversity among some states in their statutory approaches
provides a fertile field of innovation inviting emulation by other
states.
III. THE DOCTRINAL ELEMENTS OF FORCE AND NONCONSENT IN THE
CONTEXT OF CRIMINALIZING RAPE BY FRAUD AND RAPE BY
COERCION
Deceit and violence-these are the two forms of deliberate assault on
human beings. Both can coerce people into acting against their will. Most
harm that can befall victims through violence can come to them also
through deceit. But deceit controls more subtly, for it works on belief as
well as action. Even Othello, whom few would have dared to try to sub-
due by force, could be brought to destroy himself and Desdemona
through falsehood.447
The continuing proliferation of cases involving criminal defen-
dants who accomplish sexual intercourse by means of fraud or coer-
cion448 and, to a lesser extent, the widespread promulgation of
legislative enactments outlawing some types of this behavior,449
have fueled the heated debate over the propriety of criminalizing
47 BOK, supra note 50, at 18 (footnote omitted); cf. Beale, supra note 5, at 321 ("A
seeming consent extorted by force or terror differs from consent obtained by fraud. In
the latter case the mind is deceived into agreement; in the former, the body is forced to
act without a real agreement of the mind.").
448 See supra Part I.
449 See supra Part II.
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rape by fraud and rape by coercion. In addition, Estrich's sugges-
tion45. that rape law should prohibit sexual intercourse secured by
fraud or extortion to the same extent that criminal law outlaws
taking money by these means has spawned increased controversy
and contributed to a substantial body of theoretical commen-
tary.4"' The breadth and depth of this debate are virtually lim-
itless." 2 Cases of rape by fraud or rape by coercion inevitably
serve as lightning rods, triggering a host of fundamental disagree-
ments about the crime of rape, many revolving around the doctrinal
elements of force and nonconsent. For instance, courts, legislatures,
and commentators cannot agree about: (1) rape's historical make-up,
i.e., whether it always required both force and nonconsent; s3 (2)
the nature of its defining harm, i.e., a crime of violence or a sexual
offense;454 (3) the function of rape law, i.e., to protect bodily secu-
rity or sexual integrity too;455 (4) the meaning of force, i.e., physi-
cal force only or also constructive force;456 (5) the relationship be-
tween force and nonconsent, i.e., whether force merely corrobo-
rates nonconsent or has independent significance;47 and (6) the
meaning of consent, i.e., tacit assent or affirmative, freely given
approval indicated by words or conduct.4 8  Moreover, feminist
and radical critiques of criminal law, in general, and rape law, in
particular, overlay these multiple disagreements, adding levels of
complexity to an already complex rape analysis.
49
450 ESTRICH, supra note 7, at 103.
"' Estrich, Rape, supra note 7, at 1120. Estrich reiterates the above suggestion in a
subsequent 1987 publication.
452 See, e.g., Dripps, Beyond Rape, supra note 8, at 1796 (calling rape law "a
messn); Schulhofer, Sexual Autonomy, supra note 9, at 40 (noting profound disagreement
about 'what rape is').
... See, e.g., Schulhofer, Sexual Autonomy, supra note 9, at 60 (arguing that com-
mon-law definition of rape was nonconsensual sexual intercourse).
" See infra notes 487-534 and accompanying text.
455 See, e.g., Harris, supra note 12, at 644 (positing rape by fraud cases demonstrate
that central question of rape law is sexual integrity not just bodily security); see also
KEITH BURGESS-JACKSON, RAPE: A PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATION 43 (1996) (discussing con-
servative (rape as trespass), liberal (rape as battery), and radical (rape as degradation)
views on rape; Chamallas, supra note 17, at 780-813 (discussing the traditional, liberal,
and egalitarian views of sexual conduct).
" See, e.g., State v. Etheridge, 352 S.E.2d 673 (N.C. 1987).
117 See infra notes 535-558 and accompanying text.
' See infra Part B.
419 BURGESS-JACKSON, supra note 455, at 103, comments:
The liberal, to put it pithily, makes consent the touchstone of rape and
believes that most women, most of the time, consent to sexual intercourse.
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This Part explores the two separate, but interrelated require-
ments of traditional rape law-force and nonconsent.40 Cases of
rape by fraud and rape by coercion implicate both these doctrinal
mainstays of rape because physical force or threat of such force may
generally be absent and consent, in some form, is usually present.
Although related, the force and nonconsent elements present two
different challenges. First, the critical question with respect to force
is whether rape law should expand beyond physical force to sub-
sume nonforcible, alternative methods of accomplishment, such as
fraud or coercion. This Article examines three arguments against
expanding rape law in this fashion but concludes that the force
requirement does not present an insurmountable obstacle to the
criminalization of rape by fraud or coercion. The challenge posed,
however, by these fraud and coercion cases to the nonconsent
element of rape law is how to determine the parameters of legally
effective consent when that consent is induced by either fraudulent
or coercive pressures. This Article examines alternative formulations
for drawing the line between valid and invalid consent in both the
fraud and coercion contexts and concludes that considerable
scholarly and legislative progress has been made in solving these
difficult line-drawing problems. The question is no longer if rape
by fraud or rape by coercion should be punished but rather under
what circumstances.
A final caveat is necessary. Although the two doctrinal issues of
force and consent merit serious attention and certainly have re-
ceived it from various scholarly quarters, the existing statutory law
summarized in Part II already criminalizes various forms of rape by
Therefore, rape, conceived as nonconsensual intercourse, is rare. The radical
makes coercion the touchstone of rape and believes that most women, most of
the time, are coerced into having sexual intercourse. Therefore, rape is perva-
sive. . . . Each theorist rejects the other's conclusion. Indeed, each finds the
other's view incomprehensible and takes the other's conclusion to be a reduc-
tio ad absurdum on the theory that generates it. The liberal finds it preposter-
ous that rape is pervasive; the radical finds it absurd that it is rare.
(footnote omitted).
, Common law rape had four basic elements: (1) sexual intercourse, (2) with a
woman not the defendant's wife, (3) by force or threat of force, and (4) without her
consent or against her will. Harris, supra note 12, at 613. Some dispute exists regarding
whether "without her consent" and "against her will" are synonymous. Id. According to
Harris, force focuses on the defendant, while lack of consent focuses on the victim. Id.
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fraud and rape by coercion, in some senses eclipsing theory. This
Part, therefore, highlights this tension between scholarly debate and
practical reform.
A. The Force Requirement
The first issue addressing the criminalization of rape by fraud or
coercion center around the notion that rape law has traditionally
required the element of physical force or threat of such force. In
considering whether to outlaw certain forms of sexual contact not
involving physical force, courts and commentators have asserted
three different arguments against doing so: (1) many rape statutes
are explicitly written with the element of physical force and should
be strictly construed; (2) rape is a crime of violence and rape law is
designed to protect citizens' physical security; and (3) force pro-
vides an external, verifiable indication of nonconsent, elimination of
which will cause confusion and instability in determining victim
consent.
1. The Statutory Requirement of Force
At the most rudimentary level of analysis, the deceptively sim-
ple question of whether rape by fraud or coercion can be accom-
modated under statutes explicitly requiring force becomes more
difficult upon closer inspection. The statutory-construction problem
is actually two separate questions: what constitutes force for the
purposes of rape law and what role do courts play in making these
judgments?
a. Strict Construction of Criminal Statutes
Questions surrounding the element of force are certainly not
new; courts and commentators have struggled with them since the
1800s.46' One excellent example discussed supra is Don Moran v.
People4 62 wherein the court overturned the defendant's conviction
because the trial court had failed to properly instruct the jury on the
41 See, e.g., Beale, supra note 5; Harris, supra note 12, at 628; Puttkammer, supra
note 5.
461 25 Mich. 355 (1872) (fraudulent medical treatment case).
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force element. The Moran court cogently summarized many of the
key issues of debate regarding the statutory force requirement:
If the statute, or the definition of rape, did not contain the words mby
force,' or "forcibly,' doubtless a consent procured by such fraud as that
referred to, might be treated as no consent; but the idea of force can not
thus be left out and ignored, nor can such fraud be allowed to supply its
place, though it would doubtless supply, and satisfy, all the other terms of
the definition; and, so far as the intimation in question is to be under-
stood as going further and dispensing with all idea of force, it must be
understood as an intimation of the court of what, in their opinion, the law
ought to be, rather than what it is. And, upon abstract principles of right
and wrong, a sexual connection obtained by falsely and fraudulently
personating the husband of a woman, or by a physician fraudulently
inducing a female patient to believe such connection essential to a course
of medical treatment, must be considered nearly, if not quite, as criminal
and prejudicial to society as when obtained by force or any apprehension
of violence, and it might, and in my opinion would, be judicious for the
legislature to make some provision for punishment in cases of this kind.
But it is not for the judiciary to legislate, by straining the existing criminal
law to bring such cases within it.463
The Michigan Supreme Court's analysis in Don Moran is appealing
in its simplicity. If the statute explicitly requires force or threat, then
anything falling short is not rape. Other courts have similarly con-
cluded that fraud may not replace the force requirement of
rape.464 Despite adoption of a strict-construction approach, howev-
er, several courts have invited their respective legislatures to alter
existing statutes to punish sexual offenses secured by fraud or
coercion.46
"4' Id. at 364-65.
'" See, e.g., Lewis v. State, 30 Ala. 54, 56 (1857) (constructive or actual force nec-
essary ingredient of rape; no rape if victim consents although obtained by husband
impersonation); Commonwealth v. Goldenberg, 155 N.E.2d 187, 192 (Mass. 1959)
('Fraud cannot be allowed to supply the place of force which the statute makes manda-
tory.'); State v. Lung, 28 P. 235 (Nev. 1891) (citing Don Moran and stating that fraud
does not supply place of force); Walter v. People, 6 Am. L. Reg. NS 746 (N.Y. 1867)(fraud insufficient for rape); Bloodworth v. State, 65 Tenn. 614, 618-20 (1872) (no rape
in sham marriage case because force absent).
41 For example, in Bloodworth, 65 Tenn. at 614, the court first quoted from a previ-
ous case, Wyatt v. State, 2 Swan 396:
'We agree with the Attorney General, that the moral turpitude of the crime is
as great when perpetrated by fraud and deception, as by force,' and that the
act richly deserves to be severely punished; but the question is, not what it
deserves, nor what our feelings and individual opinions would dictate, but
.what sayeth the law."
The Bloodworth court thereupon added its own language to the same effect:
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The question of whether nonphysical coercion satisfies the
statutory force requirement seems easier to resolve than in fraud
cases because of the greater similarity between physical force and
coercion. Both physical force and nonphysical coercion involve the
imposition of another's will on the victim without the further com-
plication of resorting to deceptive stratagems to achieve that result.
However, some courts have read force quite narrowly to exclude
coercion. In State v. Thompson,66 discussed supra, the court dis-
missed the action because physical force was absent, reasoning that
the force requirement could not be stretched to include coer-
cion.467 Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Mlinarich,468 the court
found the defendant had not used forcible compulsion when he
caused his step-daughter's sexual submission by threatening her
return to a juvenile detention facility.469
To the extent that these cases stand for the proposition that
courts are not free to simply eliminate the statutory force language,
they are unremarkable. The argument that neither fraud nor coer-
cion is sufficient to satisfy statutes requiring force or threat is sup-
ported by the canon of statutory interpretation that criminal statutes
must be strictly construed and implicates notions of fair notice and
due process for defendant actors.
We therefore feel constrained to hold, that the element of force being entirely
excluded by the proof in the case, and the fact of some degree of assent
shown, and certainly no dissent, that the act could not have been both forc-
ible and against her will, and these elements are, by our statute, made essen-
tials in this crime.
The Legislature, with their attention called to this case, can, and no
doubt will, easily enact a law that will meet the precise case. We have no
power to do it, and can only administer the law as we find it.
65 Tenn. at 620-21; see also Lewis, 30 Ala. at 57; Mathews v. Superior Court, 173 Cal.
Rptr. 820, 822 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981); State v. Leiding, 812 P.2d 797, 800 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1991); State v. Thompson, 792 P.2d 1103, 1107 (Mont. 1990); Regina v. Petrozzi,
35 C.C.C. 3d 528, 2 W.C.B. 2d 109 (1987).
' 792 P.2d 1103 (Mont. 1990).
467 Id. at 1107.
46 542 A.2d 1335 (Pa. 1988) (high school principal coerced pupil to sexually submit
or not graduate).
49 Id.
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b. What Constitutes Force in Rape Law?
i. The Elasticity of the Force Requirement
The power of the strict-construction argument is lessened,
however, by the recognition that not all forms of rape involve physi-
cal force or threat: "Whatever the limits of rape by fraud, there can
be no question that rape, as a legal category, has long included
many forms of nonviolent misconduct." 470 Most conspicuously,
force is absent in cases of unconscious, mentally ill, or physically
helpless victims; in such cases, the law presumes nonconsent and
dispenses with the force requirement. For this reason, Puttkammer
criticizes Don Moran as being decided on the wrong issue: "It
would have been far simpler to go on the consent ground, and so
to avoid conflict with cases holding that rape can be committed on
an unconscious or terrified woman, where likewise force is not
used. 47'
Courts have further held that in husband impersonation and
medical treatment cases involving fraud as to the act, the only force
required is that necessary for sexual intercourse. In Pomeroy v.
State,4 72 for example, a case almost contemporaneous with Don
Moran, the court quoted: "'Whenever there is a carnal connection
and no consent in fact, fraudulently obtained or otherwise, there is
evidently, in the wrongful act itself, all the force which the law
demands as an element of the crime."'473 In fact, Roberts suggests
that rape law is policy driven, stating: "'How much force should we
allow this type of man to use against this type of woman.?' 474
Thus, while the strict-construction argument has superficial appeal
and relative validity, upon closer analysis the force requirement is
considerably more elastic than courts like to admit.
470 Schulhofer, Sexual Autonomy, supra note 9, at 63.
"' Puttkammer, supra note 5, at 420.
472 94 Ind. 96 (1883) (defendant represented that he was physician and had carnal
connection with victim without consent).
43 Id. at 100. For similar reasons, not all courts have been reluctant to exclude fraud
from rape. See, e.g., Eberhart v. State, 34 N.E. 637 (Ind. 1893) (defendant pretended to
be traveling doctor).
4' Roberts, supra note 8, at 363.
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ii. The Doctrine of Constructive Force
A second problem with viewing the force requirement under
the narrow strict-construction approach is that courts have expanded
force to include fraud in other criminal offenses in the guise of the
doctrine of constructive force. For example, in burglary law,
47
courts have enlarged the usual requirement of a physical breaking
(actual force) to include instances in which the burglar obtained
entry by "means of artifice or fraud or... pretense of business or
social intercourse"476-defining such conduct as constructive
force. Even Goldberg, quoted supra, includes constructive force as
satisfying the force requirement of rape.477 In fact, the similarity
between fraud in burglary and fraud in rape has not escaped
scholarly notice:
There is no ground on which a legal distinction between such fraud in
relation to the entry and fraud in relation to sexual activity can be drawn,
and similarly ... there hardly seems to be support for a policy grounding
which would extend greater protection in terms of crimes against property
than in terms of crimes against the person.473
In the development of burglary law, then, courts have looked be-
yond the mere exertion of force to protect habitation rights.479
The doctrine of constructive force has arisen in the context of
rape by coercion. Several courts have interpreted the force require-
ment broadly, relying on constructive force to permit rape prosecu-
tions based on coercion. For example, in Commonwealth v. Caracc-
iola48" discussed supra, the court analogized to the state's robbery
(not burglary) statute holding that the state's statutory force re-
quirement could be satisfied by constructive force. The court de-
47s See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. ScoTr, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW 477-80
(1986)
476 Nichols v. State, 32 N.W. 543, 546 (Wis. 1887); cf. Whittaker v. State, 7 N.W.
431, 431 (Wis. 1880) ("The element of force forms a material ingredient of the offence
of rape, by which the resistance of the woman violated is overcome, or her consent
induced by threats of personal violence, duress, or fraud; . . .).
47 Goldberg v. State, 395 A.2d 1213, 1219-20 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979).
41 Scutt, Fraudulent Impersonation, supra note 134, at 62-63; see also Sanders v.
State, 1995 Del. LEXIS 161 (defendant committed burglary, kidnapping, and sexual extor-
tion); Feinberg, supra note 18, at 339-40 (analogizing between robbery and burglary,
and violent and nonviolent rape).
11 But see Beale, supra note 5, at 324 (arguing constructive breaking doctrine in bur-
glary erroneous and therefore unhelpful in rape).
4o 569 N.E.2d 774 (Mass. 1991) (defendant feigned policeman to coerce woman into
sexual intercourse by threatening jail).
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clined to assume legislative intent meant to provide "greater protec-
tion to property than to bodily integrity.""' Similarly, State v.
Etheridge482 adopted a broad view in the parental rape context.
The phrase "by force and against the will of the other person" means the
same as it did at common law when it was used to describe an element
of rape. The requisite force may be established either by actual, physical
force or by constructive force in the form of fear, fright, or coercion.
Constructive force is demonstrated by proof of threats or other actions by
the defendant which compel the victim's submission to sexual
acts.483
The court held: "the parent wields authority as another assailant
might wield a weapon. The authority itself intimidates; the implicit
threat to exercise it coerces. Coercion . . . is a form of constructive
force." 484 Thus, the constructive force doctrine offers a viable basis
for expansively interpreting rape's statutory force requirement.
c. Conclusion
Although it is certainly preferable to alter the statutory defini-
tions of offenses rather than relying on judicial interpretation of
ambiguous provisions,"' rape law has sufficient doctrinal space to
accommodate broader conceptions of force than many courts ac-
knowledge because of the elasticity of the force requirement and
the availability of the doctrine of constructive force. In addition,
several state legislatures have responded to judicial invitations to
change by enacting innovative legislation to deal with these difficult
fraud and coercion cases.48 The strict-construction problem is ren-
dered moot, at least to some extent, by enactment of these new
sexual offense statutes.
481 Id. at 777. The dissent held that rape requires either physical force or threat of
bodily injury. Id. at 783.
482 352 S.E.2d 673 (N.C. 1987).
4" Id. at 682.
48 Id. at 680 (citations omitted).
"s See also Dripps, Beyond Rape, supra note 8, at 1793 n.41 ("I have serious reser-
vations about the legitimacy of courts, as opposed to legislatures, reading the force
element out of the statute books."); Schulhofer, Feminist Challenge, supra note 8, at
2184 ("The way to fill the gap is not to try expanding what we mean by force but to
have statutes punishing, as an offense distinct from forcible rape, any sexual imposition
without valid consent.").
46 See discussion supra Part II.
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2. Rape as a Crime of Violence or a Sexual Offense
A second objection to criminalizing rape by fraud or coercion
originates from competing conceptions of rape (i.e., the debate over
whether rape is a crime of violence or a sexual offense),487 and of
rape law (i.e., as protecting physical security or sexual autono-
my).488 Resolution of these fundamental, definitional questions has
clear implications for whether to expand rape law to include cases
involving fraud or coercion. On one hand, if rape is a form of vio-
lence, it may be inadvisable to dilute rape law by including cases
accomplished by nonviolent fraud or coercion. Expansion of rape
law may also trivialize forcible rape by comparison and undercut
progress made by the rape reform movements, which relied heavily
upon the rape-as-violence argument. 89 Moreover, expansion may
cause juries to refuse to convict because rape by fraud or coercion
cases may not meet jurors' expectations of rape as a violent crime.
On the other hand, if rape is a sexual offense and rape law is de-
signed to protect victims' sexual integrity as well as physical securi-
ty, it may be preferable to expand rape law to include a broader
range of methods by which sexual predation is accomplished; the
sole reliance on force may actually privilege other blameworthy
conduct. In addition, including fraud and coercion in rape law may
be more consonant with the legal system's treatment of other crimi-
nal offenses, such as theft, which encompass both violent and
nonviolent methods.
"I See, e.g., SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN, AND RAPE (1975)
(rape is crime of power and violence, not lust); ESTRICH, supra note 7, at 103-04 (rape
is about sex and sexual violation); RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 384 (1992)
(rape is 'substitute for consensual sexual intercourse); Bogart, supra note 327, at 117
(rape is attack on person as sexual being); Estrich, Rape, supra note 7, at 1183 (rape is
about sex and sexual violation); Findlater, supra note 1, at 1363 ('Rape-whether seen
as a crime of sex or a crime of violence-is about the abuse of power .... ") (discuss-
ing page 83 of Estrich's book).
" Schulhofer in Sexual Autonomy, supra note 9, at 41, comments:
Ihe main difficulty stems not from clashing conceptions of 'force' (though
these are important) but more from unresolved tension (in both law and cul-
ture) between the conception of rape as a crime of violence requiring 'force'
and the conception of rape as an offense against personal autonomy, centering
on 'meaningful consent.'
Id. SSee Lynne Henderson, Rape and Responsibility, 11 L'w & PHIL 127 (1992).
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a. Costs of Expanding Rape Law to Include
Fraud and Coercion
i. Undercutting Rape Reform
One potential cost of expanding rape law to include fraud and
coercion is the possibility of undercutting rape reform. Perhaps the
most significant advantage of thinking about rape as a violent act is
the impact that such conceptualization has had on rape law reform.
Feminists and others, arguing that rape is not simply bad sexual
intercourse but a completely different phenomenon,4' have
drawn attention to the seriousness of rape as an individual offense
and as a crime against women as a group:49' "This rape-as-vio-
lence argument did succeed in disentangling rape from sex, and
therefore harm from pleasure, in the minds of many. Until men and
women understood that rape was not sexual passion as they under-
stood it, it was difficult to obtain any rape law reform." 492 The vio-
lence argument has succeeded, and significant rape reform has
resulted.493 At this stage of legal development, therefore, it seems
unlikely that expansion of rape law to include fraud or coercion
will harken a return to earlier formulations. To the contrary, the
success of earlier rape reform has paved the way for serious discus-
sion of these other variations of rape. For example, one author com-
ments: "Perhaps the most significant aspect of the new sexual liabili-
ty law is that it is only in the last few years that women have been
bold enough to assert that they have a legal right to expect honesty
from men in sexual relationships."494 The newly burgeoning array
of statutes punishing multiple types of rape by fraud or coercion
attest to the fact that rape law is currently expanding, not
constricting.
490 See Berger, supra note 8, at 69 ("By contrast, with respect to rape, a crime al-
most universally perpetrated by men, ordinarily against women, questions of 'whose
meaning wins' are crucial in drawing the line between offensive sex and sexual of-
fense.").
4'1 See, e.g., BROWNMILLER, supra note 487.
492 Henderson, Rape and Responsibility, supra note 489, at 156. But she adds: "The
rape-as-violence argument leaves unchallenged most male interpretations of heterosexual
relations." Id. at 157.
41 See supra notes 266-274 and accompanying text.
" Chamallas, supra note 17, at 813.
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ii. Trivializing Violent Rape
A second potential cost of expanding rape law to encompass
fraud and coercion cases is the trivialization of violent rape by
comparison. Many commentators argue that an experiential or quali-
tative difference exists between violent and nonviolent rape, one
that may be invalidated or obscured by expansion of rape law to
include both forms.4 9s For instance, Berger criticizes Estrich's sug-
gestion to criminalize sexual intercourse procured by fraud or extor-
tionate threat because doing so would depreciate the seriousness of
rape:4
96
A fortiori, the notion that rape, one of the gravest possible infringements
of human integrity, should be expanded to include situations where the
woman attempts to sell her body and fails to receive the bargained-for
price simply makes a mockery of women's long efforts to achieve autono-
my, respect, and equality.
4 97
Other commentators agree, describing the experience of violent
rape as a complete negation of existence,498 a form of "spiritual
murder," 49 or "[s]hort of homicide, ... 'the ultimate violation of
self."' ° For some, the difference is not experiential but the de-
gree of harm suffered by the victims: "[Tihe force or threat of vio-
lence is itself an integral part of the total harm produced. Compul-
sion is not necessarily more destructive of voluntariness than decep-
tion is, but it is normally more harmful in itself."" ' The rape vic-
... The horrific description of one violent rape should suffice. See Nancy S. Erickson,
Final Report: 'Sex Bias in the Teaching of Criminal Law,' 42 RUTGERS L. REV. 309, 342
(1990).
4 See Berger, supra note 8, at 76-77.
4 Berger, supra note 8, at 76-77. Berger is especially critical of the notion of rape
by fraud and finds the suggestion regarding extortionate threats more plausible. Id. at 77.
' See Henderson, What Makes Rape a Crime?, supra note 8, at 226 (it is rape
when a women's existence does not matter). But see Bogart, supra note 327 (criticizing
defining crime in terms of victim's experience).
'9 Robin L. West, Legitimating the Illegitimate: A Comment on Beyond Rape, 93
COLUM. L. REv. 1442, 1448 (1993); see also Henderson, Rape and Responsibility, supra
note 489, at 164 (calling it "soul-murder').
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977) (plurality opinion) (citation omitted).
5ol Feinberg, supra note 18, at 339; see also ALA. CODE § 13A-6-65 Commentary
(1995) ("In the situation here discussed, since neither force nor imposition upon disabili-
ty is the causa causans, there is no danger of physical injury to those unable to protect
themselves.'); Dripps, Beyond Rape, supra note 8, at 1800 (arguing physical violence
"expresses a more complete indifference, or a more intense hostility, to the victim's
humanity."); Harris, supra note 12, at 633 (noting chance of physical harm less in fraud
cases).
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tim suffers not only the fundamental harm to her sexual integrity but
also the effect of violence.
Some authors, however, while not disputing the severity of
violent rape, point out that nonviolent sexual offenses also cause
serious harm
[A] woman's decision to submit to physical force may be less agonizing
than her decision to have sexual intercourse with a person who holds
economic or emotional power over her and her family. Although one can
argue that a man who obtains intercourse through threats of nonphysical
harm should be punished less severely than a violent rapist, the growing
legal appreciation of the reality of mental injury and the power of eco-
nomic duress suggests that he nonetheless should be punished."0 2
In addition to the fundamental assault on sexual integrity em-
bodied in rape by fraud or coercion,0 3 victims suffer the harms
that befall persons who are lied to, betrayed, or manipulated.
Schafran notes that victim trauma in acquaintance rape cases can be
as great, if not greater, than in stranger cases because of self-blame
and the loss of the ability to trust others.s"M Larson asserts that sex
induced by fraud may cause "grave physical and emotional inju-
ry" ; 5 while Bok points out that persons who have been lied to
are disappointed, resentful, and suspicious." 6 Although the harm
is not of the same experiential quality as violent rape, victims of
nonviolent sexual assault also suffer significantly; recognition of
nonviolent rape would validate these victims' experiences.
Finally, perhaps the single best response is provided by Rob-
erts. In discussing whether grouping together all unwanted sexual
intercourse and violent rape will trivialize violence against women,
she comments: "I fear as much that disconnecting all seemingly
nonviolent sexual coercion from sex accompanied by physical
violence will obscure the common nature of both." s07 Estrich
502 Harris, supra note 12, at 644-45 (footnotes omitted).
See, e.g., Bogart, supra note 327.
See Schafran, supra note 60, at 1018; see also Feinberg, supra note 18, at 340('Fraud in the inducement is a form of manipulation in which some traits of
the victim are used-turned against her-by the deceiver. It is not misleading
to say that even her will is to some extent involved, as well as her general
desires (with new mistaken beliefs subsumed under them) and such traits as
credulity, naivete, cupidity, or trustfulness.").
Feinberg also notes that a deceived woman may suffer 'depression, shame, loss of self-
esteem, and tortured conscience, if not pregnancy and more obvious harms.' Id. at 337.
... Larson, Women Understand, supra note 24, at 380, 453.
' See BOK, supra note 50, at 20.
0 Roberts, supra note 8, at 381.
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agrees: "The 'rape as violence' approach may strengthen the case
for punishing violent sex, but it may do so at the cost of obscuring
the case for punishing forced sex in the absence of conventional
violence, the usual pattern in the simple rape."
50 8
iii. The Effect on Juries
Some theorists worry that juries will not convict defendants if
the evidence fails to disclose the use of force because this does not
correspond to jurors' intuitive notions of rape:
But even if we by-pass the obvious vagueness problems entailed in de-
ploying such a standard against economic inducements, emotional pres-
sure, and the like, this approach will not necessarily work well for the
women we want to protect, because there is no guarantee that prosecu-
tors and juries will accept a feminist perspective on when such pressures
are improper.5°
Recent cases, however, suggest that it is not at all clear juries would
not convict. In some of the most difficult cases, involving prostitutes
who were deceived, juries returned guilty verdicts, although appel-
late courts eventually overturned them."'0 Moreover, opinion polls
indicate strong public sentiment against these types of
nonviolent sex crimes. 1'
b. Benefits of Expanding Rape Law to Include
Fraud and Coercion
i. Broader Coverage of Blameworthy Conduct
Abandoning the unitary concept of rape-as-violence has several
potential benefits. First, expansion will plug a hole in rape law that
has been troubling courts for more than a century: "These cases
make clear that one thing missing in the law of rape is some way to
505 ESTRICH, supra note 7, at 83.
0 Schulhofer, Feminist Challenge, supra note 8, at 2177.
I"0 See supra notes 193-209 and accompanying text.
... In a student opinion poll conducted by Samuel Horowitz, while a visitor at the
Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, students identified fraud in securing sexual intimacy
as high on their list of reprehensible conduct. (Sept. 10, 1996) (on file with author); see
also Dan Subotnik, 'Sue Me, Sue Me, What Can You Do Me? I Love You': A Disquisi
tion on Law, Sex, and Talk, 47 FLA. L. REv. 311, 393-401 (1995) (discussing various
public opinion polls arriving at different conclusions).
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punish sexual misconduct that is not physically violent. It is as if we
had a law against armed robbery but no law against theft." 12 The
exclusive reliance on force or violence as the indispensable element
of rape has the undesirable effect of insulating a broad range of
blameworthy conduct from criminal condemnation. As Roberts
notes:
If rape is violence as the law defines it (weapons, bruises, blood), then
what most men do when they disregard women's sexual autonomy is not
rape. If rape is committed only by violent men, then very few men are
rapists. By defining most male sexual conduct as nonviolent, even when it
is coercive, it has been possible to exempt a multitude of attacks on
women's autonomy from criminal punishment, or even critical scrutiny.
The category of violence, far from punishing all sexual assaults, actually
privileges most of them.513
Roberts's observation is buttressed by the fact that many defendants
in rape by fraud or coercion cases are habitual offenders with multi-
ple victims. 14 They were not simply persons who lied to victims
in the context of private relationships but intentionally set about
satisfying their sexual desires by preying on the most vulnerable
victims using methods falling just short of physical force. Including
fraud and coercion under rape law means that a wider range of
such defendants' blameworthy conduct will be criminalized.
ii. The Analogy to Theft Crimes
One of the strongest arguments for expanding rape law to
include fraud and coercion cases is the aptness of the analogy many
courts and commentators have made between rape and theft offens-
es,515 although troubling problems inhere in equating sexual au-
5,2 Schulhofer, Feminist Challenge, supra note 8, at 2184.
513 Roberts, supra note 8, at 362-63 (footnotes omitted); see also Rosemary J.
Coombe, Room for Manoeuver Toward a Theory of Practice in Critical Legal Studies,
14 L. & SoC. INQUIRY 69, 80 (1989) ("Economic dependence or cultural degradation are
contexts socially defined as consistent with free sexual consent and a woman's actual
agreement is constituted within this context-she is very likely to conceive of her sexual
relations as consensual so long as there is no physical coercion . . . ."); Estrich, Rape,
supra note 7, at 1118 ('the force standard guarantees men freedom to intimidate women
and exploit their weaknesses, as long as they don't 'fight' with them."); Men, Women,
supra note 194, at 153 (remarks by Prof. West) ("the focus on the effectiveness or inef-
fectiveness of rape law . . . tends almost inevitably to legitimate, as praiseworthy, just
or morally non-problematic, the vast bulk of our non-criminal consensual heterosexual
encounters.").
s' See supra Part I.G.
ss See, e.g., Lewis v. State, 30 Ala. 54, 57 (1857) (noting obtaining goods by fraudu-
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tonomy with property."' 6 Simply put, the criminal law punishes
both theft of property accomplished by force or threat as robbery
and theft of property without force as larceny, false pretenses, or
extortion depending on the nonviolent method. Robbery is graded
as the most serious offense because it entails the use of physical
force. Estrich builds on the theft analogy by arguing that the law
should punish the use of fraud or extortion to secure sexual inter-
course to the same extent it outlaws their use to secure money. 17
lent pretenses treated same as forcible theft, but obtaining sexual relations by false pre-
tenses not punished); State v. Lovely, 480 A.2d 847 (N.H. 1984) (defining extortion for
sexual assault by reference to theft by extortion statute); Commonwealth v. Caracciola,
569 N.E.2d 774, 777 (Mass. 1991) (analogizing rape to robbery statute and declining 'to
assume that the Legislature intended to give greater protection to property than to bodily
integrity.'); Commonwealth v. Gregory, 1 A.2d 501, 505 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1938) (compar-
ing fraud in sexual assault and battery case with fraud in larceny by trick); Regina v.
Petrozzi 35 C.C.C. 3d 528, 2 W.C.B. 2d 109 (1987) (court's instructions to jury regard-
ing fraud in prostitute case analogized to theft of goods); Estrich, Rape, supra note 7, at
1120 (arguing for criminalization of rape along lines of theft offenses); Feinberg, supra
note 18, at 339 (discussing difference between violent robbery and nonviolent burglary);
Harris, supra note 12, at 638-40 (analogizing rape to robbery and assault as
nonconsensual, forcible versions of ordinary interactions and also comparing victim be-
havior in robbery and rape cases); Schulhofer, Feminist Challenge, supra note 8, at
2184; Scutt, Fraudulent Impersonation, supra note 134, at 61-62 (discussing one opinion
in husband impersonation case concluding there must be 'the same defence for female
virtue against the thief in the dark as against the open methods of a highwayman.');
The Legal Bias Against Rape Victims, 61 A.B.A. J. 464 (1975) [hereinafter Legal Bias]
(quoted in Pittsburgh Action Against Rape, 428 A.2d 126, 142 (1981)) (importing rape
cross-examination strategy to robbery case); see also Chamallas, supra note 17, at 815
n.167 (observing contracts compelled by physical force are void but also those com-
pelled by economic duress or misrepresentations are voidable); Larson, Even a Worm,
supra note 4, at 9-10 (discussing age-of-consent reforms and quoting from speech of that
era: "Why do they bear so heavily upon the weaker, making the punishment for steal-
ing away a woman's honor no greater than that for stealing a silk gown; purloining her
character at a smaller penalty than the picking of a pocket would incur?). But see
People v. Evans, 85 Misc.2d 1088, 1096, 379 N.Y.S.2d 912, 919 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1975) (declining to analogize to larceny by trick because woman's right to body not
properly within meaning of theft law); People v. Harris, 155 Cal. Rptr. 472 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1979) (reversing rape conviction, but finding theft by fraud permissible on same
facts); Beale, supra note 5, at 324 (distinguishing larceny by trick and constructive break-
ing in burglary and rape law).
516 See, e.g., note 669.
517 See Estrich, Rape, supra note 7, at 1120. Estrich also points out that Evans and
Goldberg would have been guilty of property offenses if they had been attempting to
obtain money, rather than sex. Id. at 1119; see also Findlater, supra note x, at 1364
("Threats and deceptions that would be prohibited by laws against extortion, fraud, or
false pretenses as a way to obtain money should be prohibited by rape law as a way to
obtain sex." (footnote omitted)).
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Not only does this argument have intuitive and logical appeal,
it has two additional benefits. First, the theft analogy offers a viable
model for reconciling the seriousness of violent rape with the
criminalization of lesser forms of nonviolent rape. One would never
argue that the prohibition against robbery precludes punishing
larceny, false pretenses, or extortion. The theft paradigm makes
clear that it is not an either-or proposition. Second, implementing
the theft paradigm equalizes the law's treatment of force, fraud, and
coercion across the crime spectrum. 1 Rape law, instead of mak-
ing exceptions for fraud s19 or coercion, should treat these pres-
sures with the same repugnancy as they are treated in theft
offenses.s2
The analogy between rape and theft law, however, has not
been universally embraced. Ironically, Dripps and Posner, who
emphasize an economic analysis of rape, would provide little sup-
port for the concepts of rape by fraud or coercion. Dripps discusses
the theft analogy in the context of elaborating his commodity theory
of sex, his own property analogy, in which he likens sexual cooper-
ation to a service. 2' He proposes dividing sexual offenses into
two categories: sexually motivated assault, essentially violent rape,
and sexual expropriation, covering instances in which the victim ex-
pressed refusal or was incapable of consent.22 Dripps believes the
theft analogy works for the assault offense but does not work as
well for sexual expropriation because "sex differs from other com-
modities in that no clear line separates the consumer from the sup-
plier." 23 Thus, Dripps likens sexual intercourse with an uncon-
scious, helpless, or incompetent woman to larceny but balks at
expanding the analogy to theft by false pretenses. 24 Moreover, he
s18 Susan Estrich in Teaching Rape Law, 102 YALE L.J. 509, 512 (1992), argues rape
should be treated more like other crimes: "What I have been fighting for, over these
years, is not to give rape special treatment . . . but rather to stop treating it special-
ly; .... '
519 See Larson, Women Understand, supra note 24, at 412 (arguing law allows men
to use tactics to secure sex that would not be tolerated to secure money, what she calls
the sex exception to fraud).
520 See supra notes 515-531 and accompanying text (burglary analogy). But see
Schulhofer, Gender Question, supra note 10, at 136 (arguing against using same stan-
dards of fraud in rape and property contexts and advocating looking at how fraud works
in sexual arena).
2' See Dripps, Beyond Rape, supra note 8. Dripps's proposal has been heavily
critiqued. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 8; West, supra note 454.
522 Dripps, Beyond Rape, supra note 8, at 1807-08.
523 Dripps, Beyond Rape, supra note 8, at 1801.
524 Dripps, Beyond Rape, supra note 8, at 1802 ("Should sex be among the things it
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remains skeptical about criminalizing rape by fraud, although he
suggests it might be treated as theft of services. 25
Posner has also equated sex with a good but, like Dripps,
argues that sex by fraud should not be punished because fraud
should not be recognized as a form of coercion. 26 He comments:
The law usually treats force and fraud symmetrically in the sense of pun-
ishing both, though the latter more leniently. It is a crime to take money
at gunpoint. It is also a crime, though normally a lesser one, to take it by
false pretenses. But generally it is not a crime to use false pretenses to
entice a person into a sexual relationship. Seduction, even when honey-
combed with lies that would convict the man of fraud if he were merely
trying to obtain money, is not rape. The thinking may be that if the wom-
an is not averse to having sex with a particular man, the wrong if any is
in the lies (and we usually do not think of lying in social settings as a
crime) rather than in an invasion of her bodily integrity. 27
Posner's analysis, however, fails to account for non-social situations
in which victims are defrauded; most of the cases in Part I involved
professional or business contexts. 28
Some feminists have also criticized the theft analogy for com-
pletely different reasons. West argues that the analogy "wildly
misdescribes the experience of rape," which is more akin to "spiritu-
al murder than either robbery or larceny." 29 She elaborates:
"Rape is sui generis. It is not accurately captured by any analogy,
no matter how clever or elaborate .... [R]ape itself cannot be re-
duced to other painful experiences. It certainly cannot be reduced
to theft." 30 Other feminists are troubled by the analogy, claiming
it is reminiscent of earlier notions of women as men's property.
5 31
The point, however, is not that rape is similar to theft-they prohibit
is criminal to obtain by false pretenses?').
2I Dripps, Beyond Rape, supra note 8, at 1803. Dripps also argues that criminal
penalties for sexual fraud cases are premature 'until the civil law enforces contracts for
sexual services . . . ." Men, Women and Rape, supra note 171, at 145 (remarks by
Dripps).
526 See POSNER, supra note 487, at 392.
.27 POSNER, supra note 487, at 392.
"I Posner distinguishes husband impersonation and fraudulent medical treatment cases
because there the act is disgusting and humiliating. POSNER, supra note 487, at 392-93.
52 West, supra note 499, at 1448; see also Men, Women, and Rape, supra note
194, at 157 (comments of Fairstein; agreeing with West).
" West, supra note 454, at 1449; see also Henderson, What Makes Rape a Crime?,
supra note 8, at 219 n.97 (1987-88) (arguing nature of rape is not like theft).
I" Henderson, What Makes Rape a Crime?, supra note 8, at 219 n.97. But see
Dripps, Beyond Rape, supra note 8, at 1805 n.75 (suggesting women have property
rights in their own bodies).
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entirely different harms-but rather that the law's umbrella treat-
ment of theft crimes, subsuming a broad range of conduct, is useful
in crafting a comparable approach to the varieties of sexual
offenses.
c. Conclusion
The benefits of expanding rape law to encompass fraudulent or
coercive inducements outweigh those of retaining a unitary, rape-as-
violence conceptualization. Rape law, like theft law, should sub-
sume a broad range of blameworthy conduct, not simply forcible
sexual penetration or contact. More importantly, several state legis-
latures have already transcended many of the theoretical issues
inherent in this debate by prohibiting both violent rape and nonvio-
lent sexual offenses accomplished by fraud or coercion.32 or with-
out reference to force, fraud, or coercion. 33 These legislative bod-
ies have declined to assume that enactment of the latter forecloses
retention of the former. The resulting statutes grade violent rape
more harshly and punish it more severely, preserving the judgment
that it is a qualitatively more serious offense and forestalling any
possible hint of trivialization. 34
3. The Relationship of Force and Nonconsent in Rape Law
A third set of objections to the expansion of rape law to in-
clude fraud or coercion implicates the confusing and murky rela-
tionship between force and nonconsent in rape law: are these two
elements coequal or does force serve a corroborative function by
providing an external, verifiable indication of nonconsent?.3 s If
force is an independent element of rape, then its elimination or
substitution by fraud or coercion may be problematic. However, if
the real inquiry of rape law is consent, and force merely corrobo-
rates nonconsent, then factors other than force can be recognized as
invalidating consent. Embedded within this inquiry lie two subsid-
iary concerns: (1) the need for verification of nonconsent based on
532 See supra notes 328-409 and accompanying text.
533 See supra notes 410-446 and accompanying text.
s3 See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-13-503 (1997).
13' The debate over whether rape law protects women from physical assault or pro-
tects their sexual integrity is also implicated in the question of whether force and
nonconsent are equivalent prongs of rape law.
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an assumed untrustworthiness of rape victims and (2) the effect of
fraud or coercion on consent.
a. Force Corroborates Nonconsent
Competing views exist about the proper relationship between
the force and nonconsent elements of rape law. Goldberg, for exam-
ple, quoted at the beginning of this Article, argued that the issue of
consent is simply irrelevant in the absence of force. The Goldberg
court held that force and nonconsent are coequal elements of the
crime; rape cannot occur in either's absence. 36 Dripps concurs:
"The conjunction also means that no matter how nonconsensual the
sex may be, there is no crime without force." 37 By contrast,
Crosswell emphasized consent as being the central inquiry of rape
law, and force, threat, or fraud may negate it. 38
Historical support exists for the notion that the force require-
ment of rape is subservient to nonconsent. Specifically, Schulhofer
notes that the common law definition of rape was "'unlawful sexual
intercourse with a female person without her consent." 9 One
court observed that the better view is
... to require a showing of only such force as is necessary reasonably to
demonstrate that an act of intercourse has been undertaken without the
victim's consent
540
See Goldberg v. State, 395 A.2d 1213 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979).
s Dripps, Beyond Rape, supra note 8, at 1794; see also Commonwealth v. Childs,
quoted in Puttkammer, supra note 5, at 420 ('No amount of persuasion or solicitation
however improper, no amount of deception or even fraud however villainous or outra-
geous, will make illicit intercourse constitute rape, where the woman, induced or per-
suaded consents to the act.'). Dripps ultimately argues for abandoning the conjunction
by eliminating consent and focusing exclusively on the defendant's actions. Dripps, Be-
yond Rape, supra note 8, at 1805-06 ('By defining the assault offenses exclusively by
reference to the alternatives the defendant presents the victim with, consent to sex can
be taken out of the law.'); see also Cynthia Ann Wicktom, Note, Focusing on the
Offender's Forceful Conduct: A Proposal for the Redefinition of Rape Laws, 56 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 399 (1988) (making similar proposal).
s See People v. Crosswell, 13 Mich. 427 (1865).
S33 Schulhofer, Sexual Autonomy, supra note 9, at 60. He notes that American juris-
dictions added the force element. Id.
People v. Cicero, 204 Cal. Rptr. 582, 590 (1984); see also State ex reL M.T.S.,
609 A.2d 1266, 1270 (N.J. 1992) (quoting PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 55, at 211, for
a similar proposition); Schulhofer, Sexual Autonomy, supra note 9, at 63 (noting Perkins
reads force element out of rape).
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As these authorities make clear, the fundamental wrong at which the law
of rape is aimed is not the application of physical force that causes physi-
cal harm. Rather, the law of rape primarily guards the integrity of a
woman's will and the privacy of her sexuality from an act of intercourse
undertaken without her consent. Because the fundamental wrong is the
violation of a woman's will and sexuality, the law of rape does not re-
quire that "force" cause physical harm. Rather, in this scenario, 'force'
plays merely a supporting evidentiary role, as necessary only to insure an
act of intercourse has been undertaken against a victim's will. 4'
This interpretation of the force element is preferable to any other
interpretation because it also helps to make sense of cases involving
unconscious, mentally ill, or physically helpless victims: "[WIhere
the complainant clearly was incapable of effective consent, . . . it is
settled that the force requirement is satisfied merely by the amount
of force necessary to perform the sexual act." 42 Thus, with force
correctly understood as corroborating nonconsent, it should not
elide further inquiry into the question of consent.
b. Women as Untrustworthy Rape Accusers
Rape law's insistence on an external, verifiable criterion of
nonconsent embodied in the force requirement must also be viewed
in a larger historical and jurisprudential context. Many commenta-
tors have pointed to the gender bias inherent in criminal law, 43
which "is-and has been for centuries-a system of rules conceived
and enforced by men, for men, and against men." 44 Rape law is
peculiarly vulnerable to discriminatory biases against women be-
cause it is one of the only crimes that pits men directly against
women, wherein issues of credibility are often outcome-determina-
tive.s45 Estrich adds: "Moreover, because the crime involves sex
541 Cicero, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 590 (ruling force element of committing lewd and lasciv-
ious acts upon child suffices to show it was against child's will).
542 Harris, supra note 12, at 619-20 (1976) (footnotes omitted) ([Il]t is evident that
juries, courts and commentators consider assailant force and victim resistance primarily as
indicators of nonconsent. Where the force used was extreme . , the trier of fact
generally assumes that the victim did not consent to intercourse .... ); see also MONT.
CODE ANN. § 45-5-511(5) (1997) (force or threat sufficient to show nonconsent); M.T.S.,
609 A.2d at 1270-71 (discussing force requirement as proving act against woman's will
and significance of resistance as proxy for force illustrated by cases in which victims
unable to resist); POSNER, supra note 487, at 388 (distinguishing rape from ordinary sex
by nonconsent, which is difficult to prove without physical injury); WHARTON'S CRIMINAL
LAW § 290 (1995) (no consent if defendant uses force or threat).
s See, e.g., Schulhofer, Feminist Challenge, supra note 8.
s, Schulhofer, Feminist Challenge, supra note 8, at 2154.
14' Deborah W. Denno, Why Rape is Different, 63 FORDHAM L. REv. 125, 128 (1994)
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itself, the law of rape inevitably treads on the explosive ground of
sex roles, of male aggression and female passivity, of our under-
standings of sexuality-areas where differences between a male and
female perspective may be most pronounced." 4 ' Even more im-
portantly, feminist and other writers have noted that rape jurispru-
dence, dating from Lord Hale's famous maxim, 47 reveals a basic
distrust of women and fear that they will make false accusations of
rape.5 4
8
The fear of false rape charges is exacerbated in rape by fraud
cases because "doubts as to the credibility of the complainant are
magnified by the absence of such outward indicia of nonconsent as
force and resistance." 49  Puttkammer similarly argues that fraud
cases are dangerous because "the central fact of prime importance
is, not the woman's objective conduct, but her unmanifested
thoughts and beliefs. To ascertain them with any degree of assur-
ance is bound to be an excessively difficult task." 50 Harris even
maintains that rape law has developed into its current form because
of inordinate attention to the rape by fraud cases: "Scholarly discus-
sion in rape gelled in an era when legal thinkers were emotionally
distrustful of rape complaints in general, but were fascinated by
cases where consent was allegedly induced by subterfuge."" s' It
may be asserted, therefore, that errors in decision-making will be
minimized by retaining an external criterion such as force.
(Relative to other crimes, rape reveals the dark side of the social and biological dif-
ferences and potential conflicts between men and women."); see also Findlater, supra
note 1, at 1357 (rape law based on sexist notions).
ESTRICH, supra note 7, at 1091.
' Hale wrote: 'it is true, rape is a most detestable crime, and therefore ought se-
verely and impartially to be punished with death; but it must be remembered that it is
an accusation easily to be made and hard to be proved; and harder to be defended by
the party accused, though never so innocent." 1 M. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 633,
635 (1680); cf. Schafran, supra note 60, at 1013 ("Contrary to Lord Hale's allegation,
rape is an extremely difficult crime to charge and the easiest of all to defend.").
1 See, e.g., State ex rel. M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266, 1273 (N.J. 1992) ("During the
1970s feminists and others criticized the stereotype that rape victims were inherently
more untrustworthy than other victims of criminal attack."); Legal Bias, supra note 469.
19 Harris, supra note 12, at 631; see also Barbara A. v. John G., 145 Cal. App.3d
369, 377 (1983) (opining that it would be awful if we admitted that the legal system
could not sort out false from true claims).
11 Puttkammer, supra note 5, at 421. The author discloses his bias when he articu-
lates why rape is different from automobile theft-we should be more suspicious of rape
victims. Id.
I" Harris, supra note 12, at 628; see also Chamallas, supra note 17, at 832.
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Today, the widespread proliferation of rape law reform attests
to a more egalitarian system, one not predominated by distrust of
rape victims. Several states, for example, have eliminated Hale's
cynical maxim from their jury instructions."5 2 Furthermore, empiri-
cal support is notably absent in support of the notion that women
fabricate rape claims.5 3 Harris recommends
If the law would formalize the unofficial practice of requiring force as an
element of rape only where the expectation of the complainant's untruth-
fulness is not rebutted by extrinsic evidence, and then discard that expec-
tation itself as unreasoned and unreasonable, then the law would very
likely conclude that the freedom of sexual choice which is to be protected
by rape law can be as effectively negated by nonphysical as by physical
coercion." 4
Banishing the basic distrust of rape victims means external indicia of
nonconsent such as the use of force become less important.
c. Fraud and Coercion Also Invalidate Consent
If the real question in rape law is victim consent, then it seems
logical to look at all factors that undermine consent, not simply
physical force. The exclusive focus on physical force may deny the
philosophical and empirical reality that other types of pressures
erode or negate consent. Commentators approaching the consent
question from varying perspectives conclude that persons may be
compelled to do things against their wills or without true consent
by means other than force, i.e., fraud, coercion, and economic
pressure.55 Moreover, as noted earlier, criminal law takes cogni-
552 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-408 (1997) (outlawing Hale's maxim and re-
quiring jury instruction against gender bias).
s" See Schafran, supra note 60, at 1012-13.
s Harris, supra note 12, at 645.
s See, e.g., BOK, supra note 50, at 18 (noting deceit and violence may coerce per-
sons into acting against their wills); JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF: THE MORAL LIMITS OF
THE CRIMINAL LAw 269 (1986) ('Coercive force is by no means the only kind of factor
that can reduce or vitiate the voluntariness of consent. Deficient or mistaken information
is another.'); Chamallas, supra note 17, at 814 (arguing consent ineffective if secured by
physical force, economic pressure, or deception); Coombe, supra note 513, at 80 (*This
move to contextualization, however, has no logical (that is to say non-arbitrary) limits;
economic dependence, cultural degradation, and psychological pressure, for example,
could be considered in this calculation of coercion and consent if an interpretive con-
struct other than the prevailing mind/body dichotomy were utilized."); Harris, supra note
12, at 644 ("Mhe law should recognize that forms of coercion other than threats or in-
fliction of bodily harm preclude effective consent to intercourse."); Larson, Women Un-
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zance of these other factors in numerous contexts; fraud or coercion
provide a sufficient explanatory mechanism in burglary and theft
law."5 6 Finally, the impact of these factors on consent is recog-
nized in many legal contexts, particularly commercial ones outside
criminal law. ss7
d. Conclusion
Rape law, in some senses, has come full circle. Common law
rape constituted nonconsensual sexual intercourse without reference
to force. American jurisdictions added the force requirement to
supply external evidence of nonconsent, probably because of ram-
pant, sexist distrust of rape victims. Exclusive reliance on force as
the indicator of nonconsent has prevented more careful consider-
ation of other types of pressures that also invalidate consent. Today,
many state legislatures have solved this problem by enacting statutes
making certain forms of fraud or coercion illegal in the context of
accomplishing sexual intercourse. Others have disconnected the
substantive link between force and nonconsent by explicitly altering
one or another of these requirements. Finally, a substantial minority
outlaw at least one form of nonconsensual sexual offense without
force, returning to rape's common law formulation.5 8
4. Conclusion
In summary, the doctrinal element of force in traditional rape
law does not present an insurmountable obstacle to the criminalizat-
ion of rape by fraud or rape by coercion. First, rape law has suffi-
cient doctrinal space to accommodate a conception of force broader
derstand, supra note 24, at 414 ( Free choice may be thwarted by compulsion of the
body through physical violence, or more subtly by the creation of false belief through
deception.'); Schulhofer, Sexual Autonomy, supra note 9, at 45 ("Many of the ways to
defeat a person's will are not usually thought to involve force: trickery, stealth, (possibly)
economic leverage.).
ss Global criminal consent provisions often include trilogy of force, duress, or decep-
tion. See supra notes 349-354 and accompanying text.
ss7 See Larson, Women Understand, supra note 24, at 412 (noting greater protection
against fraud in commercial than sexual spheres); Schulhofer, Sexual Autonomy, supra
note 9, at 89 (observing that from "commercial transactions to medical procedures and
surgery, material misrepresentations are widely acknowledged as sufficient to invalidate
consent. Yet current law does not proscribe nondisclosure or even active, affirmative
misrepresentations to induce sexual intimacy in most contexts.').
Ss8 See supra Part II.E.
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than physical harm. Moreover, state legislatures have already enact-
ed a new genre of sexual offenses that explicitly alter, replace, or
eliminate the force requirement of traditional rape law. Second, the
costs of expanding rape law to include nonforcible fraud and coer-
cion are relatively small and the benefits considerable when com-
pared to retaining the unitary concept of violent rape. In addition,
the theft analogy provides a valuable paradigm for punishing both
forcible and nonforcible offenses. Third, the real focus in rape law
should be consent. Force, although an important method of cor-
roborating nonconsent, should not prevent examination of other
factors that also undermine consent such as fraud and coercion.
B. The Nonconsent Requirement
The second major challenge inherent in cases of rape by fraud
and rape by coercion concerns rape law's doctrinal requirement of
nonconsent. The common denominator of cases involving physical
force, fraud, and coercion is the effect of these pressures on con-
sent."59 Simply put, the central question is whether a victim's
fraudulently induced or nonphysically coerced consent is valid, de-
priving the defendant's conduct of criminality, or whether the
offender's use of fraud or coercion vitiates the victim's seeming con-
sent. 6' Another way of posing this inquiry, one suggested by
Schulhofer, is: does yes always mean yes? 6' Because modern rape
law has recognized some forms of fraud or coercion as vitiating
consent," 2 the narrower problem is where to draw the line be-
"I Larson, Women Understand, supra note 24, at 418-19, comments: "A victim's will
may be bent to the coercer's ends by means other than physical force. Force, fear, and
fraud work in much the same way: The wrongdoer arranges the victim's world so that
the act he wants her to perform appears as her best choice. . . . For the duration of
the threat or the deception, the coercer has captured the victim's will for his own
ends."
o Scutt, Fraudulent Impersonation, supra note 134, at 59, conceptualizes the ques-
tion as follows: "Where 'consent' to the particular act has in fact been given by the
woman concerned, is the charge of rape thereby ousted, or does the fraud vitiate the
consent, thus validating a charge that the man has had camal knowledge of the woman
without her consent?"
" Schulhofer, Gender Question, supra note 10, at 135, comments: "Once a 'no'
means 'no,' the next generation of issues will center on when or whether 'yes' is suffi-
cient to mean 'yes.' What happens when the 'yes' is produced by intimidation, indirect
pressure, or manipulation?".
362 Some argue that these may be exceptions rather than the rule. See Chamallas,
supra note 17, at 830 ('It might be claimed that the current legal prohibitions against
deception in sexual relationships are exceptions to a more general rule that immunizes
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tween effective and ineffective consent in cases of fraud and coer-
cion."63 Schulhofer comments:
Despite the undoubted value of legal analysis or cultural criticism that
points to commonalities between physical violence and social, economic,
or psychological pressure, the job of legal scholarship is not finished until
a workable boundary between permitted and regulated conduct has been
identified. And in the case of rape, the boundary problem is acute.5"
This section explores various formulations of how to draw the line
in both the fraud and coercion contexts. 65
1. Fraud
a. Traditional Formulations
i. Fraud in the Factum vs. Fraud in the Inducement
The traditional formula for distinguishing legally valid from
invalid consent in fraud cases is the dichotomy between fraud in
the factum and fraud in the inducement. 66 Perkins and Boyce
sexual encounters from charges of fraud.'); Schulhofer, Gender Question, supra note 10,
at 136 (noting since abolition of seduction, criminal law has immunized all misrepresen-
tations no matter how egregious).
-6 See Boro v. Superior Court, 210 Cal. Rptr. 122, 126 n.5 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985)
(asking where line should be drawn); Regina v. Linekar, 2 Crim. App. 49 (C.A. 1995)
(discussing line-drawing); Berger, supra note 8, at 76 ("What would be the limits of lia-
bility for rape by fraud?"); Estrich, Rape, supra note 7, at 1180 (drawing line between
criminal sex and seduction); Anthony Hooper, Fraud in Assault and Rape, 3 U.B.C. REv.
117, 121 (1968) (need for line drawing acute); see also Dripps, Beyond Rape, supra
note 8, at 1799 ("The second, and far more difficult, step toward a rational criminal law
of sex would be to define and grade those pressures to cause sexual cooperation, short
of violence, that deserve to be punished as crimes.").
I Schulhofer, Feminist Challenge, supra note 8, at 2176.
56 Harris, supra note 12, at 620, comments: 'Continuous juggling of the elements of
the crime by the courts and commentators reflects an urge toward administrative simplic-
ity, a search for an external standard by which to measure the subjective element of
nonconsent.'
See, e.g., People v. Harris, 155 Cal. Rptr. 472, 472 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) (fraud in
the inducement does not vitiate consent); People v. Cicero, 204 Cal. Rptr. 582, 597
(1984) (fraud in the factum does vitiate); Boro, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 125 (fraud in the in-
ducement does not vitiate); People v. Ogunmola, 238 Cal. Rptr. 300 (Cal. Ct. App.
1987) (doctor obtaining sexual intercourse under pretext of medical exam is fraud in the
factum); United States v. Booker, 25 M.J. 114, 114 (1987) (fraud in the factum includes
identity); Linekar, 2 Crim. App. at 49 (fraud in inducement includes lies about payment
of prostitute).
In Don Moran, notably, which held that fraud was insufficient to supply the place
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describe such concepts as follows:
The general rule is that if deception causes a misunderstanding as to the
fact itself (fraud in the factum) there is no legally-recognized consent
because what happened is not that for which consent was given; whereas
consent induced by fraud is as effective as any other consent, so far as
direct and immediate legal consequences are concerned, if the deception
relates not to the thing done but merely to some collateral matter (fraud in
the inducement).67
The authors maintain that the most striking illustration of this dichot-
omy occurs in rape law, 68 supporting their thesis with the follow-
ing example. If a doctor falsely tells a woman that sexual inter-
course is necessary for her treatment and she agrees, no rape oc-
curred because the doctor's misrepresentation constitutes fraud in
the inducement and the resulting consent is effective. On the other
hand, if the doctor pretends to perform a routine pelvic exam and
instead has sexual intercourse with the woman, then it is rape be-
cause this is fraud in the factum which vitiates her consent. The
woman never consented to sexual intercourse because she was de-
ceived about the act itself. 69 In fact, the court in Boro v. Superi-
or 70 relied on this classic distinction. As discussed supra in Part
I.A.1, Boro involved a feigned doctor who told his victims that sex-
ual intercourse was a necessary treatment to cure their fatal blood
disorder. The Boro court held that the defendant's lies constituted
fraud in the inducement, the victims' consent was effective, and,
therefore, defendant was not found guilty of rape. 71
Likewise, the Restatement of Torts recognizes the factum-in-
ducement dichotomy. Consent is ineffective if induced by a substan-
of force, the court seemed willing to acknowledge lack of consent based on fraud: "if
the statute, or the definition of rape, did not contain the words 'by force,' or 'forcibly,'
doubtless a consent procured by such fraud as that referred to, might be treated as no
consent . . . ." Don Moran v. People, 25 Mich. 356, 364 (1872).
57 PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 475, at 1079; see also LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note
418, at 477-80; Feinberg, supra note 18, at 332 (describing distinction as between
nonconsent and less than voluntary consent because of defective belief induced by
fraud).
'6 PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 475, at 1079.
569 PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 475, at 1079; see also WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAw
§ 290 (1995).
17 163 Cal. App. 3d 1224 (1985).
17' The dissent pointed out California had a separate statute defining consent for
sexual intercourse that implicitly repealed the factum-inducement distinction. Id. at 1232
(Holmdahl, J., dissenting); see also Feinberg, supra note 18, at 342-43 (discussing similar
fact pattem).
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tial mistake as to the nature of the invasion or the extent of harm
and it is induced by another or known to him. 72 However,
If the consent is induced by mistake concerning other matters, the rule
does not apply.... Sometimes this is expressed by saying that the con-
sent is "voidable," but not "void"' sometimes by saying that the mistake
goes merely to the "inducement" of the consent, rather than to the es-
sence of what is consented to; sometimes by saying that it goes merely to
a "collateral matter." 73
Moreover, even contract law recognizes the void-voidable dichoto-
my depending upon whether the fraud occurred in the execution or
in the inducement. 74
Despite widespread adoption, the factum-inducement distinc-
tion is objectionable on several grounds. First, some commentators
argue it is of dubious origin and question its emergence, at least in
the torts context. 75 Second, and more importantly, scholars sug-
gest that the distinction makes no sense and provides little real
assistance in differentiating between legally effective and ineffective
consent:76
Although superficially appealing, the traditional dichotomy between es-
sential and collateral matters breaks down in application and has little
predictive value.... Recent scholarship has rejected the traditional fac-
turn/inducement dichotomy and has held that if the mistake materially
affects the plaintiff's decision-making process, the consent is invalid-but,
again, only if the mistake is known to the defendant. 77
In particular, the predictive utility of the distinction has been seri-
ously undermined by its elastic application in rape cases. 78 Re-
s7 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892B(2) (1977).
s1 Id. § 892B cmt. g (1965). The illustration accompanying this provision concerns
giving a prostitute or gigolo a counterfeit bill. Id. at § 892B cmt. g, illus. 9 (1977).
" The contract distinction seems to have spilled over into the marriage area. For
instance, section 106.030 of Oregon statutes, ORE. REV. STAT. § 106.030 (1996), provides
for voidable marriages when "the consent of either party is obtained by force or
fraud ....
s1 The distinction appeared in the First Restatement of Torts; before the Restatement,
scholars either did not discuss this issue or concluded that all forms of fraud vitiated
consent. David A. Fischer, Fraudulently Induced Consent to Intentional Torts, 46 CINCIN-
NAn L. REv. 71, 71 (1977).
576 See id. at 71 ("fi-here is no basis for the distinction. Fraud always invalidates
consent, whether the fraud relates to the tortuous nature of the act or to matters of in-
ducement.'); see also FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL, 1 THE LAW OF TORTS 303 (2d ed. 1986)
(citing Fischer and concluding case law on the distinction thin); STUART M. SPEISER ET
AL, 1 THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 5:7, 800 (1983) (citing Fischer).
s7 VINCENT R. JOHNSON, MASTERING TORTS 42 (1995) (emphasis added).
" See also Puttkammer, supra note 5, at 423 ("But in fact there is little profit in any
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call, for instance, the legal sleight of hand used by the court in
Regina v. Dee, a husband impersonation case, to bring the
defendant's conduct within the purview of rape law. 79 Although
impersonation cases were commonly thought to involve fraudulent
inducement, the court held that the woman had consented to mari-
tal intercourse not adultery, which constituted fraud in the factum;
therefore, the impersonator's fraud vitiated her consent. 80 While
some authors defend this example, arguing that the courts are not
disagreeing about the underlying principle but only its application,
Feinberg comments: "there is a danger in packing too much into the
description of what was consented to, since it could undermine
altogether the distinction between fraud in the factum and fraud in
the inducement."5"' Ambiguity in the description of the consent-
ed-to act similarly arises in fraudulent treatment cases82 and in
the sexual theft context. 83
Third, the factum-inducement dichotomy fails to accurately
distinguish degrees of voluntariness. Feinberg maintains that the real
distinction should not be between fraud in the factum and fraud in
the inducement but "between those cases of fraud in the induce-
ment that reduce the voluntariness of consent substantially and
event in speaking of 'fundamental differences' as contrasted with 'merely collateral
circumstances'; the dividing line may too easily be drawn where the speaker wishes and
the arbitrary nature of his choice be covered by such terms of mere camouflage.^) (foot-
note omitted).
s7 Regina v. Dee, 15 Cox 579 (1884); see also Scutt, Fraudulent Impersonation,
supra note 134, at 63-65 (discussing case).
58 Dee, 15 Cox at 579; see also Scutt, supra note 134, at 63-65 (discussing this
case).
51' Feinberg, supra note 18, at 335; see also id. at 344-45 (discussing difference be-
tween husband impersonators and medical misrepresentation).
-02 Feinberg, supra note 18, at 335, comments:
The consent to intercourse with a physician when fraudulently induced by
medical misrepresentations, for example, could be reclassified as fraud in the
factum and therefore rape after all, since the woman could always argue that
though she consented to sexual intercourse, she was not consenting to what in
fact was done, but rather to an act of therapy that was not in fact adminis-
tered.
Later, he adds "But there is no reason in principle why sex by fraudulent inducement in
cases where it is plausibly harmful (as in our example) ought not to be a crime." Id. at
341; see also State v. Quinlan, 596 N.E.2d 28 (1992) (victim consented to medical
procedure, not acts of sexual penetration; thus, consent vitiated because obtained by
deceit).
513 See JOHNSON, supra note 577, at 42 ("Surely, the gigolo's mistake ... relates to
those facts which determine whether the liaison was offensive to him or whether he
suffered mental aggravation.').
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those that do not."s84 Schulhofer similarly comments: "[A]t least
some frauds in the inducement are sufficiently serious to invalidate
consent and justify criminal punishment.""' Courts' adherence to
the formulaic factum-inducement distinction thwarts serious inquiry
into these more significant and finer-grained differences.
Finally, Perkins and Boyce assert that the distinction is only
Icontrolling in the prosecution of offenses in which absence of
consent is an element of the crime, but unimportant in the prosecu-
tion of other offenses." 86 In battery and larceny cases, they argue,
all types of fraud render consent invalid. 87 Harris disagrees with
this basic premise, asserting that other crimes, such as assault and
robbery, also require nonconsent 88 Her argument reinforces the
notion that the real difference is not doctrinal (i.e., whether the
nonconsent element is explicit or implicit) but rather the differential
treatment of fraud in the context of rape as compared to other
crimes. Moreover, under Perkins and Boyce's analysis, the factum-
inducement distinction may lose its significance in states with provi-
sions explicitly altering the nonconsent element or with new statu-
tory crimes such as sexual battery or sexual extortion, depending
upon the elements required for conviction. Notably, courts in Ha-
waii, Tennessee, and Wisconsin have recently eschewed the distinc-
tion by holding that it was irrelevant under their respective sexual
offense statutes. 89
ii. Nature and Quality of Act and Identity
A second formulation, very similar to the factum-inducement
dichotomy and appearing in British and Canadian cases, is fraud as
to the nature or quality of the act or the identity of the defen-
Feinberg, supra note 18, at 335.
s Schulhofer, Gender Question, supra note 10, at 135-36.
s' PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 475, at 1084; see also LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note
x, at 479 ("However, as to other offenses where consent is only sometimes a defense,
such as battery, both forms of deception may be considered unlawful and thus a bar to
effective consent.').
17 In an old larceny case, the court held "fraud supplied the place of force., PERKINS
& BOYCE, supra note 475, at 1083 (quoting Pear's Case, 2 East P.C. 685 (1779)).
5" Harris, supra note 12, at 638-40 (analogizing rape to robbery and assault as
nonconsensual, forcible versions of ordinary interactions).
19 State v. Oshiro, 696 P.2d 846 (Haw. Ct. App. 1985); State v. Tizard, 897 S.W.2d
732, 740-42 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994); State v. Dantes, 350 N.W.2d 740 n.1 (Wis.
1984).
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dant.sg° Commentators, however, have also criticized this formula-
tion for its elasticity: "But once the courts admit that a consent to a
touching or intercourse can be vitiated by the fraudulent conceal-
ment of the purposes of the accused, then the problem of where to
draw the line becomes acute. The expression 'the nature and quali-
ty of the act' does not help the courts to solve this problem." s"'
This formulation seems no more satisfactory than others because it
still begs the question of what constitutes the act to which the vic-
tim consented. 92 Its explicit inclusion of identity fraud, however,
does resolve the impersonation aspect of rape by fraud, a strategy
not emulated in other formulations. Rather than debating whether
deception as to identify constitutes fraud in the factum or fraud in
the inducement, this formulation bypasses that classification and
explicitly provides that identity fraud vitiates consent.
b. Commentators' Suggestions
Abandoning the traditional formulation of fraud in the factum
versus fraud in the inducement, legal commentators have made
some suggestions, varying in degrees of specificity, about how to
draw the line between valid and invalid consent in cases of rape by
fraud. These scholarly approaches fall into the following three over-
arching categories: (1) voluntariness or autonomy, (2) materiality,
and (3) totality of the circumstances.
" See also Puttkammer, supra note 5, at 424 (suggesting drawing the line between
cases where victim knows she was consenting to sexual intercourse and those where
she did not). Statutes in Arizona, Nebraska, and California use this language. See supra
Part ll.C.
591 Hooper, supra note 563, at 121.
592 Koh, supra note 328, at 92-94 (discussing medical treatment cases). In England,
Parliament also passed the Sexual Offenses Act of 1956, making it a misdemeanor to
procure a woman to have sexual intercourse by false pretenses or false representations.
However, because the scope of this provision is unclear, Koh suggests construing it
more broadly than nature of the act or identity.
It is hoped the courts would give it a liberal construction and consider the
types of misrepresentation that are likely to induce a woman to have sexual
intercourse, to which but for the representation, she would not so consent. For
example, a misrepresentation as to a person's health such as in Clarence's
case should be serious enough to merit punishment but not, it is submitted, if
it involves a misrepresentation of a person's wealth or family connections.
Id. at 94 (referring to Regina v. Clarence, (1888) 22 Q.B.D. 23, 43-44.).
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i. Voluntariness or Autonomy
In one of the most thorough treatments of fraudulently pro-
cured consent, 93 Feinberg argues that the real question is what
types of fraud reduce the voluntariness of consent to a level that
should not be recognized as legally effective. He classifies fraudu-
lent inducements as follows: (1) bluffing threats (extortionate fraud),
(2) bluffing warnings, (3) false promises, and (4) other false pretens-
es. Bluffing threats are really a form of coercion and not fraud be-
cause the real harm comes from its extortionate aspect. Bluffing
warnings combine fraud and coercion "in such a way that the coer-
cive pressure that reduces the voluntariness of the victim's consent
would not exist but for her fraudulently induced false belief."
5 94
The worse the threatened harm, the less voluntary is the con-
sent. 95 Feinberg would outlaw Boro-likes96 fraudulent treatment
cases under this second category based on the coercive nature of
the false warning. The third category, false promises, affects
voluntariness because the victim does not assume the risk of de-
fault; these should be actionable as rape or gross sexual imposition
if they are coercive enough (i.e., avoiding or eliminating an intolera-
ble evil rather than offering an attractive prospect). For instance,
Feinberg argues that criminal law should subsume the actions of a
wealthy man who falsely promises to financially assist the mother of
a sick child in return for her sexual favors but not the actions of the
same rich man who merely offers a desirable, but not desperately
needed, alternative to the woman. Finally, Feinberg discusses sever-
al types of fraudulent inducements in his fourth category, other false
pretenses, positing the same coerciveness distinction. 97 He ex-
cludes from criminal sanction, for example, a rock-star impersonator
who exploits a fan's mistake as to his identity to accomplish sexual
intercourse. In summary, Feinberg finds fraud objectionable when
its effect on consent is too coercive. 98 While his proposal is more
s Feinberg, supra note 18.
s9 Feinberg, supra note 18, at 343.
.S Feinberg, supra note 18, at 343, adds: 'if we use objective standards of
voluntariness and require also that the warning be at least minimally credible, then the
voluntariness of the procured consent might also vary with degree of credibility."
s' Boro v. Superior Court, 210 Cal. Rptr. 122 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
s' Feinberg, supra note , at 344-45.
s BOK, supra note 50, at 22, comments: "Deception, then, can be coercive. When it
succeeds, it can give power to the deceiver-power that all who suffer the consequences
of lies would not wish to abdicate.'
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expansive than the factum-inducement distinction, subsuming Boro
for instance, it still may not be broad enough to cover many sexual
scam cases because of its emphasis on coerciveness.
On the other hand, Schulhofer advocates focusing on sexual
autonomy as the central precept of rape law and outlawing illegiti-
mate pressures in causing someone to submit to sexual intercourse.
In the fraud context, where he believes no clear consensus ex-
ists, 99 he argues that the autonomy perspective helps identify
some forms of deception that are "indefensible intrusions on free-
dom of choice." 6°° Schulhofer specifically mentions falsehoods
about pecuniary interest, nondisclosure or misrepresentations in-
volving significant health risks and adds that any deceptions "in-
tended to create feelings of isolation, physical jeopardy, or econom-
ic insecurity should likewise be considered unprivileged and an
unwarranted intrusion on autonomous choice." 6 1 He remains
more wary of misstatements concerning emotions or commitment to
a relationship.02 Schulhofer's proposal, like Feinberg's, is more
expansive than the traditional factum-inducement distinction be-
cause it includes falsehoods regarding pecuniary interests and health
issues. Moreover, his comment regarding deceptions strongly re-
sembles Feinberg's emphasis on coerciveness.
Finally, Bogart advocates defining rape simply as
nonconsensual sexual intercourse.0 3 Judging, on standard philo-
sophical grounds, the four possible conceptualizations of rape, i.e.,
as forcible, coerced, nonvoluntary, or nonconsensual, Bogart con-
cludes that the superior definition is one based on nonconsent. He
defines nonconsensual sex as existing "[w]here participation is not
willing, not chosen freely, not chosen without the application or
presence of external pressures,....."6'4 Bogart posits a nonconsen-
sual model of rape as the preferable choice because of its ability to
cover a broad spectrum of scenarios, including those involving
deception. He argues that fraud cases distinguish the nonconsent
and nonvoluntary models: 65 Specifically, "Because the beliefs un-
s9 Schulhofer, Sexual Autonomy, supra note 9, at 92.
Schulhofer, Sexual Autonomy, supra note 9, at 93.
6 Schulhofer, Sexual Autonomy, supra note 9, at 93.
6o2 Schulhofer, Sexual Autonomy, supra note 9, at 93.
Bogart, supra note 327, at 118.
' Bogart, supra note 327, at 118; see also Chamallas, supra note 17, at 814 (dis-
cussing refurbished model of consent which is not 'freely given if secured through phys-
ical force, economic pressure, or deception.n).
6s Bogart asserts that nonvoluntary sex includes forcible and coerced sex as well as
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derlying the action are false, although the action itself is voluntary,
there is no effective consent. Consequently, the cases may be
termed instances of rape under the nonconsent model. Under the
nonvoluntary model, these are cases of simple seduction.""" For
Bogart, then, rape law should focus on the falsity of the victim's
belief, rendering the resulting consent ineffective, rather than on the
coerciveness of the fraudulent inducement. This more expansive ap-
proach is shared by Larson and Bok in their discussions of sexual
fraud and lying.6 7 All three scholars opine that deception prevents
the victim from having information necessary for an informed
choice.
The major critique of the voluntariness or autonomy approach
is two-fold. First, some feminists argue that autonomy is illusory in a
culture in which women occupy a subordinate role and that all
forms of sexual intercourse are coerced to some degree. °8 Sec-
ond, they argue that the liberal idea of rights embedded in the
autonomy perspective is more male-oriented and does not take into
account women's feelings." 9 Chamallas, for example, proposes a
notion of mutuality that goes beyond consensual sex.610 While
these critiques are valid, they fail to offer an alternative method of
distinguishing valid and invalid consent. West is the most helpful by
suggesting that rape law should not ask about consent but rather
about the legitimacy of the pressures brought to bear on
victims. "
cooperation due to 'compelling circumstantial pressures.' If lack of cooperation results in
serious inconvenience or substantial harm, the sex is nonvoluntary; examples include
unemployment and being abandoned in an unfamiliar place. Bogart, supra note 327, at
18. One example of a court adopting a nonvoluntary approach is Commonwealth v.
Mlinarich, 542 A.2d 1335, 1335 (Pa. 1988).
Bogart, supra note 327, at 120.
BOK, supra note 50, at 20 (-They see that they were manipulated, that the deceit
made them unable to make choices for themselves according to the most adequate
information available, unable to act as they would have wanted to act had they known
all along."); Larson, Women Understand, supra note 24, at 414, 422.
See, e.g., Chamallas, supra note 17, at 783 ([F]eminists have contended that the
liberal notion of rights is inadequate to protect women against the coercive power exer-
cised by men in society."); Schulhofer, Feminist Challenge, supra note 8, at 2175-76
(discussing dominance approach of MacKinnon).
I Chamallas, supra note 17, at 796.
61" Chamallas, supra note 17, at 784.
611 West, supra note 499, at 1459.
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ii. The Materiality Approach
Commentator's second approach to determining whether con-
sent is legally effective, derived from criminal and civil fraud law, is
to focus on the nature of the misrepresentation, particularly its mate-
riality to the victim's decision-making process. Estrich, in her pro-
posal to criminally punish actors using fraud to obtain sexual inter-
course in the same manner as actors using fraud to obtain money,
describes the relevant category of fraud as "deceptions of material
fact."61'2 This approach would have three basic components: (1)
the misrepresentation must be material, (2) the victim's reliance
must be reasonable, 13 and (3) the actor must have intended to
mislead when making the misrepresentation. 14
Larson advocates the adoption in the civil arena of a modern
tort of sexual fraud, a modified version of an action for intentional
misrepresentation applied to lies told to induce sexual consent.615
Some of Larson's ideas supporting tort liability for achieving sexual
intercourse by fraud may be adapted to criminal law, although the
two systems obviously serve different functions. Larson's new tort of
sexual fraud provides:
One who fraudulently makes a representation of fact, opinion, intention,
or law, for the purpose of inducing another to consent to sexual relations
in reliance upon it, is subject to liability to the other in deceit for serious
physical, pecuniary, and emotional loss caused to the recipient by his or
her justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation." 6
This sexual fraud tort would require an intentional misrepresenta-
tion, (i.e., knowledge of falsity and calculated to mislead), mate-
612 Estrich, Rape, supra note 7, at 1182.
613 See also Feinberg, supra note 18, at 343 (discussing requirement that bluffing
warning be at least minimally credible).
614 With respect to the intent, one way of narrowing the class of behavior that might
fall within the purview of rape.by fraud is to insert a heightened intent requirement, for
example, the specific intent to cause the victim to submit through the use of fraud.
Kansas's rape statute prohibits two types of knowing misrepresentations. See supra notes
297-298 and accompanying text. Bok defines a lie as "an intentionally deceptive mes-
sage in the form of a statement." BOK, supra note 50, at 15. She distinguishes cases in
which the person intends to deceive the other person from those in which the person is
self-deceiving. Id.
615 Larson, Women Understand, supra note 24, at 453.
616 Larson, Women Understand, supra note 24, at 453.
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riality (i.e., whether a reasonable person would act on it),6 7 and
justifiable reliance (i.e., was it justified under the circumstances).
Chamallas, who is skeptical about whether the law is at a stage
of development where deception is generally regarded as an imper-
missible inducement to sex, comments: "Perhaps the principal im-
pediment to criminalizing rape by fraud is the desire to avoid the
difficult task of choosing which lies will be treated as material and
which will be dismissed as insignificant." 18 Chamallas appears to
favor a tort action like Larson's, although she worries such liability
might interfere with "the universal interest in ending unwanted
relationships."1 9 However, she adds: "This concern could be met
by limiting recovery to cases in which a plaintiff proves that the
defendant consciously misrepresented a material fact with the pur-
pose of inducing sex," 2' thereby adopting the major components
of Larson's proposed tort.
Several other scholars discuss an approach to rape by fraud
cases which strongly resembles the materiality approach. Dripps, in
proposing to treat cases of sex secured by fraud as theft of services,
emphasizes that most sexual relationships are complex and would
limit criminal liability to a narrow class of deception:
No single representation causes sexual cooperation; a host of causes are
in play. A prospective lover can be talented, beautiful, and rich, but still
somehow unacceptable. By contrast, the theft-of-services statutes only
punish representations made in bad faith when the representation is a
necessary and sufficient condition for obtaining the service.621
Dripps's approach requires a higher standard for the misrepresenta-
tion than Larson's but still focuses on the causal connection betwe-
en the statement and sexual relations.62 Feinberg also notes that
617 One torts treatise states: "Material . . . means not . . . decisive, but . . . given
[some] weight in the decision-making process.' JOHNSON, supra note 528, at 42. The
book asserts the gigolo may be able to maintain an action for battery under a mate-
riality theory because "[slurely, the gigolo's mistake . .. relates to those facts which
determine whether the liaison was offensive to him or whether he suffered mental ag-
gravation.' Id.
61C Chamallas, supra note 17, at 833 (footnote omitted).
619 Chamallas, supra note 17, at 835.
620 Chamallas, supra note 17, at 835.
621 Dripps, Beyond Rape, supra note 8, at 1803. Dripps is also concerned with the
slippery slope argument; he worries that the criminalization of rape by fraud would lead
inevitably to the "sweeping criminalization of sex, including, most prominently,
recriminalizing adultery.' Id. He adds that sexual fraud cases are premature until the
civil law enforces contracts for sexual services. Men, Women, and Rape, supra note
194, at 145 (remarks by Dripps).
62 Dripps' proposal seems only to make sense in the relatively rare cases in which
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one possible way of grading fraudulently induced beliefs is accord-
ing to their centrality to the victim's decision-making process.623
As discussed above, however, he prefers an alternate conceptual ap-
proach to ranking false beliefs. 24
The major critique of the materiality approach concerns its
feasibility. Subotnik, for instance, questions whether a sexual fraud
tort is really workable.625 Similarly, Posner discusses the difficulty
of litigating over false statements about feelings.626 He believes
that women should take self-protective measures against fraud by
potential sexual partners rather than punishing those who perpetrate
the fraud.
iii. Totality of the Circumstances628
In an article written more than twenty years ago, Harris argues
that the criminal law "has not yet developed a principled standard
of effective nonconsent in rape. " "' To fill this void, she suggests:
"Principles that should guide the current controversy over consent
in rape can be derived from an examination of policies that govern
the meaning of effective consent in other situations where one
person violates another's safety and freedom of choice."630 More
specifically, Harris proposes that courts look at the totality of the
circumstances in deciding whether the victim validly consented to
sexual intercourse.631 She likens this inquiry to that conducted in
search-and-seizure cases: "To best protect fourth amendment inter-
ests, courts require that effective consent be informed, specific to
the scope of the search, and uncontaminated by any physical or
the victim was a prostitute and offered her sexual services for sale, but not in other
noncommercial cases in which the woman's sexual integrity is impugned. See also Reed,
supra note 197 (suggesting the use of the crime of obtaining services by deception in
cases involving prostitutes in England).
62 Feinberg, supra note 18, at 341, asks whether mistaken belief is the whole rea-
son, a sufficient condition or critical element thereof, a necessary but insufficient reason,
or a mere consideration for consenting.
624 See supra notes 593-597 and accompanying text.
625 Subotnik, supra notes 433-438.
626 POSNER, supra note 487, at 393.
627 POSNER, supra note 487, at 393.
628 See also CAL PENAL CODE § 261(b) (West 1998) (duress for rape tested by the
totality of the circumstances).
629 Harris, supra note 12, at 613.
6 Harris, supra note 12, at 637.
631 Harris, supra note 12, at 645.
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1632mental coercion. Harris's proposal is also similar to theparadigm of informed consent used in medical treatment cases. 33
c. Legislative Enactments
State legislatures have approached the line-drawing problem in
criminalizing rape by fraud cases from several different angles,
providing a fertile field of alternative statutory solutions. First, some
states simply outlaw fraud in the context of certain professional rela-
tionships. Several medical-treatment statutes, for instance, explicitly
mention fraud or deceit, while others emphasize the unprofessional
or unethical nature of the conduct, arguably including fraudulent
practices. 34 Similarly, a number of states rely on the notions of
therapeutic deception or emotional dependence in psychotherapist-
patient provisions. 65 These enactments embody the legislative
judgment that fraud is totally inappropriate in certain alliances be-
tween vulnerable patients and those holding positions of trust.
636
Moreover, these statutes embody the corollary proposition that fraud
is generally more coercive in these contexts than outside them,
lending tacit support to Feinberg's and Schulhofer's emphasis on
coerciveness.
Second, some states specify a limited set of conditions involv-
ing fraud under which victim consent, as traditionally understood,
does not relieve the defendant of criminal sexual liability.6 37 In
addition to older provisions outlawing husband impersonation,
fraud as to the nature of the act, fraudulent administration of drugs,
or seduction, three states punish a form of sexual offense when the
victim concededly consented to the conduct. Alabama punishes
632 Harris, supra note 12, at 642. She does not favor looking at consent in terms of
duress.
63 See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 57 cmt. 9, illus. 2 (1977) (discussing
providing intercourse for counterfeit money); Schulhofer, Feminist Challenge, supra note
8, at 2181 (discussing consent in the context of medical procedure).
634 See supra notes 279-288 and accompanying text.
63 See supra notes 289-300 and accompanying text.
636 See also FAIRSTEIN, supra note 47, at 197 (arguing legislation particularly needed
when defendant serves professionally as victim's caretaker or in similar position of trust);
Larson, Women Understand, supra note 24, at 411 (concurring in her discussion of tort
liability for sexual fraud). But see Jeffrey A. Barker, Comment, Professional-Client Sex: Is
Criminal Liability an Appropriate Means of Enforcing Professional Responsibility?, 40
UCLA L. REv. 1275 (1993) (arguing against a broad application of criminal sanctions).
637 See supra notes 339-348 and accompanying text.
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sexual activity if consent is obtained by any fraud or artifice,38
California requires consent be induced by fear based on fraud,639
and Kansas requires consent be secured by the defendant's knowing
misrepresentations regarding necessity or authority.60
Each of these statutes represents a unique legislative judgment
about the effects of certain types of fraud on consent. The provi-
sions in California and Kansas, based largely on fraudulent coer-
cion, are similar to suggestions made by Feinberg and Schulhofer.
Kansas's knowing-misrepresentation standard also adopts the height-
ened intent requirement emphasized in the materiality approach.
Alabama's treatment of fraud in the sexual context as a misdemean-
or represents a more general judgment that fraud is a less serious
inducement than force. While these statutes are useful because they
describe the types of fraudulent misrepresentations that are so egreg-
ious as to render a defendant's conduct criminal in the face of con-
sent, they also cover only a limited range of scenarios. They repre-
sent a strategy that has characterized rape by
fraud-piecemeal solutions to a more global problem.
A third legislative approach is that adopted by Tennessee
which simply rewrote its rape and sexual battery statutes to include
instances in which sexual penetration or contact is accomplished by
fraud." The primary benefit of Tennessee's approach is that it de-
fines the offense broadly, not triggering the limitations inherent in
the other two approaches. However, the problem is ascertaining
what types of fraud make consent invalid. Although Tennessee's
courts have eschewed the factum-inducement distinction, 2 it re-
mains unclear how the state distinguishes effective and ineffective
consent in the fraud context. Further legislative guidance seems
preferable, perhaps in the guise of a nonexclusive list of the types of
misrepresentations that fall inside or outside (e.g., relating solely to
emotional ties or the intimacies of a romantic relationship) the
statute's purview.
Finally, some state legislatures have explicitly altered the con-
sent standard by including global consent provisions in their crimi-
63 See supra notes 336-338 and accompanying text.
" See supra notes 339-340 and accompanying text. But see Schulhofer, Sexual Au-
tonomy, supra note 9, at 93 n.136 (suggesting California's statute does not add much to
current rape doctrine).
o See supra notes 341-342 and accompanying text.
"' See supra notes 331-335 and accompanying text.
64 State v. Tizard, 897 S.W.2d 732, 740-42 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994).
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nal codes which state that consent is ineffective if obtained by
force, duress, or deception." These enactments are not tied to
particular status relationships or specific types of misrepresentations
but provide that deception is an illegitimate inducement across the
board. Moreover, because these consent provisions arguably apply
to all crimes, not simply sexual ones, they equalize the treatment of
deception in rape law with its treatment in other criminal contexts.
However, it remains unclear whether in practice states actually
apply these global consent provisions to sexual offenses. If they do
not apply them, then victims of sexual exploitation receive no pro-
tection. If they do, the problem is knowing what types of deception
make consent ineffective-the line-drawing problem again. Will
these statutes harken back, for instance, to the inducement-factum
distinction? The first step in developing these statutes may be to
insert language or commentary explicitly making them applicable to
sexual offenses. Second, further definition similar to Tennessee's
statute may be useful although case law may have already fleshed
out the contours of deception in nonsexual contexts for application
to rape cases.
d. Conclusion
Diversity of opinion continues to exist regarding the appropri-
ate parameters of legally effective consent in cases of rape by fraud.
In general, both commentators' suggestions and legislative enact-
ments are more expansive than the traditional factum-inducement
dichotomy and, thereby, offer greater protection to potential victims.
The current stream of legal thought is decidedly pointing in the
direction of a more thorough examination of the basis of victim con-
sent and the effect of defendants' fraud on the voluntariness of that
consent, rather than adherence to a formalistic distinction. What
Larson terms the "sex exception to fraud" may be slowly erod-
ing.644 This trend coincides with movements in the tort and con-
tract realms, where the emphasis seems to be shifting toward a
materiality standard. Within this larger intellectual movement lies a
smaller trend focusing on the coerciveness of fraud. This smaller
63 See supra notes 349-361 and accompanying text.
64 Larson, Women Understand, supra note 24, at 412 ('1 use the shorthand term 'sex
exception to fraud' when referring to the law's failure to protect the decision to have
sexual relations from coercion by fraud.").
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trend represents a logical starting point for expansion of rape law's
coverage because the emphasis on coerciveness resonates with the
traditional force element and cases involving coercion per se. A
greater challenge inheres in cases where the effect of fraud is not
strictly coercive but the denial of information critical (or material) to
the victim's decision-making process. The dividing line between
valid and invalid consent in rape by fraud cases merits continued
attention and development from judicial, legislative, and scholarly
quarters.
2. Coercion
Courts, legislatures, and commentators agree to a far greater
extent about the propriety of criminally punishing rape by coercion
than its fraudulent counterpart. This more robust agreement is likely
due to the greater similarity which exits between physical force or
threat of force, extreme forms of coercion, and the pressures encom-
passed by nonphysical coercion. Berger comments: "In general, the
notion of submission to threat not only finds a basis in current un-
derstandings of force but also invokes the types of concern for
sexual autonomy that are wholly absent when a man fraudulently
induces a woman to engage in sex."64 Moreover, coercion cases
bypass many of the highly charged problems that have plagued the
treatment of fraud in sexual contexts. Thus, Dripps, Schulhofer, and
Chamallas, all skeptical to some degree about punishing rape by
fraud,646 endorse outlawing some forms of coercive sexual
conduct.
"s Berger, supra note 8, at 77 (also arguing that woman who yields to sex for ad-
vancement suffers the same diminution in integrity whether or not man has lied, while a
victim of rape by coercion who yields because of intimidation has the right to feel
"degraded, not merely duped.").
6 See Chamallas, supra note 17, at 830 ('It is debatable whether the law is at a
point where deception is generally regarded as an impermissible inducement to sex. It
might be claimed that the current legal prohibitions against deception in sexual relation-
ships are exceptions to a more general rule that immunizes sexual encounters from
charges of fraud."); Dripps, Beyond Rape, supra note 8, at 1803 ("Applying criminal
fraud principles to representations made to initiate relationships more complex than one
of simple prostitution invites the sweeping criminalization of sex, including, most promi-
nently recriminalizing adultery. . . . I shall content myself with skepticism about the
desirability of doing so."); Schulhofer, Sexual Autonomy, supra note 9, at 92 (noting that
no clear social consensus exists about when misrepresentations in intimate sexual matters
are improper).
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This greater unanimity is further reflected in scholarly and
legislative proposals for distinguishing between legal and illegal
coercive pressures on consent in rape cases. The major line-drawing
problem in these cases is the one identified by the MPC: "[[]here
are obvious dangers in extending the prospect of criminal sanctions
into the shadow area between coercion and bargain. To take an
extreme example, the man who 'threatens' to withhold an expen-
sive present unless his girlfriend permits his advances is plainly not
a fit subject for punishment under the law of rape."647 According
to the MPC, coercion is overwhelming the victim's will, while a
bargain is merely offering "an unattractive choice to avoid some un-
wanted alternative."648 The same distinction arises in the case law.
In Commonwealth v. Mlinarich, 49 for instance, the court reasoned
that the defendant's step-daughter could choose between returning
to a juvenile detention facility or acceding to defendant's sexual
demands; therefore, her assent was not involuntary."" A second
source of dispute is whether coerced sexual contact should be
punished as a sexual offense or as nonsexual extortion or
coercion.
a. Commentators' Suggestions
i. Extortionate Threats
Estrich, one of the foremost proponents of the criminalization
of rape by coercion, argues that rape law should comprehend in-
stances in which the criminal actor secures sexual contact through
extortionate threats; more specifically, she proposes punishing sex
secured by extortion in the same manner as the law prohibits extor-
tion to obtain money-at least as a starting point."' Confronting
W47 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 cmt. at 312 (Proposed Official Draft 1962); see
also Berger, supra note 8, at 76 (opposing criminalizing situations in which victim does
not get bargained-for exchange).
'a MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 commentary at 314 (Proposed Official Draft 1962);
see also Feinberg, supra note 18, at 344 (using similar test); Chamallas, supra note 17,
at 820 ("When the [economic] pressure is regarded as unlawful, it is labeled coercion;
when it is lawful, it is likely to be called a bargain.' (footnote omitted)).
'A 542 A.2d 1335 (Pa. 1988).
's0 Id. at 1341. The court added: "Certainly difficult choices have a coercive effect
but the result is the product of the reason, albeit unpleasant and reluctantly made.' Id.
at 1342.
6' Estrich, Rape, supra note 7, at 1120 ("It is almost certainly impossible to expect
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the line-drawing question of whether rape law can effectively regu-
late sexual bargains, Estrich argues that the task is not impossible
because extortion law already prohibits a broad range of
threats." 2 Estrich also believes that the inclusion of coerced sex
under nonsexual criminal coercion statutes is a poor alternative to
expanding rape law's coverage because such other statutes do not
emphasize that the loss of bodily integrity is far more serious than
monetary loss.653
Dripps, as noted earlier, proposes treating sexual autonomy as
a commodity and its exploitation as analogous to theft.6 4 Al-
though Dripps suggests that "sexual autonomy means freedom from
illegitimate pressures" and that "[c]onsent is only the label we attach
to causes of conduct deemed legitimate,"55 he appears to posit
that the only illegitimate means worthy of criminal condemnation
are force (i.e., his crime of sexually motivated assault) and disre-
garding an expressed refusal or exploiting a victim's incapacity to
consent (i.e., his sexual expropriation offense).656 This conceptual-
ization offers little by way of expanding the reach of traditional rape
law.657 In response to Estrich's proposal to outlaw sexual inter-
course secured through extortionate threats, Dripps argues: "Extor-
tion can be covered simply by amending the extortion statutes to
include sex among the things it is criminal to obtain by unlawful
threat."" 8 Thus, Dripps, unlike Estrich, believes that nonsexual
crimes would adequately redress instances in which the defendant
coerced the victim's sexual submission; he makes no provision for
the unique harm endemic to sexual offenses.659
that the law could address all of the techniques of power and coercion which men use
against women in sexual relations.').
652 Estrich, Rape, supra note 7, at 1120.
's Estrich, Rape, supra note 7, at 1121.
64 Dripps, Beyond Rape, supra note 8; see also Donald A. Dripps, More on Distin-
guishing Sex, Sexual Expropriation, and Sexual Assault: A Reply to Professor West, 93
CAL L. REv. 1460 (1993). For critiques of Dripps's analysis, see West, supra note 499;
Men, Women, supra note 194, at 148-56 (remarks by West).
65 Dripps, Beyond Rape, supra note 8, at 1786-87; see also Coombe, supra note
513, at 80 ("Peller's point is that concepts of consent and coercion which are supposed
to be the source of legal interpretation are actually effects of the structure of legal repre-
sentation.").
6 6 Dripps, Beyond Rape, supra note 8, at 1807-08 (model statutes).
657 See also Schulhofer, Feminist Challenge, supra note 8, at 2178 (reaching same
conclusion about Dripps's proposal).658 Dripps, Beyond Rape, supra note 8, at 1802.
69 See also Feinberg, supra note 18, at 335 (discussing bluffing threats or extortionate
fraud).
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ii. Illegitimate Restraints on Sexual Autonomy
In contrast to Estrich's and Dripps's focus on extortionate
threats, several other scholars approach the coercion problem from
a more global perspective by suggesting that the appropriate divid-
ing line is between legitimate and illegitimate inducements or re-
straints on sexual autonomy. For example, West comments: "We
might very profitably ask not which sexual practices are consensual
or not, but rather which of our sexual practices are legitimate means
of obtaining sex and which are not."66 Even Dripps suggests: "In
the rape context, we must grade the pressures to have sex according
to their legitimacy-from those pressures to have sex that are per-
fectly moral, to those that are immoral but not criminal, to those
that are criminal, to those that constitute crimes of the most serious
sort."661 While this formulation is promising, it begs the question
of what are legitimate and illegitimate restraints?
Schulhofer and Chamallas have attempted to flesh out in great-
er detail what constitute illegitimate restraints. Schulhofer proposes
that the law should focus on women's autonomy which he defines
as "the right to protection from those interferences that our culture
and our legal system already consider impermissible."
662
Schulhofer's first premise is that consent for sexual intimacy requires
affirmative permission clearly signaled by words or conduct and that
silence or ambivalence are insufficient to qualify as consent.6
63
Second, he seeks to identify the kinds of interferences that violate
sexual autonomy in cases in which the victim agrees.6"' Thus, he
argues that an employer cannot legitimately trade a promotion for
sexual favors, but a man living with a woman may condition contin-
ued financial support of her on sexual intimacy because he is valid-
ly entitled to pursue sexual fulfillment.66 s In other words,
Schulhofer would criminally punish some sexual bargains based on
West, supra note 499, at 1459.
Dripps, Beyond Rape, supra note 8, at 1788.
6"2 Schulhofer, Feminist Challenge, supra note 8, at 2180. He also asserts that the
dominance approach articulated by Catharine A. MacKinnon and others does not solve
the problems in determining what conduct to punish as rape.
I Schulhofer, Feminist Challenge, supra note 8, at 2180-81.
Id. at 2182.
"I But see Roberts, supra note 8, at 381-386 (disagreeing with some of Schulhofer's
conclusions and arguing that "relying on autonomy replicates the problems I noted earli-
er of defining rape according to male entitlements to sexual access to women.' Id. at
384.).
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the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the pressure, rather than measuring
its effect on the victim. He adds: "This approach identifies a base-
line of existing rights, and it leaves room for the evolution in the
standards for valid consent."666
In another article, Schulhofer provides more detail about the
"kinds of pressures and constraints that intrude on autonomous
choice and render consent ineffective"667 by identifying four possi-
ble categories of illegitimate pressures. Three involve types of coer-
cion: extortionate behavior, institutional or professional authority,
and economic power; the fourth, deception, was discussed
earlier.66 Agreeing with Estrich and Dripps, Schulhofer asserts:
"[E]xtortionate behavior is already understood to be unprivileged
and illegitimate."669 He also argues that institutional and profes-
sional relationships should be protected from sexual exploitation, a
position consonant with the burgeoning group of abuse-of-trust and
abuse-of-authority statutes reviewed supra in Part II. With respect to
institutional authority and economic pressure, Schulhofer notes that
"coercion results from altering the [person's] ordinary range of op-
tions in a legally impermissible way."67 In total, Schulhofer pro-
vides the broadest, most well-developed categorization of coercive
pressures by exploring what it is that makes nonforcible conduct
excessively intrusive or coercive, without resort to concepts that are
hopelessly open-ended.671
Chamallas argues that criminal law should refurbish the notion
of consent in the context of sexual offenses.672 Rape law, instead
of simply relying on consent, should be based on a new, positive
ideal of mutual sexual conduct-"mutuality"-which is also capable
of separating moral from exploitative sex.673 She elaborates: "Un-
der the refurbished version of consent, consent is not considered
freely given if secured through physical force, economic pressure,
Schulhofer, Feminist Challenge, supra note 8, at 2184.
7 Schulhofer, Sexual Autonomy, supra note 9, at 77.
Schulhofer, Sexual Autonomy, supra note 9, at 77-93.
Schulhofer, Sexual Autonomy, supra note 9, at 79. Schulhofer argues that if one is
not permitted to obtain property by such behavior, then one should not be allowed to
obtain sexual acquiescence either.
670 Schulhofer, Sexual Autonomy, supra note 9, at 85.
671 Schulhofer, Sexual Autonomy, supra note 9, at 77.
672 Chamallas, supra note 17, at 814.
673 Chamallas defines mutuality as "whether the target would have initiated the en-
counter', but notes that this standard may be problematic in the criminal context.
Chamallas, supra note 17, at 836-37.
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or deception"-the "trio of unacceptable inducements."674 Chama-
Has's proposal resembles Schulhofer's because of its emphasis on
the unacceptability or illegitimacy of pressures causing sexual com-
pliance. It is also expansive because it conjoins force, economic
pressure (one type of coercion), and fraud (discussed above) as
factors invalidating consent. Chamallas notes that physical force is
always considered an illegitimate inducement to sexual intercourse,
an assertion that is clearly consistent with traditional rape doc-
trine.67 She argues that the case is less clear regarding economic
pressure because of the blurry line between coercion and bar-
gain,676 but adds, "I discern a trend here to regard economic pres-
sure as an unacceptable inducement to sex and to create a range of
legal sanctions to discourage economically coerced encounters,
even if such sex is not subject to direct criminal sanctions. "677 Al-
though Chamallas's discussion of unacceptable inducements is not
as well-developed as Schulhofer's, she agrees with his conclusion
that economic pressure is illegitimate.
b. Practical Reforms
State legislatures have adopted three general approaches to the
line-drawing problem in cases of rape by coercion. First, the most
common tack is to criminalize sexual intercourse between victims
and persons holding positions of trust or authority,678 mirroring
Schulhofer's suggestion to the same effect. Coercion is implicit in
the abuse-of-trust statutes based on the power inherent in profes-
sional authority; it is explicit in the abuse-of-authority provisions,
especially those requiring that the criminal defendant use the posi-
tion of authority to cause submission.. Addressing rape law's
nonconsent element, several enactments explicitly alter the defini-
tion of consent (although a few change the force requirement),
while others eliminate consent as a defense, e.g., psychotherapists
and prison guards provisions. Finally, some states specifically pro-
674 Chamallas, supra note 17, at 814. She adds: "This trio of unacceptable induce-
ments may not seem exceptional to anyone with a passing acquaintance with twentieth
century contract law.' Id. at 815.
'C chamallas, supra note 17, at 816.
676 Chamallas, supra note 17, at 820.
", Chamallas, supra note 17, at 830.
'= See supra notes 276-327 and accompanying text.
679 See supra notes 311-312 and accompanying text.
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hibit sexual extortion in employment. These statutes express a legis-
lative conclusion that coercion, in the form of a position of trust or
authority, is an illegitimate inducement to sexual relations regardless
of consent.
A second major approach adopted by several states is to outlaw
various forms of nonphysical coercion administered to accomplish
sexual intercourse.6"0 A number of states prohibit threats to retali-
ate, including extortion. Several jurisdictions provide for other types
of coercion, such as exposing the victim to public humiliation or
disgrace. Others, modeled after the MPC, do not specify the precise
nature of the threat, but employ a generalized standard such as ren-
dering "a person of reasonable firmness incapable of resisting."681'
These provisions beneficially supplement the abuse enactments by
transcending professional relationships and authoritative positions.
The third major approach involves a few jurisdictions that have
crafted special provisions addressing instances of sexual extortion or
sexual coercion. 682 Delaware, the only state with a sexual extor-
tion statute, covers a broad range of extortionate measures such as
exposing secrets or harming another in health, business, or repu-
tation. Hawaii's definition of compulsion includes property damage
and financial loss. New Jersey defines coercion for purposes of
sexual assault by reference to its criminal coercion statute, which
covers the same types of conduct as Delaware's statute. These three
statutory approaches, especially the third, are noteworthy not only
because they tacitly agree with Estrich's position but because they
reflect a normative judgment that sexual intercourse accomplished
by coercive pressure merits punishment as a sexual crime rather
than as nonsexual extortion or criminal coercion.
c. Conclusion
A remarkably strong isomorphic relationship exists between
scholarly suggestions and legislative enactments regarding the types
of coercive pressures that are legally problematic in securing con-
sent to sexual intercourse. This commonality of approach "rests on
the judgment that using one's ability to cause harm in order to
6o See supra notes 277-394 and accompanying text.
68 N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-04(1) (1997).
682 See supra notes 395-405 and accompanying text; see also State v. Lovely, 480
A.2d 847 (N.H. 1984) (interpreting state's sexual assault statute by referring to theft by
extortion statute).
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override the will of a reluctant female is wrongful and should be
punished."68 The best-developed area, especially in terms of stat-
utory enactments, is the abuse of professional or authoritative posi-
tions. The widespread criminal condemnation of this behavior is
further supported by civil statutes and disciplinary rules that prohibit
sexual abuse occurring in these contexts. Extortion or extortionate
threats are also well-represented in current enactments, either in
statutory variations based on the MPC language or in more specific
provisions like Delaware's sexual extortion law. The extortion stat-
utes provide a viable model of thinking about a comprehensive
array of nonphysical threats that would be illegal if used to obtain
property or money."' Finally, the least-developed area concerns
economic pressures or inducements, probably because they come
closest to the vexatious problem of sexual bargains or, even more
broadly, prostitution;... this facet of coercion and its effect on
consent warrants increased attention from academic and legislative
circles.
CONCLUSION
As we have become more civilized, we have come to condemn the more
overt, aggressive and outrageous behavior of some men towards women
and we have labelled it "rape". 6
Amid the flux of scholarly debate and practical reform, one thing is clear
The law of rape has not ceased and in all likelihood will not cease to
evolve. Nor, arguably, should it, for the law of rape, like any body of
law-perhaps more than other bodies of law-reflects changing social
attitudes and conditions, normative as well as material." 7
After more than a century, modern rape law stands on the
threshold of resolving the difficult conundrum posed by cases in-
volving rape by fraud and rape by coercion. This legal evolution
has awaited certain critical developments in judicial, legislative, and
scholarly thought. First, it has taken the gradual proliferation of
archetypical fraudulent treatment cases occurring in ever-broadening
683 MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 cmt. 312 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
"4 See supra notes 515-531 and accompanying text (discussing analogy between rape
and theft offenses).
"I See Chamallas, supra note 17, at 826-30 (discussing feminist view of prostitution
as extreme form of coerced sex).
People v. Evans, 379 N.Y.S.2d 912, 914 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975).
817 BURGESS-JACKSON, supra note 455, at 82 (footnote omitted).
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professional circles and husband impersonation scenarios spilling
over into assorted nonmarital contexts, as well as the steady accu-
mulation of new genres of fraudulent and coercive sex cases more
closely resembling commercial-like fraud, property-like offenses,
and authoritative abuse, to recognize the patterns of sexual preda-
tion inherent in these crimes. Second, state legislatures have had to
undergo two successive waves of rape reform before most were
willing to respond to repeated judicial invitations for reform and to
seriously confront the specter of criminalizing this conduct. Altering
the force and nonconsent elements of traditional rape law in inno-
vative ways, these legislative bodies have enacted five different stat-
utory solutions to the problems posed by cases of rape by fraud and
rape by coercion. Finally, it has required countless scholarly articles
and commentary addressing the historical, doctrinal, philosophical,
and political aspects of rape law and, more specifically, the function
of force and the meaning of consent in sexual offenses to augur
change in this area. Today, as a result of these synergistic develop-
ments, it would not be an overstatement to assert that the crucial
question is no longer whether to criminalize rape by fraud and rape
by coercion but rather when (or under what circumstances) to do
so. If, as one author argues,688 rape law developed into its tradi-
tional formula because of inordinate attention to rape by fraud
cases, these cases (and those involving coercion) currently provide
an opportunity to recalibrate the outer boundaries of acceptable
sexual conduct between members of our society.6 9 As the twenty-
first century approaches, the evolution of rape law to condemn
those persons who accomplish sexual intercourse by means of fraud
or coercion is long overdue.
Harris, supra note 12, at 628.
r" State ex reL. M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266, 1278 (N.J. 1992) ("Today the law of sexual
assault is indispensable to the system of legal rules that assures each of us the right to
decide who may touch our bodies, when, and under what circumstances.).
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